Kemi Kwaja Mohideen vs Susan Galife

AR. Lakshmanan, J.—Heard the learned Counsel for petitioner. This civil revision petition is admitted. Mr. R. Subramanian appears for the

respondent. Heard both the counsel at length. By consent of both, this civil revision petition is taken up for final disposal.

The above civil revision petition has been filed against the order of the Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry in E.A. No. 70 of 1993 in E.P. No.

44 of 1992 in H.R.C.O.P. No. 90 of 1988. The petitioner is the landlord. The learned Principal District Munsif allowed E.A. No. 70 of 1993

which was filed under Sections 47, 94(e) and 151, C.P.C., seeking to determine and adjudicate that the decree and the order under execution is a

nullity and incapable of execution and consequently to dismiss the E.P. and for other reliefs. The petitions was presented on 15.7:1993 before the

said court. The respondent is a tenant. Before the learned District Munsif, the respondent herein challenged the decree under execution on the

ground that it is one passed without jurisdiction and consequently is incapable of execution before the said court. The lower court, however,

rejected the allegation of the respondent that she was not aware of the proceedings in the rent control proceedings and held that such a plea cannot

be accepted: The lower court, after a detailed consideration of the materials placed before it, allowed the E.A. Aggrieved against the said order,

the present civil revision petition has been instituted.

The petitioner herein, who is the owner of the premises in question, filed a petition u/s 10(3)(a)(i) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent

Control) Act, for eviction of the respondent. According to him, he is residing at present at 1/4, Kamaraj Salai, Pondicherry in a rented premises

and he is not having any residential building in the same commune, and therefore, he is in need of the premises for his personal occupation. The

petitioner further contended that when he requested the respondent to quit and deliver possession of the demised premises, the respondent

requested some time to vacate the premises, but even after the time requested, the respondent has not vacated the premises and therefore, the

petition is filed before the rent control court for eviction of the respondent on the ground of personal occupation. On 3rd November, 1988, the

Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, passed an order in the presence of Mr. C.P. Thirunavukarasu, counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.

Krishnamoorthy, counsel for the respondent, on the basis of an endorsement made by the respondent. The order reads as follows:

This is a petition praying to grant an order of eviction as against the respondent directing her to hand over possession of the premises mentioned in

the schedule.

When the petition came up for hearing, the respondent makes endorsement that he would vacate within three years. Petitioner also agrees.

Hence, petition allowed with costs. Time for eviction three years.

The petitioner after the expiry of three years filed E.P. No. 44 of 1992 for the delivery of the premises in question. Delivery was also ordered as

prayed for in the E.P. In the meanwhile, the respondent herein filed E.A. No. 70 of 1993 under Sections 47, 94(e) and 151, C.P.C. requesting the

court to determine and adjudicate that the decree and order under execution is a nullity and incapable of execution and consequently dismiss the

E.P., and in paragraph-3 of the affidavit in E.A. No. 70 1993, the respondent states as follows:

I swear my understanding that the said order and decree for eviction (put in execution in this E.P.) does not satisfy the requirements of law

inasmuch as the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to pass such decree without satisfying himself of the truth of the existence of the ground of

personal occupation as alleged by the landlord. Inasmuch as the order and decree does not even whisper anything about such satisfaction and

inasmuch as the said compromise also does not contain an admission as to the requirement of the premises for the personal occupation by

landlord, the order and Decree is a nullity on the fact of it and incapable of execution under law. I understand that the court of Rent Controller

lacks the inherent jurisdiction to pass such an order and decree the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 and consequently

the same is legally inexecutable being nullity under the law.

The petitioner herein filed a counter-affidavit to the said E. A. denying all the allegations contained in the affidavit. It was contended on behalf of the

petitioner that the executing court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of

which rent court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of statutory ground for eviction. In such a case, it must accept and execute the

decree as it stands. It is further contended that the consent decree was passed in the presence of the counsel for the tenant and since the tenant

caused damages and waste to the premises, a suit for injunction was also filed along with a separate application for eviction before the rent court

and in that situation, the tenant has herself made an endorsement agreeing to vacate the premises by accepting the contention in the petition. The

Principal District Munsif also examined the respondent herein as P.W.1. The respondent herein as P.W.1 has stated in her chief examination the

relevant portion of which is as follows:

