K.C. Estates Private Limited vs State of Punjab

V.K. Bali, J.—K.C. Estates Private Limited, a body incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, through present petition filed by it under Article 226, through present petition filed by it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeks issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari so as to quash notification dated June 19, 1996 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as also follow up declaration issued under Section 6 of the said Act on May 13, 1987.

Brief facts of the case as projected in the petition, reveal that there was a proposal to acquire land which remained under consideration of the State Government during the year 198283. However, notification under Section 4 of the Act came into being on November 30, 1992 and followup declaration under Section 6 was issued on October 13, 1993. These notifications lapsed as award was not given within the prescribed period. Consequently, fresh notification under Section 4 came to be issued on June 20, 1996. Followup declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on May 13, 1997. Public notice of the substance of notification under Section 4 of the Act was given in the locality on July 1, 1996. Petitioner filed its objections under Section 5A of the Act on July 18, 1996. List of witnesses and documents to be relied upon by the petitioner were submitted on September 12, 1996 but the case of the petitioner was never fixed for entertaining the objections nor any date was given to it to produce the evidence nor even personal hearing was given to it. Constrained, petitioner filed written arguments on September 17, 1996 and supplements the same on September 30, 1996. It is the case of the petitioner that notification under Section 6 of the Act came to be published on May 13, 1997 without considering the objections filed by it.

The primary contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that petitioner was not heard in the matter of objections under Section 5A of the Act and, therefore, all proceedings culminating into declaration under Section 6 of the Act and thereafter are wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the purpose of acquisition is totally vague and that being so, proper objections under Section 5A of the Act could not be filed and that too would provide a valid ground to the petitioner to ask for quashing of notification under Section 4 and followup declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The third and last contention of the learned counsel is that the proposal of the Government to acquire the land was mooted way back in 1982 and when for the first time notification came into being in the year 1992, it was not taken to its logical end and without collecting any fresh material the present notification has now been issued.

Pursuant to notice issued by this Court, respondents have entered defence and contested the claim of the petitioner. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, it has been pleaded that the notification issued under Section 4 on November 30, 1992 and followup declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on October 13, 1993 could not be taken to its logical end as the Land Acquisition Collector could not announce the award within the prescribed time because of lengthy procedure for obtaining the market rates etc. from various authorities. In this case, the market rates were not supplied in time by the District Collector and the Commissioner of Jalandhar Division. Allegation of the petitioner that notifications are vague has been refuted. It has been clearly mentioned in the said notification that the land is required for setting up Mandi Township at Kartarpur. Objections under Section 5A of the Act were invited and petitioner filed the same. The Land Acquisition Collector afforded opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner filed its objections under Section 5A of the Act and was heard through its counsel in the matter. The Collector sent his report in this regard to the competent authority, which, on application of its mind and after considering the report of the Collector, found no legal force in the objections filed by the petitioner and rejected the same and thereafter issued declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The requirement of law and FC''s standing order were, thus, followed in deciding the objections under Section 5A of the Act. Objections under Section 5A of the Act were filed by the petitioner and Shri Narsingh Lal Singal, Advocate, appeared on its behalf on September 4, 1996 before the Land Acquisition Collector. Insofar as other owner, Amarjit Singh is concerned, he had adopted delaying tactics in the matter by producing witnesses on different dates and the Land Acquisition Collector refused to examine the witnesses who were not relevant in the matter. Petitioner also tried to delay the matter by way of applying for copy of report of the Collector under Section 5A of the Act and by applying to examine the land acquisition file. Petitioner was not entitled to get copy of report under Section 5A of the Act and, therefore, the same was refused to be supplied to it. The Land Acquisition Collector examined the objections filed by the petitioner and heard the lawyer who appeared before him on behalf of the petitioner at the time of hearing of objections and submitted its report to the Government.

Inasmuch as the counsel representing the petitioner before the Land Acquisition Collector, who was none other than the one who appears before this Court, had categorically pleaded that objections under Section 5A of the Act were not heard, this Court wanted to examine the records. The same have been made available to the court by the respondents. The records of the case would clearly reveal that Shri Narsingh Lal Singal, Advocate appeared before the Land Acquisition Collector on September 4, 1996. All the objections raised by the petitioner have been detailed in column No. 4 and the comments on the said objections have been made by the Land Acquisition Collector in column No. 5. The objections as such have been dealt with by the Land Acquisition Collector. After going through the records of the case, we are satisfied that the counsel for the petitioner was heard in the matter of objections filed by it under Section 5A of the Act and proper, meaningful and effective hearing was given to the petitioner. As mentioned above, all objections of the petitioner have been mentioned serialwise in column No. 4 with its comments in column No. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not heard in the matter of objections under Section 5A of the Act is, thus, factually incorrect. We are rather surprised to note that such an objection has been taken by the petitioner and through the counsel who himself appeared before the Collector in the matter of objections under Section 5A of the Act. This Court has observed that in almost all the cases challenging land acquisition proceedings, the point regarding nonhearing of objections u/s 5A is being taken, ever since it has been held by this Court and the Apex Court, that hearing of objections under Section 5A of the Act is necessary and the said hearing cannot be an empty formality. It appears that every one is taking such an objection without even caring to know as to how the objections were dealt with by the concerned authorities. In quite a few cases, as in the present case, such allegation has been found to be false.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to examine the witnesses in support of the objections raised by it. The counsel, however, could not take the matter any further as he was unable to show as to on what particular objection witnesses were required to be examined and if produced, what particular objection they were to prove that might be enough so as not to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Insofar as purpose of notification being vague is concerned, we again find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. It has been specifically mentioned in the impugned notifications that land was required for a public purpose, namely, setting up of new Mandi Township at Kartarpur. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relies upon judgment of the Apex Court in Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150. The purpose of acquisition in the case aforesaid was mentioned as "planned development of the area". Inasmuch as it could not be said with certainty as to for which purpose land was acquired, it was held that "If the persons were unable to object effectively, particularly when they were not shown the scheme or the plan in respect of the public purpose, the acquisition proceedings were liable to be quashed." As mentioned above, the public purpose as mentioned in the notifications under challenge is not vague and the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in Munshi Singh''s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. There is no merit in the third and last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no fresh material has been collected which might now necessitate acquiring the land, subject matter of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The acquisition could not be taken to its logical end when notification under Section 4 was issued in 1992 as the award could not be announced within the time stipulated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The reason as to why the award could not be announced withim the prescribed period of limitation has since already been mentioned.

For the reasons mentioned above, we find no merit in the present petition and dismiss the same in limine.

Before we may, however, part with this judgment, we would like to mention that normally, costs were imposed upon the Government and the respondents when their action was found to be illegal or which could not otherwise be supported on any rationale. A time has perhaps now come when the petitioners also need to be burdened with costs for making reckless and blatantly untrue allegations simply with a view to earn notice of motion and stay from this Court. As mentioned above, in this case, the very lawyer, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner before the Land Acquisition Collector in support of objections under Section 5A of the Act, has appeared in this Court in support of the present petition and yet an allegation has been made in the petition that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner in the matter of its objections under Section 5A of the Act. We, therefore, dismiss this petition with costs quantified as Rs. 5000/. The State may recover the costs in accordance with law if petitioner may not pay itself within thirty days from today.