Kehar Singh vs Municipal Committee, Rajpura

Harbans Lal, J.

The plaintiffs appellants, filed a suit in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Second Class Rajpura, against the defendant Municipal Committee, for the grant of a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant (now respondent) Municipal Committee from recovering housetax within the Municipal Limits for the period from July 1, 1961 to March 31, 1966 and thereafter on the ground that the mandatory procedure as prescribed in sections 62 to 66 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter to be called the Act) had not been complied with. It was also prayed that the notices issued for the recovery of the housetax against the plaintiffs and others were illegal and no recovery could be made on their basis. These contentions were controverted by the defendant Municipal Committee. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :

Whether the defendant Municipal Committee is not legally competent to recover tax on buildings and lands for the period 1.7.61 to 3.6.1966 from the plaintiffs ?

Whether the Punjab State is a necessary party ?

Whether the suit in the present form is defective ? If so with what effect ?

Relief.

After recording of evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit. The appeal by the plaintiffs (the present appellants) before the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala met the same fate. It is against this judgment and decree dated February 19, 1970, that the present appeal has been filed.

The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the procedure prescribed under sections 62 to 66 of the Act is mandatory without the compliance of which no housetax could be imposed. The finding of the lower Appellate Court, in this regard, is that the housetax was imposed by the State Government under section 62A(3) of the Act as the defendant Municipal Committee had failed to impose the same under section 62 of the Act and therefore, it was not necessary to follow the procedure as prescribed under sections 62 to 66 of the Act. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the housetax was imposed by the State Government in the present case and not by the defendant Municipal Committee. Under section 62A of the Act the State Government has the jurisdiction to require a Municipal Committee, by a general or a special order, to impose any tax as mentioned in section 61 of the Act and it is the duty of the Municipal Committee to act accordingly. In case a Municipal Committee fails to carry out the order of the State Government, the latter is competent to notify in the official Gazette the imposition or modification of the tax by a suitable order. Sub clause (3) of section 62A of the Act provides as follows :

"If the Committee fails to carry out any order passed under subsection (1) or (2) the State Government may by a suitable order notified in the official Gazette impose or modify the tax. The order so passed shall operate as if it were a resolution duly passed by the Committee and as if the proposal was sanctioned in accordance with the procedure contained in section 62."

The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that though the order imposing the housetax was passed by the State Government, yet the procedure as provided in sections 62 to 66 of the Act had to be complied with. Section 62 of the Act provides that the Municipal Committee for the purpose of imposing a tax, has to pass a resolution and invite objections which can be filed by the persons concerned within thirty days of the notification After the objections are disposed of the proposals are to be sent by the Deputy Commissioner or the Municipal Committee to the State Government which, under subsection (8) of section 62 of the Act is competent to accord sanction or refuse the same or return the same to the Municipal Committee for further consideration. A perusal of these provisions clearly shows that the final authority to sanction the imposition of the tax is the State Government and the procedure for sending proposals, inviting objections and their disposal is prescribed only for the Municipal Committee. The State Government is competent to impose a tax by a proper notification or order and it is not possible to conclude from any provision of the Act that the procedure prescribed for the Municipal Committee has also to be followed by the State Government.

The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there is no evidence on record to show that the State Government had issued any order to the defendant Municipal Committee to impose the housetax and that the defendant Municipal Committee had failed to comply with that order and as such the housetax could not be imposed by the State Government under section 62A of the Act. This contention has no substance. According to subsection (3) of section 62A of the Act, the order passed by the State Government is to operate as if it were resolution duly passed by the Municipal Committee and as if a proposal was sanctioned in accordance with procedure contained in section 62 of the Act. Subsection (12) of section 62 of the Act lays down that a notification of the imposition of a tax under the Act shall be conclusive evidence that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the present case, admittedly notification for the imposition of house tax within the limits of Rajpura town was issued by the State Government and under subsection (12) of section 62 of the Act, it will be conclusive evidence for the purpose that the tax had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There is nothing on the record to justify and conclusion that the State Government had not directed the defendant Municipal Committee to impose the housetax or that the defendant Municipal Committee had not failed to comply with such an order, nor is there any specific issue framed in this regard. Therefore, the appellants cannot succeed on the mere vague allegation that the conditions prescribed under section 62A the Act had not been complied with.

No other contention has been raised.

For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.