She was stated that there was a litigation initiated by the landlord seeking injunction against her on the ground that she was unauthorisedly making

construction in the premises and she was not making construction as alleged by the landlord and in O.S. No. 362 of 1988 filed by her landlord on

the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Pondicherry, seeking an ex parte injunction, the court passed an order of injunction in I.A. No. 1996 of

1988 and in that litigation, she represented to the court that she was not making any alterations in the premises but only re-roofing the premises and

she was permitted to re-roof the premises without any alteration and in the effect, she made an endorsement in the court records. Thereafter, the

plaintiff therein, who is the landlord withdrew the suit as not pressed. She however stated that she did not make any endorsement in the court

records in an eviction proceeding seeking three years time for vacating and she did not find any reason for my landlord initiating action against her

to evict her from the premises.

In cross-examination, she has deposed as follows:

I deny the suggestion that the respondent herein filed H.R.C.O.P. No. 90 of 1988 against me seeking my eviction. I deny the suggestion that in

H.R.C.O.P. No. 90 of 1988, I appeared before the court and prayed for three years time for vacating the premises and since the respondent also

agreed for such terms. I was granted three years time. I deny the suggestion that now I am falsely deposing. I have not submitted to an order in the

eviction proceedings seeking three years time.

The witness was recalled as per order in E. A. No. 97 of 1993 dated 9.11.1993 and she deposed in cross-examination as follows:

I did not receive any notice in the original eviction proceedings from the court. I do not remember the name of the counsel whom we engaged in

the original eviction proceedings to defend my interest. It is true that the signature found in the summons now shown to me is my signature. Ex. B-1

is the said notice served on me through court containing my signature. The signature now shown to me as found in the vakalath is my signature and

Ex. B-2 is the said vakalath. Ex. B-3 found in the endorsement in the original proceedings is my signature.

It is thus clear from her evidence that she made an endorsement in the eviction petition, that her signature found in the summons shown to her at

the time of examination, was her signature and that Ex. B-1 is the notice served on her through court and it contains her signature and the signature

shown to her as found in the vakalath and the signature found in Ex. B-3 (endorsement in O.P.) is her signature. The Principal District Munsif by

his order dated 15th December, 1993. however, allowed the E.A. by accepting the case of the respondent herein that the Rent Controller has not

applied his mind to satisfy himself on the ground on which the landlord sought eviction. Learned Principal District Munsif further says that from the

reading of the order, there is nothing on record to construe that the learned Rent Controller has applied his mind regarding the ground on which the

landlord sought eviction of the tenant. One observation made by the learned Principal District Munsif reads as follows:

There is absolutely no mention about the subjective satisfaction regarding the ground raised by the landlord. Perhaps, the learned Rent Controller

appears to have adopted the labour-saving device in composing the impugned order as a matter of routine without judiciously applying his mind.

Further, the learned Rent Controller has granted 3 years time for eviction as could be seen from the decree. Under the scheme of the Act, as could

be seen from proviso to Section 10(3)(a) of the Act, the Rent Controller can grant only a maximum of 3 months time for eviction of the tenant.

In my opinion, the above observation made by the learned Principal District Munsif (Mr. D. Ramabathiran) against his colleague Judicial Officer

Mr. G. Patric, the then Rent Controller cum Principal District Munsif, it totally unwarranted and uncharitable. The learned Principal District Munsif

should hereafter avoid such unwarranted comments against his own colleague. The court is expected to go into the question of merits of the case as

put forward by the respective counsel and not to travel any further.

Mr. K. Yamunan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/landlord submitted that the lower court has totally erred in holding that the order

of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller by consent of parties, is null and void and cannot be executed and the court below should have

held that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on the basis of the joint endorsement by parties, is perfectly valid in law and well

within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. Admittedly, both the parties were present along with their advocates when the order was passed by

the Rent Controller by giving three years time to vacate the premises. The tenant has also made an endorsement in the petition which was also

accepted by her at the time of examination in court in the E.A. proceedings. Yet another proceeding which was pending in the District Munsif''s

Court, Pondicherry, filed by the petitioner herein for an injunction against the tenant, was also compromised on the basis of the endorsement made

by the tenant. The view of the learned Principal District Munsif that since under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, a Rent

