Kattamanchi Krishna Reddi vs Thota Ramakrishnayya Chetty alias Ramakrishnan, by his Agent Gangojamma

Ramesam, J.—In this appeal, the 2nd defendant is the appellant and the plaintiff, the respondent. The suit was filed to declare the sale of the

Shrotriem village of Vasudevapuram in May, 1911, for arrears of revenue, void on the ground that it was made during plaintiff''s minority and

therefore opposed to Regulation X of 1831.

The plaintiff alleged that the village originally belonged to the plaintiff''s family as joint family property and that it fell to plaintiff''s father''s share in

a partition. When the father died in 1905, the plaintiff became sole owner. The 2nd defendant admitted that the village belonged to the joint family

consisting of plaintiff''s father and others but denied the partition and that the plaintiff became the sole owner in 1905. The first issue was framed

with reference to this plea.

In appeal, he wishes to argue that the property did not belong exclusively to plaintiff''s family. According to his present suggestion, the plaintiff''s

family owned only 3 14ths share in the village and the appellant filed new documents to substantiate his plea.'' Having regard to his admission in the

written statement, we do not think this plea should be allowed to be raised at this stage. We say nothing on the merits of this plea.

The partition must be found to be true as plaintiff''s first witness, whom we see no reason to disbelieve, proves it.

The next point argued is that the sale is not void. The argument consists of two parts (1) That Regulation X of 1831 does not apply. (2) The

operation of the Regulation is partly cut down by Section 63 of Act II of 1864.

Taking up the first point, the appellant''s contention is that Section 2 of the Regulation applies only to cases where the minor owner obtained the

property by '' regular course of inheritance'' and this does not include cases of survivorship in a joint family. In the present case, the village was not

plaintiff''s father''s self-acquisition.

I think Section 2 itself throws some light on the words '' regular course of inheritance.'' The word '' accession '' occurring at the end of the

section seems to have been used in the same sense as '' inheritance.'' This is not an unnatural use of the word vide '' inherit, inheritance '' and ''

inheritor '' in Stroud''s Judicial Dictionarf and my judgment in T.S. Sivarama Aiyar and Others Vs. T.S. Gopalakrishna Chettiar (dead) and Others,

referring to Watkins v. Frederick 11 HLC 358.

The word '' inheritance '' occurs in Regulation IV of 1822 (preamble), Regulation V of 1804 (Section 3), and Regulation III of 1802 (Section

16) and it is difficult to hold in these instances that '' inheritance '' does not include '' the taking of property of survivorship.'' I think it is a fair

inference that in Section 2 of Regulation X of 1831, the word is used in the same general sense.

It is next contended that Section 63 of Act II of 1864 saves the operation of Regulation X of 1831 only in respect of minor landholders. In the

present case, the village was not registered in the name of plaintiff''s father or plaintiff and the plaintiff is not a minor landholder. But the words in

the sentence are '' minors and other disqualified landholders.'' The word '' minors '' includes registered and unregistered owners and this may be the

reason why the word '' other '' is used with reference to disqualified landholders. No doubt the results would have been the same even if the word

''other'' is omitted; but the two parts of the phrase would have been overlapping. We have not got '' minor and other '' but '' minors '' and we do

not see any reason to cut down the natural meaning of the words as they stand. It seems to me that the object of the words beginning with '' in

respect of '' was to compendiously refer to the subject-matter of Regulations V of 1804 and X of 1831 so far as it was pertinent.

In Saminatha Aiyar Vs. Govindasami Padayachi and Others, the Regulation was applied to a minor whose name was not registered. It is true

that the ground of the decision was that the Government ought to find out the correct heir of the deceased person and the responsible officer

should enter his name in the proper register. Whatever the ground may be, it must be conceded that the decree is inconsistent with the appellant''s

contention based on Section 63 of the Revenue Recovery Act. In Sangapally Lakshmayya v. Intoory Bolla Reddy ILR (1902) M 385 : 13 MLJ

139, it is not clear whether the 1st defendant''s name was registered or not. I am, therefore, of opinion that Regulation X of 1831 applies to all

minor owners of property whether registered or not.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Reilly, J.

I agree that the appeal must be dismissed. Plaintiff succeeded before the District Judge on the ground that the sale was held while he was a

minor for arrears which accrued after his accession to the property and was therefore in contravention of Regulation X of 1831. For defendant 2,

the transferee of the auction-purchaser, it is contended that after the enactment of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the special protection

given to minors by Regulation X of 1831 was preserved only by Section 63 of the Act and that in that section the word "" minors "" includes only

minor landholders and plaintiff is not a landholder within the meaning of the Act, never having been registered as such. I agree with Mr.

Srinivasagopalachari, who appears for plaintiff, that "" minors "" in the phrase "" minors and other disqualified landholders "" in Section 63 cannot be

treated as equivalent to "" minors and other disqualified landholders "" so as to make the word "" minors "" mean "" minor landholders."" The effect of

Section 63 in my opinion is to leave the special rights conferred on minors by Regulation X of 1831, whether they are technically landholders or

not, unaffected by the Act.

We have therefore to see whether plaintiff comes within the protection of Regulation X of 1863. It is admitted that his right to the property in

question is that of the last surviving member of the joint family of his father and himself. Can it be said within the words of the Regulation that the

property "" descended to him by the regular course of inheritance""? Strictly those words are far from appropriate to property taken by survivorship,

which has not really descended to plaintiff and to which he is not heir. But I agree with my learned brother that it is probable that in 1831, when the

true incidents of survivorship were less clearly recognised than now, those who enacted Regulation X of 1831 intended the words quoted to

include property taken by survivorship by a minor who was the last surviving member of a joint-family. The property of such a minor would need

protection no less than that of a minor who took as heir. Moreover, the use of the word "" accession "" at the end of the sentence points to

something not confined strictly to inheritance by an heir being intended. f agree that the sale was in contravention of the Regulation and that the

appeal must be dismissed with costs.