High CourtsDivision Bench

K.C. Menon vs P. Krishnan Nayar

Madras High Court · Decided on 25 March 1926 · Citation: (1927) ILR (Mad) 978 : (1926) 24 LW 304 : (1926) 51 MLJ 328

HON’BLE JUDGES
Wallace, J

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46 paragraphs · 1,064 words

Wallace, J.—This is a petition to revise the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Calicut refusing the petitioner''s petition to summon

certain witnesses for the prosecution. The petitioner is prosecuting the accused for offences u/s 477"" A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 282

of the Indian Companies Act for concocting false balance sheets, when he was the Managing Director of the Manorama Printing Works in 1921

and 1922, in particular for showing an inflated and false value of the stock in hand and including in the company''s stock the full value of books only

sent to them for sale on commission. The petitioner filed his complaint on 3rd November, 1925 naming three witnesses. At that time the books of

the company had been impounded and were in the Lower Court. His witnesses were examined on 23rd and 24th November, 1925 and cross-

examined on 5th and 6th December, 1925. The petitioner put in a further list of four witnesses styled ""experts in valuation,"" and the Magistrate

examined these on 12th December, 1925 and 19th December, 1925. On 17th December, 1925 the petitioner put in a further list of witnesses

stating that he had got further information about the inclusion in the stock list of books which never belonged to the company and were not in its

possession, some of which the petitioner had secured. The Lower Court refused to summon these on the ground that it was new matter, and the

petitioner has put in this revision petition.

2.

His chief point is that at the stage which the case has reached, the Magistrate has no option to refuse to examine witnesses cited by him, and he

relies on Section 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That section lays down that not only shall the Magistrate take all the evidence which may

be produced in support of the prosecution but shall himself ascertain the names of other persons able to give evidence for the prosecution and

summon such of the latter as he thinks necessary. In the present case, the new list of witnesses is one offered by the complainant himself, just as his

previous list of expert witnesses was offered, some time after the complaint was filed and after the trial had begun. What then is the proper attitude

for the Court to take up regarding such a list? The section does not appear to me to be very clear on the point; but, as I read it, it means first that

the complainant should himself pro- duce what evidence he can in support of the prosecution and the Magistrate shall proceed to hear it. The

Court is apparently not bound to issue process for such witnesses, or to grant time for the production of such witnesses, but if produced he must

record their evidence. There is no section here corresponding to Section 208(3) in the case of committal proceedings or S 244(2) in the case of

trial in summons cases. This is a remarkable omission as otherwise the language ""shall take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the

prosecution"" is the same in all the three sections; and Section 257 gives the accused the power of asking the Magistrate to issue compulsory

process, while Section 252 itself gives the Magistrate power to summon persons whom he has himself ascertained to be acquainted with the facts

of the case. Next when the complainant has done all he can without the assistance of the process of the Court, it is then for the Magistrate to

ascertain from the complainant or otherwise the names of other persons likely or able to give evidence and he must summon such of those as he

thinks necessary, i. e., such of those he thinks will be of value in assisting the prosecution case. He cannot, I take it, arbitrarily refuse to summon

such witnesses.

3.

It is his duty to assist and not to hamper the prosecution and for that purpose he must issue summons to persons, of whom the complainant has

informed him, who, he considers, are likely to give useful evidence. Obviously, I take it that the Magistrate is not bound to or expected to exercise

his duty of ""ascertaining"" more than once, and the proper time is when the evidence ""produced"" in support of the prosecution has been taken, and

that ordinarily includes the cross-examination, if any, and re-examination, if any, before the charge [see Varisai Rowther v. King-Emperor ILR

(1932) M 449 .

4.

Now, I find from the Magistrate''s order that though he asked the complainant after the examination-in-chief of his original witnesses whether he

had any more witnesses to examine, he did not and has not yet asked him that question after the examination of the original witnesses was over nor

was the question in the proper form. The question to be asked is not whether complainant has any more witnesses whom he can produce without

summons but whether he can inform the Court of any witnesses who will have to be brought by process. The Magistrate has therefore in my view

not complied with the law. The stage of examining the original witnesses produced by the complainant is over. But still, the Court has to ascertain

from the complainant whether there are any other persons able to give evidence in support of the prosecution. The Court must remedy this defect

and must do so now.

5.

As to whether the petitioner has traversed new grounds, the consideration of that matter seems to me not at all a matter of procedure on which I

can at this stage be properly called upon to give a decision. The discretion to summon or not to summon lies with the Magistrate. But he is not to

interpret that discretion in a narrow or purely technical sense. He must look at the prosecution case broadly, decide what are the broad allegations

of facts on which the complaint is founded and then determine whether the evidence offered is not necessary to assist in the establishment of that

case. A useful test will be whether, if the accused were acquitted in this case, it would be open to the complainant to put in a fresh complaint on the

facts now put forward.

6.

I set aside the order and direct that the petition be reheard in the light of the above remarks.