Controller can grant only three months time and since the Rent Controller has granted three years time in the instant case, it is beyond the

jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and therefore, the order of eviction is nullity and cannot be executed, in my opinion, is totally erroneous and

unsustainable in law. When both the parties agree, it is always open to the court to pass orders on the basis of the endorsement or on the basis of

the agreement reached between the parties. I can only say that the Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry, Rent Controller has failed to appreciate

that the law is well-settled by catena of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court that the order of eviction passed on the basis of

the admission made by the tenant, is perfectly valid and can be executed. Likewise, the view of the Rent Controller that merely because the Rent

Controller has granted three years time for eviction, the order is a nullity, is wholly erroneous and without any legal basis. Mr. K. Yamunan, in

support of his contention, has cited the following decisions viz.:

K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, , Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others, , Roshan Lal and Another Vs. Madan Lal

and Others, , Suleman Noormohamed and Others Vs. Umarbhai Janubhai, . Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead)

by L.Rs., .

Mr. R. Subramanian, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent- tenant filed his summary of the submissions in the form of a memo.

According to him, there is no admission about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction as contemplated u/s 10 or 14 of the Pondicherry

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, in an endorsement made by the respondent in R.C.O.P. No. 90 of 1988 and all that the endorsement

states is that the tenant agrees to vacate the premises after three years. It also says that enhanced rent of Rs. 400 is payable. As such, Mr. R.

Subramanian would contend that the decisions reported in Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another, and Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri

K.L. Bansal, , will alone apply. While referring to the decisions cited by Mr. K. Yamunan, Mr. R. Subramanian would contend that even the

decisions reported in K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, . Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others, , Roshan Lal and

Another Vs. Madan Lal and Others, , Suleman Noormohamed and Others Vs. Umarbhai Janubhai, , Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman

Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead) by L.Rs., have only held that if in the compromise memorandum or in any other material available on record it could be

seen that there is an express or implied admission of existence of a statutory ground of eviction alone, the Rent Controller can pass a decree in

terms of the compromise.

Let me now consider the decisions cited by Mr. K. Yamunan, K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, , is a leading case on the issue in question. In that

case, both the parties entered in to a compromise whereby the tenant withdrew his defence in the rent control petition and submitted to a decree

for eviction unconditionally and the tenant prays for time for vacating upto 5th June, 1969 that the petitioner/landlord agrees to the same and that

the tenant agrees to vacate the petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to the landlord on or before the said date

viz., 5th June, 1969 without fail under any circumstances and undertakes not to apply for extension of time. It was agreed by both parties that the

memo of compromise was executable as a decree of court. The compromise petition was signed by both the parties as well as the advocates

appearing for them. The court, after referring to the petition of the landlord, passed the order recording the compromise memo and ordered

eviction by consent by granting time to vacate till 5.6.1969. After the disposal of the rent control petition, the landlord filed execution petition in the

City Civil Court, Madras to execute the order of eviction against the tenant. The tenant filed E.A. No. 1314 of 1969 objecting to the execution of

the decree on the ground that it was a nullity and inexecutable and as such he prayed for the warrant of possession issued in execution petition to

be recalled and to dismiss the execution petition itself. The tenant''s main plea was that the decree sought to be executed was one based on

compromise or consent without the rent control court having satisfied itself by an independent consideration regarding the bona fide requirement of

the property by the landlord for his own occupation and as such the decree contravened Section 10 of the Act. This application was opposed by

the landlord saying that the pleas raised by the tenant could not be sustained and that the landlord''s case was true and that he unconditionally

withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree. Therefore, he pleaded that the decree sought to be executed does not suffer from any infirmity.

The City Civil Judge overruled the objections raised by the tenant and dismissed the E.A. The tenant carried the matter to this Court in C.R.P. No.

