Kasimuddi and others vs Queen-Empress

This is a rule calling upon the District Magistrate to show cause why the judgment of the Sessions Judge of Rungpur, dated the 13th of January 1896, should not be set aside, and the appeal readmitted and re-heard by him, on the ground that his judgment does not comply with the provisions of the law. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the judgment of the Sessions Judge does not comply with the provisions of sec. 367, read with sec. 424, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the judgment should therefore be set aside, and the case sent back to the learned Sessions Judge for a re-hearing; and in support of this contention he relies upon the cases of In re Shivappa ILR 15, Bom. 11 and Farkan v. Shomsher Mahomed. ILR 22, Cal. 241.

Having regard to the nature of the judgment complained of, we think the contention is not valid. In the Bombay case cited, Birdwood, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, observed, "The District Magistrate, in dealing with the appeal before him, has failed to comply with the provisions of secs. 367 and 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and from his judgment, as it stands, we are unable to say that he has duly considered the evidence in the case." And in the Calcutta case it was observed that the judgment there complained of did not, as sec. 367 read with sec. 424 requires, contain the point or points for determination, nor did it contain any explicit statement of the reasons for the decision on each point or points. The judgment there in fact was one in the nature of a stereotyped judgment which might answer for any case. Nor can the same thing be said of the judgment in the present case? Clearly not. Here, though the judgment is not a long and elaborate one, it affords a clear indication that the learned Sessions Judge considered the evidence, and duly considered it too. For he observes that he cannot put much reliance upon certain of the witnesses examined. Then he observes with reference to an argument based upon the fact of one Jalad''s house having been attacked, to show that the real occurrence was there, that the argument only suggests that the two houses were attacked one after the other. And finally he observes that after analysing and tabulating the evidence, there was room for doubt in regard to the guilt of two of the accused persons, and he accordingly set aside the conviction as against them. All these circumstances, go, in our opinion, clearly to indicate that the learned Judge has duly considered the evidence, and that the judgment is not open to the exception taken. The result is that this rule will be discharged and the conviction and sentence affirmed.