K.C.C. Periapulian and Others vs Akkamall and Others

Nainar Sundaram, J.—Certain facts have got to be delineated before the questions raised both in the second appeal and in the writ Petition

are gone into. An extent of 1 acre and 46 cents, in Survey No. 351/4 in A. Vellalapatty village in Melur Taluk, Madurai District, was jointly owned

by one Akkamal and one Puliammai (who is no more). Akkammal is the first Petitioner in the Writ Petition and the first Respondent in the second

appeal. Puliammai died on 14th April 1975. Her successors-in-interest are Petitioners 2 to 6 in the writ Petition and Respondents 2 to 6 in the

second appeal. Periapulian, the first Respondent in the writ Petition and the Appellant in the second appeal, filed an application under the Tamil

Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act (X of 1969), hereinafter referred to as the Act, to have his name recorded as a cultivating

tenant under the provision, of the Act. This application was filed on 23rd April, 1975. Not content with this, Periapulian filed a suit Original Suit

No. 258 of 1975 on the file of the District Munsif of Melur on 17th September, 1975 against Akkammal and Ors. for a permanent injunction

restraining the Defendants, their men or agents from, in any way, interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the lands in question by

him, the Plaintiff, as cultivating tenant. That suit was dismissed on 14th February, 1977. An appeal as against the judgment and decree in Original

Suit No. 258 of 1975 was preferred to the District Court, Madurai, on 21st March 1977 which appeal was later dealt with as Appeal Suit No.

116 of 1977 by the Subordinate Judge of Madurai. While the appeal was pending, the Record Officer and Tahsildar, Melur, the second

Respondent in the writ Petition passed Orders in the application under the Act on 3rd October 1977 directing that Periapulian shall be registered

as cultivating tenant in respect of the lands in question. As against the Orders passed by the Record Officer and Tahsildar, an appeal was preferred

by Akkammal and others and the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Appellate Authority of tenancy Records under the Act, the third Respondent

in the writ Petition, by Order, dated 5th July 1978, set aside the Order of the Record Officer and Tahsildar holding that there is no ground for

Periapulian to claim tenancy rights. As against the Order of the Appellate Authority of Tenancy Records, Periapulian preferred a revision to the

Additional Collector, Madurai, the Revisional Authority under: the Act and the fourth Respondent in the writ Petition, and the Revisional Authority

allowed the revision on 28th September 1978 directing the registration of Periapulian as cultivating tenant of the lands. Akkammal and others

challenge the Order passed by the fourth Respondent in the Writ Petition. The appeal Suit No. 116 of 1977 came to be dismissed by the

Subordinate Judge of Madurai on 20th August, 1979 and the second appeal has been preferred as against the judgment and decree of the

Subordinate Judge of Madurai in the said appeal.

The substantial question of law that has been mooted out for consideration in the second appeal runs as follows:

Whether in law the civil Court has jurisdiction to evaluate the evidence and independently decide the question as to whether the Plaintiff is a

cultivating tenant of the suit land even after the decision of the authority under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of

Tenancy) Act holding that Plaintiff is a cultivating tenant and in spits of Section 16-A of the said Act and indirectly set aside or nullify the effect of

the said statutory proceedings ?

Mr. T.R. Mani, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in the writ petition, submits that the jurisdictional question as to whether the

lands were let for cultivation by a tenant at all had come to be decided early by a competent civil Court in the suit even on 14th February, 1977

and the certified copy of the judgment in the suit was, in face produced before the Authorities under the Act as exhibit R.2, and the decision of the

civil Court must, in the said circumstances he held to be binding on them. The learned Counsel relies on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court

in Periathambi v. District Revenue Officer ILR (1980) Mad. 255 (F.B.) for the proposition that the controversy as to whether a particular piece of

land has been let for cultivation by a tenant or not is one constituting the jurisdictional issue and that controversy cannot be said to be within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Authorities functioning under the Act and the said controversy having been resolved by a civil Court of competent

jurisdiction, it is binding on the Authorities under the Act.

Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in the second appeal and the first Respondent in the writ petition, would

submit that the civil Court''s jurisdiction is expressly extended in respect of the question as to whether a particular person is a cultivating tenant or

not and in the instant case, the revisional Authority under the Act has rendered a decision on 28th September, 1978 that Periapulian is a cultivating

tenant entitled to be registered as such in respect of the lands and the certified copy of the Order of the Revisional Authority has been produced as

additional evidence before the Subordinate Judge of Madurai and admitted and marked as exhibit A-6, and in view of the decision of the

Revisional Authority under the Act there is no scope for the civil Court to valuate the evidence and independently decide the question as to

whether Periapulian is a cultivating tenant of the lands or not.