797 of 1970. This Court by its judgment and order dated 15th September, 1970 has reversed the order of the City Civil Court and accepted the

contentions of the respondent- tenant. The learned Judge has held that the decree for eviction dated 31st March, 1969, is solely passed on the

basis of the compromise and the Rent Controller has not applied his mind to satisfy himself whether the bona fide requirement of the landlord has

been established. On this line of reasoning, the learned Judge held that the eviction order is a nullity and is not executable. The landlord filed an

appeal before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in para 24, para 26 and para 27 of its judgment, observed as follows:

Para 24: We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that the decree for eviction in the case before us has been passed solely on

the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. No doubt a reading of the order of the Court dated March 31, 1969, isolated from all

other circumstances may give the impression that the decree for eviction is passed because of the compromise between the parties. It is no doubt

true that the order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. If

the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was satisfied can also be considered from the

point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question? Other materials on

record can also be taken into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was

material before the court, when it passed the order of eviction by consent, from which it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the

requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be a nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of

the landlord. In our opinion, this view is erroneous.

Para 26: The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact

viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order.

Satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt, a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial

finding. If at some stage the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties

invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of

eviction was based.

Para 27: It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord''s

claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other

of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the

landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material

to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory

grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact of the tenant withdrawing his

defence. According to us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case

regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred,

the position was entirely different. In none of those cases was there any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly accepted the

plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant.

Alagiriswami, J. While agreeing with the order passed by Vaidialingam, J, has however thought it necessary to add a few words of his own and

allowed the appeal filed by the landlord.

In Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others, , the Supreme Court has observed in paras 26 and 29, as follows:

Para 26: From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was

some material before the court, on the basis of which, the court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for

eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be

valid."" Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an

express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts

admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible u/s 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before

the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that

makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand,

evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.

In Para 29: Be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity, is taken, the

executing court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which, the rent

court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it

stands.

To allow the executing court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the rent

court. Since in the instant case, there was a clear admission in the compromise incorporated in the decree, of the fundamental facts that could

constitute a ground for eviction u/s 12(3)(a), the executing court was not competent to go being the decree and question its validity.

The observations made in para 29 as mentioned above, will be the answer to the contentions raised by Mr. K. Yamunan that the executing court is

not competent to go behind the decree.

In Roshan Lal and Another Vs. Madan Lal and Others, , the Supreme Court has observed in paras.6 and 8 as follows:

Para 6: It is too late in the day to contend that the provisions of 0.23, Rule 3 of the CPC cannot apply to eviction suits governed by the special

statutes. Undoubtedly, a compromise of such suit is permissible under the said provisions of law. The protection of the tenant is inherent in the

language of 0.23, Rule 3 when it says ""where it is proved to the-satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted by any lawful agreement or

compromise.... the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith

so far as it relates to the suit."" If the agreement or compromise for the eviction of the tenant is found, on the facts of a particular case, to be in

violation of a particular Rent Restriction or Control Act, the Court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be a lawful agreement. If

on the other hand, the court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise and, if necessary, by considering them in the context of the

pleadings and other materials in the case, that the agreement is lawful as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit, the court is bound to record the

compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith. Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts or on their admission in

a compromise either express or implied, is not different.

Para 8: It is regrettable that though the appellants go about three years'' time to vacate the shop in dispute from the date of the compromise decree,

they were ill-advised to fight the litigation further and thus cause delay in the vacating of the shop by another five years. We have no doubt in our

mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the compromise decree was clearly valid and executable. We uphold the decision of the

High Court but on a slightly different basis.

In Suleman Noormohamed and Others Vs. Umarbhai Janubhai, , the Supreme Court, while considering an identical case, observed as follows:

Where an eviction suit under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, was disposed of on compromise between

the parties, the tenant having either expressly or impliedly suffered a decree for eviction as being liable to be evicted in accordance with Section

12(3) of the Act and there was abundant intrinsic material in the compromise itself to indicate that the decree passed upon its basis was not in

violation of the Act but was in accordance with it, the compromise decree was not a nullity and could be executed on non-compliance.

While recording the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, it is not necessary for the court to say in express terms in the order that it

was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one. It will be presumed to have done so, unless the contrary is shown.

Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (Dead) by L.Rs., , is a case arising under the Rent Control Act and the order of

eviction is passed on the compromise decree. It was alleged that the decree was a nullity and not executable due to non-existence of statutory

ground of eviction. The Supreme Court had held that Courts satisfaction of existence of statutory grounds can be inferred impliedly, from the

compromise and that the admission of tenant contained in the compromise can be taken into account. The Supreme Court further observes that the

executing court has to examine the question of nullity of the decree on the basis of the record and cannot permit the tenant to lead fresh evidence in

that regard. The Supreme Court in the above case held on facts that the tenant impliedly admitted the existence of statutory grounds and hence the

decree is executable.

