Kasi Viswanathan Chetty vs A.S.P.L.S. Somasundaram Chetty and Others

This Appeal is against an order refusing to set aside a sale in execution of a, money decree against the appellant first defendant and other

members of his family.

The lower Court was asked to set aside the sale on several grounds. Only one argument has been attempted here, that the sale is bad for want

of notice to appellant as required by Order XXI, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code. The necessary facts are that a decree passed on 8th August

1912 by the Chief Court of Lower Burma was transmitted to the Ramnad District Court in May 1914 and thence to the Ramnad Sub-Court. It

was returned to the Ramnad District Court; the application for execution there was treated as one for transfer to the lower Court, Sivaganga Sub-

Court, and the decree and execution petition, by a possibly lax procedure to which however no objection is taken at present, were transferred

accordingly. In the lower Court the present proceedings followed. It is admitted by the respondent that there was no notice of the proceedings in

the Lower Burma Chief Court, and no notice of other proceedings has been proved. The question is whether this renders them and in particular the

latest proceedings in the lower Court, invalid. Is there an illegality established or merely an irregularity? In the latter event the Appeal must fail,

because the lower Court has found in its judgment, paragraph 27, that the price realized was not inadequate and that finding against substantial loss

to the appellant has not been attacked.

An attempt has been made to argue that absence of notice can be justified with reference to Rule 22, Clause (1) proviso, because rateable

distribution was once allowed in the Ramnad Sub-Court by an order adverse to the appellant on 20th February 1916 and although that order was

set aside by the High Court, rateable distribution was again allowed by the Coimbatore District Court on 16th January 1917. But these adverse

orders are not within one year of the present application for execution contemplated by the proviso. For the present application (Execution Petition

Application No. 1100 of 1918) was presented on 12th November 1918. It was for sale after a previous application for sale had become

inoperative owing to the respondent''s failure to produce an. encumbrance certificate and had been dismissed, the attachment being maintained.

Much less are these orders within the one year, if on the view most favourable to the respondent, the date of presentation of the original application

for execution in the Ramnad District Court is taken as 9th April 1918.

Next it is suggested that the appellant''s objection to the absence of notice must be regarded as waived by him, because he was served with

notice of the settlement of sale proclamation in the present proceedings and did not appear and take objection, to the validity of those proceedings

up to that stage. We agree with the finding that there was service in accordance with Order V, Rule 17, on the appellant since the evidence is clear

that there was affixture, during his temporary absence on his house where his wife was living and we agree that this was rightly declared sufficient.

It may, however, be doubtful whether the argument based on a waiver can be sustained if illegality affecting the jurisdiction of the Court and not

irregularity is in question. We therefore have to decide between the two, which of them is established. That is the substantial issue before us.

The answer proposed by the respondent is that illegality is not established in view of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22, the contention being that that sub-

rule is applicable none the less, because the Court did not record its reasons for dispensing with, the issue of notice, the provision for such record

being directory not mandatory.

The appellant relies on authorities that notice is essential. Some of these the respondents distinguish on the ground that they relate to cases in

which notice is necessary not because of the lapse of one year since the passing of the decree and the last application for execution, but because

devolution of interest has occurred. That distinction, however, is negatived by the absence of anything in the rule to support it, the same language

being used as applicable to both classes of cases. The real ground of distinction, to be drawn seems to us to be between the cases under the

former Code and under this, there being nothing in the former Code corresponding -with Sub-rule (2) now under consideration. The cases

accordingly under the former Code to which we have been referred, Gopal Chunder Chatterjee v. Gunamoni Dasi I.L.R(1893) . Calc. 370,

Gurudas Biswas v. Bhowanipore Zamindary Co. Ltd. (1921) 25 C.W.N. 972 and Raghunath Dan v. Sundar Das Khetri (1915) I.L.R 42 Calc.

72 (P.C.), must be dismissed from consideration. In the cases decided, under the present Code in Shyam Mandal v. Satinath Banerjee ILR (1917)

Calc. 954, Ram Kinhar v. Sthiti Ram (1918) 27 C.L.J. 528, no mention, was made of the Sub-rule (2), and in Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Narayana

Aiyangar (1917) 40 I.C. 670, although it was mentioned, there was no full discussion of its implications. On the other hand Blanchenay v. Burt

(1813) 4 Q.B. 707, relied on by the respondent deals with English procedure in 1843 and is not of assistance. In Mahomed Meera Rowther v.

Kadir Meera Rowther (1914) M.W.N. 63, the Court at least doubted whether omission of the notice would be more than an irregularity with

reference to Sub-rule (2).

Turning to principle, there is good reason for holding that no illegality is in question when once, even conditionally, the issue of notice is made by

Sub-rule (2) discretionary. Notice may under Sub-rule (2) be omitted at the discretion of the Court. It may further be pointed out, with reference

to the application of the sub-rule for failure to record reasons, that such application is consistent only with the directory character of the provision

since it imposes a duty on the Court, which the party interested in its performance has no means of enforcing and as to the performance of which

he has indeed no means at the time of satisfying himself. We have been referred to other cases in the Indian authorities in which the Court is

required to record its reasons before using its powers. In Gopal Singh v. Jhakri Rai I.L.R(1886) . Calc. 37, its obligation to do so before admitting

evidence on appeal and in Kamal Kutty v. Udayavarma Raja, Valia Raja of Chirakkal ILR (1913) Mad. 275, a similar obligation before passing a

preliminary order u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code, are considered. In both these cases it was held that the omission to record reasons did not

deprive the Court of jurisdiction, the provision ot law being merely directory. Kanchan Mandar v. Kamala Prosad (1915) 29 I.C. 734, the

direction to record reasons before granting a review and in Yacoob v. Adamson ILR (1886) Calc. 273, the duty of the Presidency Magistrate to

give reasons before convicting are dealt with. In these two cases it was held that the omission invalidated the proceedings; but the language used

indicates that, if the matter had been considered on its merits and if the superior Court had been able to satisfy itself of the propriety of the lower

Court''s action the conclusion would have been different. In these circumstances we hold that the provision in Sub-rule (2) requiring the Court to

record its reasons is only directory, and that failure to issue a. notice in the present case was not necessarily fatal to the validity of the proceedings.

It would of course ordinarily be open to the appellant to ask us to consider the Court''s use of its discretion on its merits. But firstly there is, as

already observed, the finding of the lower Court that no substantial loss resulted against which nothing has been said, and secondly it is not difficult

with reference to the facts mentioned in paragraph 24 of the lower Court''s judgment, to infer the reasons on which it acted.

The result is that the Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.