Kaushalya Devi (Deceased) Through Her Lrs Dinesh Shandil & Others vs Benu Garg And Others

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 06.08.2007 passed by learned District Judge Shimla (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 17.06.2006 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.3, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a declaration that Power of Attorney stated to have been executed by her on 17.04.1984 in favour of defendant No.2 is a fraudulent document which has been obtained by practicing fraud, misrepresentation and deceit, the sale deed dated 02.12.1988 executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No. 1 on plaintiff's behalf is illegal, null and void regarding the suit land mentioned in the plaint and that the plaintiff is the co-owner in possession of Khasra No. 1344/696 measuring 3-10 bighas of land. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and restraining the defendant No.2 from acting upon the Special Power of Attorney dated 17.04.1984 were also sought. It was asserted that the plaintiff is a woman who has been deserted by her husband. Defendant No.2 is an influential businessman, and his elder brother, Yashpal Garg, had purchased the land from the plaintiff's husband. Defendant No.2, his brother and other family members constructed a hotel known as Asia the Dawn. Yashpal Garg, brother of defendant No.2, approached the plaintiff in the year 1983 for purchasing the land, and the plaintiff sold the land to him on 02.12.1985. Defendant No.2 and his brother, Yashpal Garg, approached the plaintiff and told her that her signature was required on certain papers to get the mutation attested in their favour. The plaintiff put her signature on the blank papers at the instance of defendant No.2 and his brother. Defendant No.2 sold the land to his wife, defendant No.1, for a sale consideration of ₹35,000/-. The plaintiff made enquiries and found that the sale was made on the basis of a Power of Attorney dated 17.04.1984, stated to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.2. The plaintiff never visited the office of the Sub-Registrar, Shimla. She did not purchase the stamp papers for the execution of the Special Power of Attorney. Plaintiff does not know a word of English, and the document has been written in English. The Special Power of Attorney mentions that the plaintiff was identified by Surinder Kumar, whereas the plaintiff does not know any Surinder Kumar. The plaintiff had also not received any money from defendant No.2. The sale deed violates the provisions of Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act because defendant No.1 is not an agriculturist. The defendants threatened to dispossess the plaintiff of the suit land. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above.

The suit was opposed by defendants No.1 and 2 by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and jurisdiction, the suit being barred by limitation, and the plaint having not been properly verified as per the law. The defendants admitted that Yashpal Garg had purchased the land from the plaintiff. They denied the rest of the plaintiff's claim. They specifically denied that they had approached the plaintiff for getting her signatures for attesting the mutation or obtaining her signatures on the blank papers. They asserted that the plaintiff appointed defendant No.2 as her Power of Attorney in respect of the suit land. Plaintiff knew that she had sold the suit land to defendant No.1 through defendant No.2. The Special Power of Attorney was executed and registered by the plaintiff with the Sub-Registrar. The value of the property has increased, and the plaintiff filed a false civil suit to grab the land. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.

Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 also filed a separate written statement taking preliminary objection regarding the suit being bad for want of notice under Section 80 of CPC, lack of cause of action and locus standi, and the suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The contents of the plaint were admitted regarding the registration of the sale deed and the Special Power of Attorney. It was asserted that the plaintiff was present in the office and was identified by one Surinder Kumar Sharma. She executed a Special Power of Attorney voluntarily. The suit has been filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.

The following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court on 29.05.2003:

Whether the Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff on 17.04.1984, in favour of defendant No.2, is a result of fraud and the same has been obtained by defendant No.2 from her by practicing of misrepresentation and deceit, as alleged? OPP.

Whether the sale deed dated 01.12.1988 executed by defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1 on behalf of the plaintiff by way of Power of Attorney dated 17.04.1984, is illegal, null and void ab initio in respect of the Khasra No. 1563/1344/696 measuring 0-17 Bighas, that i.e., 693.34 square meter, as alleged? OPP

Whether the plaintiff is a co-owner in possession of the Khasra No. 1344/696 land measuring 3-10 Bighas, as alleged? OPP

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of a permanent perpetual prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the ownership and possessory rights in respect of the suit land, i.e., Khasra No. 1563/1344/696 measuring 0-17 Bighas, and Khasra No. 1344/696 measuring 3 Bighas 10 Biswas, as alleged? OPP

Whether the suit is not competent and maintainable? OPD

Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD

Whether the suit is not properly verified in accordance with the law? OPD

Whether the court has no jurisdiction to try and determine the present suit? OPD

Whether the suit is bad for non-compliance of the notice under Section 80 CPC? OPD

Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD

Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD

Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of a necessary party? OPD.