The submissions made by the Counsel on both the sides necessitate a reference to the dictum of the Full Bench so as to assess the questions

raised in the present matters. It is true that the Full Bench agreed with the conclusion in Muniyandi v. Rajangam ILR (1976) Mad. 201 that the civil

Court''s jurisdiction is expressly excluded in respect of the question as to whether a particular person is a cultivating tenant or not. But the matter

did not. rest there. The Full Bench clearly indicated that where a controversy arises as to whether the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at

all, the determination of that controversy cannot be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Authorities functioning under the Act. The following

observations in the judgment of the Full Bench (at page 291) are elucidative on this aspect:

A controversy may arise whether the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at all. The question to be considered is, whether the determination

of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act so as to bar the jurisdiction of the civil Court u/s

16-A. From the language of Section 3(2) it cannot be stated that the determination of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

authorities functioning under the Act, though the determination of that controversy is basic and fundamental to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the

Record Officer and the other authorities under the Act. The very object of the Act is 10 provide for the preparation and maintenance of record of

tenancy rights in respect of agricultural lands and therefore, if there is no tenancy in respect of a land, there is no question of any further particulars

being determined. This aspect is made clear even from the definition of the expression ''landowner'' occurring in Section 2(5) of the Act because

according to the said definition, ''landowner'' means the owner of the land let for cultivation by a tenant and includes the heirs, assignees or legal

representatives of such owner or persons deriving rights through him. Consequently, the controversy as to whether a particular piece of land has

been let for cultivation by a tenant or not is one constituting the jurisdiction issue which a Record Officer has to decide before he can determine any

other matter under the Act. But that controversy cannot be said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act,

because to hold so will enable the statutory authorities to assume jurisdiction by erroneously deciding the jurisdiction issue. If the controversy

arises, the authorities functioning under the Act have necessarily to decide the same, because a decision on that controversy alone will determine

the jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act. If the decision is that the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant, then the Record

Officer will have jurisdiction to determine the further particulars provided for in Section 3(2) of the Act. If, on the other hand, the decision of the

controversy is that the land has not been let for cultivation by a tenant there is no question of there being any tenancy rights in respect of the said

land and consequently, there is no question of the Record Officer ascertaining or determining any further particulars in this behalf. Therefore, if such

controversy arises, that controversy cannot be said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act and any

determination of that controversy by the authorities can be said to be only incidental to the assumption of jurisdiction by the authorities under the

Act. Subject to this qualification it can be held that once the Record Officer or any other authority functioning under the Act has come to the

conclusion that the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant, the matters provided for in Section 3(2) have to be determined by the Record

Officer, or other authority functioning under the Act and to that extent the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred u/s 16-A of the Act.

In the light of the above observations of the Full Bench, have to bold mat the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not ousted decide as to whether a

particular land has been let out for cultivation by a tenant at all. In the instant case, this question was gone into by the civil Court and at the time

when the Record Officer and Tahsildar rendered his decision on 3rd October, 1977 he District Munsif, Melur, had already decided this question

against Periapulian holding that the tenancy pleaded by him is not factually true. In spite of this decision, the Record Officer and Tahsildar opined

that the civil Court''s proceedings do not prevent him to decide the tenancy rights. If, in fact, the civil Court is competent to decide the jurisdictional

question as to whether a particular land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at all, a decision rendered by such civil Court cannot be ignored by

the authorities under the Act. It will be a different matter if the authorities under the Act have earlier decided this question and the civil litigation

Either cropped up later or Came to be decided after the initiation of proceedings under the Act. I am not expressing any opinion on this question.

Suffice it to point out that, if there is a decision by a Court of competent jurisdiction on the jurisdictional question as to whether a particular land

has been demised as a leasehold or not and that decision has come to be rendered before the matter is considered by the authorities under the Act,

the latter are bound by such decision.

Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel appearing for Periapulian, the Appellant in the second appeal and the first Respondent in the writ petition

would state that no finality on this question was reached in civil litigation even at the time when the revisional authority under the Act passed Orders

on 28th September, 1978 and the appeal Suit No. 116 of 1977 came to be disposed of by the Subordinate Judge of Madurai only on 20th

August, 1979. This contention has no legal and factual significance. Neither the Record Officer and Tahsildar, the First Authority under the Act,

nor the Additional Collector, the Revisional Authority under the Act, chose to brush aside the decision in the suit on the ground that no finality has

been reached. At this stage, it will be appropriate to dispose of the question raised in the Second Appeal. That question stands answered by the

dictum of the Full Bench when it laid down that there is no bar for the Civil Court to go into the jurisdictional question as to whether a particular

land was let out to a tenant or not. Now we have before this Court not only the judgment in the suit but also the judgment in the appeal and both

the Courts below have negative the contention put forth by Periapulian that the lands were demise to him as leasehold. Periapulian relied on a

receipt, dated 21st February, 1975 purported to have been issued to him by late Puliammal acknowledging receipt of rent for the lands. This

document is marked as exhibit A-2 in the suit. There is profuse and considerate discussion over this document as well as other factual aspects of

the case by the two Courts below and they came to the conclusion that the case of Periapulian that the lands were let out to him cannot be

believed. They have not accepted the genuineness of this document marked as exhibit A-2 in the suit Periapulain relied on yet another document

and that is a manure card dated 19th August, 1975 marked in the suit as exhibit A-1. Both the Courts below found no warrant for attaching any

significance to this manure card because it had come to be procured just before the filing of the suit. In the said circumstances, I have to answer the

question raised in the second appeal for consideration against the Appellant Periapulian and hold that the civil Court can definitely go into the

question as to whether a particular land is the subject-matter of tenancy at all and that a decision having been rendered earlier to the decision of the

First Authority under the Act, it will have to hold the field unless set aside by the Appellate Court.

There is no scope for interfering in Second Appeal with the findings of facts rendered by the two Courts below. Hence, the second appeal fails

and the same is dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs.

The disposal of the second appeal renders the decisions of the Civil Courts on the jurisdictional question as to whether a particular laud was let

out or not, conclusive and final. The revisional authority has not even chosen to advert to the decision in the suit which was already there at the time

when it came to dispose of the matter. The certified copy of the receipt dated 21st February, 1975 alleged to have been given by late Puliammal

was produced before the Authorities under the Act and marked as exhibit P-1. The certified copy of the manure card dated 19th August, 1975

had been produced and marked before the said authorities as exhibit P-2. In spite of the civil Court eschewing the original of these documents as

worthy of no credence, the revisional authority has chosen to reassess the question on the basis of the certified copies of these documents and has

come to the conclusion that there was, in fact, a demise of the lands to Peripulian under a tenancy agreement. The decision of the civil Court on this

question having had come to be rendered earlier, there is no warrant for the revisional authority to ignore the same and reassess the matter once

again and that too on an assessment of the certified copies of the relevant documents. Viewed in this light, I am not able to uphold the decision of

the revisional authority under the Act.

Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel appearing for Periapulian, the Appellant in the second appeal and the first Respondent in the writ

petition, draws my attention to the judgment of Natarajan J., in Alwar v. Tahsildar & Record Officer ILR (1979) Mad 207 and submits that the

finding of the civil Court is relevant only for the purpose of granting or not granting the relief of injunction sought for and it cannot take away the

jurisdiction of the Officers under the Act. The learned Judge was considering a contention urged before him as to whether there is a bar for

maintaining an application under the Act after the decision in rendered by the civil Court on the question of the status of a tenant claimed by a party

litigant. In that case, the suit laid was for a permanent injunction and in the process of finding out whether the party was entitled to an Order of

injunction in his favour or not, it became incidentally relevant to examine the nature of his possession. Under these circumstances, the learned Judge

held that the civil Court can evaluate the status of that person but, that finding can only be confined to granting or not granting the relief of injunction

sought for and it cannot override Section 16-A of the Act or take away the jurisdiction of the officers named in the Act to deal with applications

directly arising under the provisions of the Act. The decision of the learned Judge cannot be construed as laying down a general proposition that

when a question as to whether a particular land was demised or let or not has been raised before a competent civil Court and a decision has been

rendered one way or the other, it should not weigh with the Authorities under the Act. As stated above, the Full Bench clearly pointed out that

such a question part takes the character of a jurisdictional aspect and a civil Court''s jurisdiction is not ousted to decide such questions. If this is so,

a decision on that question, if already rendered, is definitely binding on the Authorities under the Act.

For all these reasons, I feel obliged to allow the writ petition and accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the Order of the Fourth

Respondent is quashed. There will be no Order as to costs in this writ petition.