High CourtsSingle Bench

Kehar Singh vs Jangir Singh

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 10 December 1951 · Citation: (1951) 12 P&H CK 0006

HON’BLE JUDGES
Chopra, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Registration Act, 1908 — Section 60
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No. 164 of 2006
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

3 paragraphs · 667 words

Chopra, J.—This is defendant''s second appeal in a suit for pre-emption, which was dismissed by the trial Sub-Judge on the ground of limitation, but decreed on appeal by the District Judge, Bannala. Three-fourth of some vacant site and a house in village Rampur Chhana was sold by Bachan Singh in favour of Kehar Singh for Rs. 1,200/- by a registered deed. The deed was executed on 23-2-2003 and was presented for registration the same day. It was, however, actually entered in the Registers on 25th ''Mar'' 2003. A suit for possession by pre-emption was brought by Jangir Singh on 24th of ''Mar'' 2004. The defendant resisted the suit on various grounds and also pleaded that it was barred by time. The trial Sub-Judge held that the plaintiff had a preferential right to pre-empt the sale, that the price had not been fixed or paid in good faith and that the market-value of the property was Rs. 600/-. But since the suit in the opinion of the trial Sub-Judge suffered on the ground of limitation, it was dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned District Judge did not agree with the trial Judge on the question of limitation. He was of the view that the limitation of one year under Art. 10 of the Limitation Act started from the day when the deed was actually entered in the Registers and, therefore, held the suit to be within time. Agreeing with the decision of the trial Judge on other points he accepted the appeal and decreed the suit for possession on payment of Rs. 600/-. This is defendant''s appeal.

2.

Shri Jagan Nath, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has not been able to convince me that the decision of the District Judge on the point of limitation was in any way wrong. The case admittedly falls under Article 10 of the Limitation Act and under that Article the limitation of one year for a suit for pre-emption starts to run when the purchaser takes physical possession of the whole of the property sold, or where the subject of sale does not admit of physical possession, when the instrument of sale is registered. There is absolutely no evidence that the vendee had taken physical possession of the property sold to him, nor has the judgment of the District Judge been assailed on that ground by the Counsel for the appellant. The sale was not of any particular or specified portion of the site and the house but only of a share in them. It is admitted that no portion of the property had been effected. Obviously, therefore, the subject; of sale did not admit of physical possession and we have to fall back on the date of registration, it is not disputed that the document was entered in the Register on 25th Har 2003 and that the suit was within tame from that date. u/s 60 of the Registration Act a document is taken to be registered only when it is entered in the book and a certificate stating the number and page of the book in which it is entered, is endorsed thereon. As between the transferor and the transferee a registered document may take effect from the date of execution but as regards third party the point of time at which the deed is to be effective is when the endorsements of registration is made thereon. The limitation in the present case would, therefore, start from 25th of Har 2003 and the suit having brought within one year thereof, must be held to be within time.

3.

Both the Courts below have found that the price had not been fixed or paid In good faith and that the market-value of the property is not more than Rs. 600/-, The learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to make out a case for interference in the concurrent finding of the Courts below on purely a point of fact. The appeal is therefore, dismissed with costs.