Relief.

The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiff examined Maan Singh (PW1), Chander Hans Parmar (PW2), Hardyal (PW3), herself (PW4) and Jagdish Kumar (PW5). Defendants No.1 and 2 examined defendant No.2 (DW1/1&2), Pawan Sharma (DW2/1&2) and Kuldeep Bansal (DW3/1&2), and defendant No.3 examined Pawan Sharma (DW1/3).

The learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff had executed a Special Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.2 in her sound disposing state of mind. Defendant No.2 executed a valid sale deed in favour of Defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 was put in possession of the suit land after the sale deed, and the plaintiff had no right over the suit land. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issue Nos. 5, 10 and 11 in the affirmative, the rest of the issues in the negative and dismissed the suit.

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned District Judge Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the plaintiff had executed a Special Power of Attorney in her sound disposing state of mind. Defendant No.2 had executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No.1. The Special Power of Attorney was executed before the execution of the sale, and the plea taken by the plaintiff that her signatures were obtained on the pretext that mutation of the sale deed was to be attested was falsified by this fact. There is no infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, the appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law vide order dated 24.09.2008: -

Whether the Power of Attorney (Ext.DW3/1/A) allegedly executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.2 is illegal and invalid, having been procured by him fraudulently, and the same is not binding on the appellant.

I have heard Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr Sumeet Goel, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Vivek Negi, learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2(a) and 2(c) and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No.3 and 4.

Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in dismissing the suit. Defendant No.1 did not step into the witness box, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against her. There was no proof of the payment of consideration to the plaintiff, and a sale deed without consideration is void. The plaintiff was deserted by her husband, and the protection of a pardanashin lady was available to her. The burden shifted upon the defendants to prove the due execution of the Special Power of Attorney and that the plaintiff had independent advice at the time of execution of the Special Power of Attorney. The defendants did not lead the evidence to this effect. The learned Courts below erred in shifting the burden of proof upon the plaintiff, which vitiated their judgments and decrees. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions.

i) Kamlesh Rani v. Balwant Singh, 2010 SCC OnLine HP 2844;

ii) S. Kesari Hanuman Goud v. Anjum Jehan, (2013) 12 SCC 64;

iii) Iqbal Basith v. N. Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718;

iv) Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 206;

v) Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, (1972) 4 SCC 562;

vi) LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491;

vii) Niko Devi v. Kirpa, 1988 SCC OnLine HP 11;

viii) Krishna Mohan Kul v. Pratima Maity, (2004) 9 SCC 468;

ix) Mallo v. Bakhtawari, 1984 SCC OnLine All 866 and;

x) Kewal Krishan v. Rajesh Kumar, (2022) 18 SCC 489 and

xi) Shanti Devi vs. Jagan Nath, Civil Appeal No. 11795 of 2025, decided on 12.09.2025.

Mr Suneet Goel, learned Senior Counsel for respondents No.1, 2(a) to 2(c), submitted that the plaintiff had executed sale deeds in favour of various persons. She was aware of the nature of the documents being executed by her. She cannot claim the protection available to a pardanashin lady. She was openly dealing with the whole world and was not a pardanashin lady. The burden was upon her to prove that defendant No.2 had practised fraud upon her. There is no satisfactory evidence in support of his plea. Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held against the plaintiff. This is a pure finding of fact and should not be interfered with while deciding the regular second appeal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.P. Puttaswamy versus Thimamma and others (2020) 13 SCC 125 in support of his submission.

Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No.3 and 4, submitted that defendant No.3, being a public official, had discharged his duties faithfully. The plaintiff had appeared before the Sub-Registrar and acknowledged the execution of the Special Power of Attorney. There is a presumption regarding the regularity of the acts done by the public official in the discharge of his official duties. The learned courts below rightly held that the plaintiff had executed a Power of Attorney in her sound disposing state of mind. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

Substantial Question of Law:

The plaintiff Kaushalya Devi (PW4) admitted in her cross-examination that she had executed a sale deed in favour of Yashpal Garg, Sheela Rani and her daughters. She used to visit Patwari because the people used to visit her to purchase her land. These admissions show that the plaintiff is not a rural rustic woman who is not aware of worldly affairs. She had sold the lands and executed the sale deeds. Therefore, she was aware of the registration procedure, and, the submission that the plaintiff is in the position of a pardanashin lady cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the judicial committee of the Privy Council in Ismail Mussajee Mookerdum v. Hafiz Boo, 1906 SCC OnLine PC 4, that the benefit of a pardanashin lady is not available to a woman who goes to the Court and interacts with the world. It was observed:

"Khaja Boo was a very old woman, with the natural infirmities incident to her age. She was not of unsound mind or unable to attend to business. She is spoken of as pardanishin, but she had no objection to communicate, when necessary, in matters of business, with men other than members of her own family, and to some extent she did so. She was able to go to Court and give evidence in her litigation against her son, and she was able to attend at the registrar's office in person to acknowledge her deeds for the purpose of registration."

Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim the protection available to a pardanashin lady, and the judgments in Krishna Mohan Kul (supra), Ningawwa (supra), Niko Devi (supra) and Mallo (supra) do not apply to the present case.

The plaintiff asserted that defendant No.2 and his brother visited her house and obtained her signature on the blank papers by saying that her signature was required for getting the mutation attested. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 916, that the burden of establishing that transactions were not genuine rested upon the appellant, and mere allegation of fraud or misuse of fiduciary relationships was not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence. It was observed:

"45. The burden of establishing that the transactions were not genuine sale transactions, but merely security arrangements for loans, rested upon the appellant, and mere allegations of fraud or misuse of fiduciary position are not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Subhra Mukerjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (2000) 3 SCC 312, to contend that where fraud and fiduciary misuse are alleged, the beneficiaries of the transactions must establish their bona fides. The principle laid down therein is well settled. However, before the burden can shift upon the respondents, the appellant was required to first establish foundational facts constituting fraud or fiduciary misuse. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the initial burden continued to remain upon the appellant."

The plaintiff asserted in her examination-in-chief that she does not know Vinod Kumar Garg, defendant No.2; however, she had seen him. This statement makes her testimony highly doubtful. If she did not know defendant No.2 and had no means of verifying that he was the brother of Yashpal Garg, she would not have put her signature on a blank paper on his asking.

It is impossible to believe that a person would put his/her signatures on the blank paper at the request of a person who was only seen and was not acquainted.

The plaintiff asserted that Yashpal Garg sent defendant No.2, who said that her signatures were required for getting the revenue entry mutated in his favour. She put her signature on the blank papers. She stated in her cross-examination that the mutation of the land sold by her was attested in favour of Yashpal Garg. She did not say that the mutation was attested based on the signatures put by her. As per her version, the papers signed by her were used to forge her Special Power of Attorney. She has not explained how the mutation was attested in her absence or without her signature if her signature was required for attestation of mutation. Hence, her version that her signature was required for attesting the mutation is made doubtful.

The plaintiff claimed that she did not know how to read and write English. However, she has executed a cancellation of Power of Attorney (Ext.PW1/A), in English. The fact that she had executed a cancellation deed in English shows that she used to execute the documents in English, and the plea taken by her that she was not aware of English and the Special Power of Attorney executed in favour of defendant No.2 is bad cannot be accepted.

The Special Power of Attorney (Ext.DW3/1/A) is a registered document. Pawan Sharma (DW3/1) proved that this document was pasted in book No.4, Volume No. 65 at Sl.No. 73 dated 17.04.1984. Kuldeep Bansal (DW-3/1 & 2) stated that Kaushalya Devi had visited the Tehsil Office on the date of execution of her Special Power of Attorney. She had put her signature, and thereafter, he had put his signature on the Special Power of Attorney. He stated in his cross-examination that the Special Power of Attorney was executed in the year 1984. Kaushalya Devi and another witness had put their signatures on the Special Power of Attorney. The Special Power of Attorney was executed regarding the sale/purchase of the land. He, defendant No.1, defendant No.2, plaintiff and the witnesses had appeared before the Sub- Registrar.