Thus, it is very clear from the judgments above referred to, of the Apex Court that the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of

compromise and if necessary by considering the same in the context of the pleadings and other materials in this case and found that the agreement

is lawful, as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit, the court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith.

Therefore, passing a decree for eviction in the instant case by the Rent Controller on the admission of a tenant in a compromise, is certainly valid in

law. The tenant in this case, having agreed to have three years time to vacate the premises, has now filed the present execution application raising

the ground of nullity of the order of eviction passed on the basis of consent. It is regrettable that though the tenant has got about three years time to

vacate the premises in question from the date of the compromise decree, she was ill-advised to fight the litigation further and thus cause. delay in

the vacating of the premises in question by few more years. I have no doubt in my mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the

compromise decree of eviction passed, was clearly valid and executable and therefore, I have no hesitation to uphold the decision of the Rent

Controller ordering eviction on the basis of the compromise decree. I am also of the view that the court passed the compromise decree in the

presence of both parties and their counsel and after satisfying with the genuineness of the endorsement made by the tenant, agreeing to vacate the

premises in question. I have already referred to in detail about the earlier proceedings between the very same landlord and the tenant and the

injunction suit filed by him. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Rent Controller to pass a detailed order, once he is satisfied with the genuineness

of the endorsement and claim of both parties. The Rent Controller has applied his mind and satisfied himself on the ground on which the landlord

sought eviction. Mr. K. Yamunan is also right in his submission that where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of

nullity is taken the executing court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of

which, the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case the court must accept and

execute the decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing

court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial court''s

jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is, therefore, not necessary

for the court to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is

whether there was some material on the basis of which the rent court could have, as distinguished from, must have been satisfied as to the statutory

ground for eviction. To allow the executing court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the

decision of the rent court. I therefore find that there are sufficient materials available on record for the rent control court to come to the conclusion

that the Rent Controller has applied his mind before passing the order. Even otherwise, there are materials on record in the decree that the Rent

Controller has applied his mind before passing the order to the facts that,

(a) the application is filed for eviction on the ground of personal occupation;

(b) the petitioner herself made an endorsement in the docket agreeing to vacate the premises within a period of three years and also agreed to pay

enhanced rent till then;

(c) the Rent Controller granted three years time to vacate the premises.

These materials ipso facto prove that there are sufficient materials or atleast some materials to pass the order of eviction. So, I am not in a position

to countenance the arguments of Mr. R. Subramanian, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant that the order is nullity on the face

of it. it is further seen that the consent decree was passed in the presence of the counsel for the tenant. Since the tenant caused damages and waste

to the premises, a suit for injunction was filed and at the same time, a suit for eviction was filed and in that situation, the respondent herself made an

endorsement agreeing to vacate the premises by accepting the contention in the petition. The decisions cited by Mr. R. Subramanian reported in

Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another, and Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal, are distinguishable on facts. In fact, these two

judgments viz. Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another, and Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal, were elaborately considered in

K.K. Chari Vs. R.M. Seshadri, and other later judgments.

All the decisions of the Apex Court, cited by Mr. K. Yamunan, uniformly stress the existence of a statutory ground for admission which is

expressly or impliedly found in the compromise or any other material on record would make a decree based on the compromise lawful. On the

facts and circumstances of the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that in the case on hand, the existence of a statutory ground for eviction

cannot be disputed and that the endorsement made by the tenant would speak for the same. The order passed by the learned Rent Controller will

reveal only/such admission. Therefore, I hold that the order passed by the learned Rent Controller based on the endorsement dated 3.11.1988 is

not a nullity and can be put in execution. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent/tenant fails and the civil

revision petition filed by the landlord is allowed and the order of the court below impugned in this civil revision petition is set aside. The

petitioner/landlord is at liberty to proceed with any execution proceedings. The learned Principal District Munsif, while allowing the E.A. which is

impugned in this civil revision petition, has dismissed E.P. No. 44 of 1992 on his file. Since the said order is now set aside. E.P. No. 44 of 1992 is

restored to file.