KEC International Ltd. vs Mohd. Hanif and Others

J.P. Singh, J.—Mohd. Hanif, representing 105 persons employed by KEC International Limited, Batote, in connection with the construction

of 220 KV Line Tower Nos. 149, 150, 151 and 153 at Nachlana Ramsoo, Tehsil Banihal, had filed a Claim Petition before the Authority under

the Payment of Wages Act (Assistant Labour Commissioner) Doda, seeking recovery of delayed wages amounting to Rs. 22 lacs. This claim was

awarded in favour of the labourers in terms of the direction issued by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (Assistant Labour

Commissioner) Doda vide its Order dated 28th of December, 2002.

KEC International Limited, Batote, filed an appeal against the award of the Authority before learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, who,

vide his judgment dated 1st of October, 2005, has held the appeal barred by time and accordingly dismissed it.

Aggrieved by the judgment of learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, M/s KEC International Limited has filed this petition invoking

revisional jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the order of learned Additional District Judge, Ramban.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records.

Finding that the appeal was delayed by one day, learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, had dismissed it by rejecting the request of the

appellant to condone the delay because the provisions of the Limitation Act, according to learned Additional District Judge, had no application to

the appeals under the Payment of Wages Act.

While computing the period of limitation, learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, appears to have acted irrationally omitting to consider the

principles underlying Section 12 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act.

Going by the principles underlying Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and those of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, even if the provisions of

the Limitation Act, as such, had not to apply to the Special Act, the day, on which the order had been passed by the Authority under the Payment

of Wages Act (Assistant Labour Commissioner) Doda, had to be excluded while computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal

under the payment of Wages Act. Thus calculated, the period of limitation had to expire on 27th of January, 2003. Learned Additional District

Judge, Ramban, has thus erred in not excluding the day when the order had been passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act while

calculating the period within which the appeal had to be filed. That apart, even if the period of limitation had to expire on 26th of January, 2003

(which, however, is not the legal position, as observed hereinabove), the appeal was required to be filed on 27th of January, 2003 because 26th of

January, 2003, had to be treated as a close day for the Court, being a National Holiday. The finding of Learned District Judge, Ramban, that the

appeal was required to be filed on 2.6th of January, 2003, cannot thus be sustained.

Petitioner has specifically stated in his memo of appeal that it had made all arrangements to prefer its appeal on 27th of January, 2003 and its

representative along with its Advocate had remained waiting in the Court premises up to 3 p.m when they are stated to have handed-over the

appeal papers to the concerned clerk for its being presented next day when the Judge had reportedly to join.

Learned Additional District Judge, Ramban has recorded in his judgment that the learned Presiding Officer of the Court was on casual leave on

27th of January, 2003. That being the position, the Court had to be treated to be closed on the day when there was no Presiding Officer and in

that view of the matter, appellant's appeal having not been filed on the day when the Presiding Officer was on leave, could not have been treated as

barred by time.

Petitioner's appeal against the judgment of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (Assistant Labour Commissioner) Doda, having

been preferred with the prescribed period of limitation, there was no occasion for the Learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, to have

considered the application, or otherwise of Section 5 and the provisions of the Limitation Act, to the appeal in question. That being the case, the

judgment of Learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, becomes unsustainable and is required to be set aside.

Allowing this revision petition, the impugned judgment of Learned Additional District Judge, Ramban dated 1st of October, 2005 is,

accordingly, set aside and petitioner's appeal shall accordingly revive for its reconsideration by the Learned Judge, on its merit and in accordance

with law.

Mr. D.S. Thakur, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, the representative of the labourers had submitted during the course of

consideration of this petition, that the learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, was not the competent Court to entertain the appeal because the

Court of Learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, has not been constituted as a District Court for the purpose of the Payment of Wages Act.

Mr. Piyush Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, disputes the submission of Mr. Thakur, saying that requisite

Notifications have been issued both by the State Government as also by the High Court, empowering Learned Additional District Judge to act as a

District Judge within the area of its jurisdiction.

I have no material on records to go into the question raised by Mr. D.S. Thakur. This question shall, therefore, remain alive for its

consideration by Learned Additional District Judge, Ramban, when any such objection is raised before him by the respondent.