Section 60(2) of the Registration Act provides that a certificate signed, sealed and dated by the Registering Officer shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by this Act and the facts mentioned in the endorsement referred to in Section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned. Therefore, there is a presumption attached to the registered document that it was validly registered and its contents were read over and explained to the executant, who admitted them to be correct. It was laid down by this Court in Kripa Ram vs. Smt. Maina 2002(2) Shim. L.C. 213, that there is a presumption regarding the correctness of the endorsement made on the registered documents. It was observed:

Section 60 of the Registration Act specifically provides that the certificate endorsed on the document, registered by the Registrar, shall not only be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided under the Act, but also that the facts mentioned in the document referred to in Section 59 have taken place as mentioned therein. It is now settled that the presumption of due execution of a document arises from the endorsement of the Sub Registrar under Section 60 of the Act. As far back as in 1928 Privy Council in Sennimalai Goundan and another v. Sellappa Goundan and others, AIR 1929 Privy Council 81, interpreting the provisions of Section 60(2) read with Section 115 of the Evidence Act held that where a person admits execution before the Registrar after the document has been explained to him, it cannot subsequently be accepted that he was ignorant of the nature of the transaction. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that his father and brothers, with the intention of defrauding the plaintiff of his legitimate share in the family properties, entered into a fraudulent collusive partition. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff's case was proved, and it decreed the suit. In the appeal, it was held that the plaintiff failed to make out the alleged fraud and allowed the appeal. The decree of the Trial Court was set aside. The Subordinate Judge had found that the partition was unequal because the land allotted to the plaintiff was less than that allotted to the other brothers. It was found that contemporaneously with the partition, some land that fell into the share of plaintiff Karuppa were conveyed to his second wife, Nachakkal, by a registered sale deed. Nachakkal gave evidence that the transaction was bogus, as she never paid the consideration for the sale, though she admitted the execution of the sale deed before the Registrar. Her story that she was ignorant of the nature of the transaction, it was held, cannot be accepted as she had admitted the execution of the sale deed before the Registrar.

A Division Bench of this Court, Kanwarani Madna Vati and another v. Raghunath Singh and others, AIR 1976 HP4I, interpreting the provisions of Section 62 of the Registration Act, held that there is a presumption of correctness of the document if its execution is admitted before the Registrar. The Division Bench in para 20 observed:

"Under Section 60(2) of the Registration Act, the certificate given by the registering officer shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by this Act and that the facts mentioned in Section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned. Therefore, there is a presumption that attaches to the correctness of the endorsements made on the document by the Registering Officer. These endorsements show the presentation of the document personally by Smt. Madna Vati for registration. She was identified by Kr. Jowala Singh and her signatures were also obtained by the Registering Officer on both the endorsements, i.e., the endorsement of the presentation and that of admitting the contents of the documents and the receipt of the consideration by her. In order to rebut this, it was necessary for defendant No.2 to have produced the Sub Registrar. She did not produce him in the witness box. Therefore, the presumption of correctness shall become conclusive."

In the present case, as noticed earlier, there is an endorsement of the Sub Registrar to the effect that the contents were read over and explained to the vendor-plaintiff, Maina Devi and, therefore, the presumption is that the contents of the sale deed were read over and explained to her. The Sub Registrar (DW3) himself is categorical in his evidence that the contents of the sale deed were read over to Maina Devi. He duly proved the endorsements. Therefore, in the circumstances, the learned first Appellate Court was not right while reversing the findings of the Trial Court on the grounds that the contents of the sale deed were not read over or explained to the plaintiff.

A Single Judge of this Court in Rewat Ram Sharma v. Munshi Ram (RSA No.242 of 1994) decided on December 13, 2001, relying upon Kanwarani Madya Vati, Sennimalai Goundan (supra) and Dinesh Chandra Guha v. Satchindannanda Mukherji, AIR 1972 Orissa235, held that admission of signatures on the endorsement made by the Registrar by an executant of the document in the absence of anything else to the contrary, would lead to the inference that the plaintiff was present before the Sub Registrar when the document was presented for registration and the onus to rebut the presumption under Section 60(2) the Registration Act was heavily on the plaintiff which the plaintiff did not discharge. In that case, the plaintiff's case of the plaintiff was that he had borrowed some money from the defendant and had agreed to mortgage his property in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff was taken to the Tehsil Headquarters for the purpose of executing the mortgage deed. His signatures were obtained by the defendant by making him believe that it was a mortgage deed, and later on, the defendant proclaimed that the property had been gifted to the defendant, and the plaintiff realised that, instead of the mortgage deed, a gift deed was executed from him fraudulently by the defendant. He repudiated the gift deed and filed a suit that the gift deed was a result of misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence on the part of the defendant. It is in this context that the Court held that Section 60(2) of the Evidence Act raises a presumption as to the correctness of the endorsement made on the document by the Registering Officer."

A similar view was taken in Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 936, wherein it was observed at page 321:

To appreciate the findings arrived at by the courts below, we must first see on whom the onus of proof lies. The record reveals that the disputed documents are registered. We are, therefore, guided by the settled legal principle that a document is presumed to be genuine if the same is registered, as held by this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal [Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353]. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as below : (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27)

"27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption." (emphasis supplied)

In view thereof, in the present cases, the initial onus was on the plaintiff, who had challenged the stated registered document.

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The trial court had justly placed the initial burden of proof upon the plaintiff, as it was her case that the subject documents were forged or a product of fraud and more so because the documents bore her signature. The first appellate court did not elaborate on that aspect. Even assuming that the burden had shifted upon the defendants, the witness identifying the signatures of the dead attesting witness was examined by the defendants. Therefore, the documents stood proved, and the burden was duly discharged by the defendants."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Hemalatha (D) v. Tukaram (D), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 106 that a registered deed carries with it a formidable presumption of validity and the Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered document as a sham. It was observed:

"COURTS SHOULD NOT CASUALLY DECLARE A REGISTERED DEED A 'SHAM', AS REGISTRATION CREATES A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY & GENUINENESS

It is a settled position of law that a registered Sale Deed carries with it a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is not a mere procedural formality but a solemn act that imparts a high degree of sanctity to the document. Consequently, a Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered instrument as a "sham". Adopting the principles enunciated in Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353 (27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption......"), Jamila Begum (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through Lrs., (2019) 2 SCC 727 ("16. The sale deed dated 21-12-1970 in favour of Jamila Begum is a registered document, and the registration of the sale deed reinforces the valid execution of the sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law...."), and Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300("33. To appreciate the findings arrived at by the courts below, we must first see on whom the onus of proof lies. The record reveals that the disputed documents are registered. We are, therefore, guided by the settled legal principle that a document is presumed to be genuine if the same is registered..."), this Court reiterates that the burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger. Such a challenge can only be sustained if the party provides material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title.

The grounds typically accepted to challenge a registered Deed at the instance of the vendee/executant are fraud or want of capacity in any party or mistake of fact or fundamental illegality like where the Deed was executed under deceit or sold by a fraudster who did not own the land or where the Deed was executed without consideration, namely, if no money or value was actually exchanged despite recitals in the Deeds or where there was coercion or intimidation like where the seller was forced to sign without free consent.

While the aforementioned grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive, this Court must caution against the growing tendency to challenge registered instruments 'at the drop of a hat'. If the sanctity of registered documents is diluted, it would erode public confidence in property transactions and jeopardise the security of titles. In a society governed by the Rule of Law, registered documents must inspire certainty; they cannot be rendered precarious by frivolous litigation."

Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly shifted the burden upon the plaintiff.

The evidence of the plaintiff is not satisfactory, as noted above. She examined the public officials to prove that the record and their testimonies do not show that the Special Power of Attorney was executed fraudulently. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the Power of Attorney executed in favour of defendant No.2 was legal.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that defendant No.1 did not step into the witness box to prove the sale deed in her favour, and an adverse inference should be drawn against her. He also submitted that the sale deed without consideration is not a sale deed. These questions do not arise in the present case because the primary burden to prove that the plaintiff had not executed the Special Power of Attorney was upon the plaintiff, and she has failed to discharge it. The sale deed was executed based on a Special Power of Attorney. The Special Power of Attorney specifically stated that he had received the sale consideration and handed it over to the plaintiff. Therefore, it is not the case where no sale consideration had passed between the parties, and, the judgments cited on behalf of the appellant in Kamlesh Rani (supra), S. Kesari Hanuman Goud (supra), Iqbal Basith (supra), Sait Tarajee Khimchand (supra), Ram Pal Singh Bisen (supra) and Kewal Krishan (supra) do not apply to the present case.

It was held in LIC (supra) that the mere exhibition of a document does not dispense with its proof. The Special Power of Attorney was proved by examining the witness. Shanti Devi (supra) and H.P. Puttaswamy (supra) deal with the requirements of the Sale Deed, which is only disputed on the ground of lack of competence. Hence, cited judgments do no apply to the facts of the present case.

Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the Special Power of Attorney was executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.2, which is binding upon her and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

Final Order:

In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed

Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.

Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith.