Kewra Bai vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Heard.

This revision petition has been preferred against the judgment dated 05.12.2017, passed by the appellate Court by 8th Additional Sessions Judge,

District- Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No.196 of 2017, by which the judgment of conviction and sentence of the trial Court dated 29.08.2017 in Criminal

Case No.833 of 2014 was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicants were charge-sheeted for commission of offence under Sections 147, 294, 323 and 506 (Para-2) read with Section 149 of I.P.C. for

which they were tried. The learned trial Court vide judgment dated 29.08.2017 acquitted the applicants from the charges under Sections 294, 323 and

506 (Para-2) read with Section 149 of I.P.C., however all the applicants were convicted for offence under Section 147 of I.P.C. and sentenced only

with fine of Rs.1000/- with default stipulation. The learned appellate Court has vide impugned judgment upheld the judgment of the trial Court and

dismissed the appeal.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicants that the impugned judgment and the judgment of the trial Court both are erroneous and against

the facts, law and evidence of the case. The applicants were falsely implicated in the case which is fully concocted. The conviction under Section 147

of I.P.C. against the applicants cannot sustain as the applicants have been acquitted from the other charges under Section 294, 323 and 506 (Para-2)

read with Section 149 of I.P.C. The essential ingredients of the offence of riot as defined in Section 146 of I.P.C. were not specifically proved by the

prosecution.

Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mariadasan and Others Vs. State of T.N. reported in 1980 Cri.L.J. 412,

in which it was held that the fight which started suddenly on the spur of the moment in a heat of passion, therefore, the accused persons could be

liable only for the individual acts committed by them and there is no evidence to support the act of rioting. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has similarly held in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jodha Singh and Others reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1822. Hence, the

applicants are entitled for acquittal in the case against them, hence, it is prayed that this revision petition be allowed and the impugned judgment as well

as the judgment of the trial Court both may be set aside.

Learned State counsel appearing for the non-applicant opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants and submits that the

prosecution has brought sufficient evidence for establishing the commission of offence by the applicants under Section 147 of I.P.C., therefore, the

learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court both have not committed any error in holding the applicants guilty under Section 147 of I.P.C. and

sentencing them accordingly. Hence, the present revision petition is devoid of merits, which may be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the document present on record.

Considered on the legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Ex.P/1 is written complaint given by Meena

Devi Nirmalkar (P.W.-1), in which it was alleged that on 03.01.2014, the applicant No.1 had raised a turmoil in the meeting of the Gram Panchayat in

the presence of all the Panch Members. Later on, the applicants came to the Government School Lofandi, where the Self-Help Group of Meena Devi

Nirmalkar (P.W.-1) was cooking mid day meal on 21.01.2014. The applicants quarreled with the Meena Devi Nirmalkar (P.W.-1) and others by

placing their claim that they should be allowed to cook the mid day meal. The numbered F.I.R. Ex.P/2 was lodged, on which basis, the case was

investigated. In the Court statement Meena Devi Nirmalkar (P.W.-1) has stated that applicant No.1 and others came to the spot, where the mid-day

meal was being cooked and quarreled with her claiming that the applicants are persons entitled for cooking mid day meal. It was on this basis, the

complaint Ex.P/1 was given and F.I.R. Ex.P/2 was lodged. She has mentioned about use of force and manhandling of the applicants but nobody was

injured. Similar is the statement of Mehtarin Nath (P.W.-2), Premin Bai (P.W.-3), Shiv Kumari (P.W.-4) and Shakun Bai (P.W.-5), who were present

on the spot.

The evidence which has been taken into consideration by the learned trial court for convicting the applicants under Section 147 of I.P.C. is only to

this extent that the applicants were present on the spot, who quarreled with the complainant, put water on the wooden stove and caused obstruction in

the cooking of the mid day meal. This evidence is present in the case on the basis of the statement given by the eye witnesses.

The question raised in this revision petition is whether such an act of the applicants is covered under the definition of 'riot' given under Section 146

of I.P.C. or not.

Section 146 of I.P.C. is as follows:-

“146. Rioting.â€"Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object

of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting.â€​

On perusal of the provision under Section 146 of I.P.C., it is evident that the unlawful assembly when uses force or violence, only then such an act

could be regarded as 'riot'.

Force is defined under Section 348 of I.P.C. which is as follows :-

“349. Force.â€"A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he

causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that

other’s body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other’s sense

of feeling: Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation

of motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described.

First. â€" By his own bodily power.

Secondly. â€"By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on

his part, or on the part of any other person.

Thirdly. â€" By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move.â€​

Force by itself is not punishable unless, it is a 'criminal force'.

The criminal force is defined under Section 350 of I.P.C., which is as follows:-

“350 . Criminal force.â€"Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person’s consent, in order to the committing of any

offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance

to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.â€​

Meena Devi Nirmalkar (P.W.-1) has not made any mention regarding use of any force.

Mehtarin Nath (P.W.-2) has stated that the applicants asked the witness not to cook food and then pulled the burning wood from the stove and put

water on it. This statement of hers remained unrebutted.

Premin Bai (P.W.-3) has similarly stated and her statement is not challenged in the cross-examination.

Similarly, the statement of Shiv Kumari (P.W.-4), Shakun Bai (P.W.-5) and Harirath Nirmalkar (P.W.-6) on this point is also unchallenged. This

act of the applicants pulling the fire wood from the wooden stove is an act within the definition of 'criminal force' under Section 350 of I.P.C. As this

act has caused F.I.R. and annoyance to the complainant and others.

The reliance of the applicants on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mariadasan and Others Vs. State of T.N. (Supra) and State of

Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jodha Singh and Others (Supra) does not appear to be applicable in the facts present in this case. The applicants had arrived at the

spot, quarreled with the complainant and others and used physical force to obstruct the work in progress. The evidence does not disclose anything as

such that the act of using force to cause annoyance to the complainant and others was an individual act. The Fifth Clause of the Section 141 of I.P.C.

is clear on this point according to which “an assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assemblyâ€, if the common object of

the persons composing that assembly is to use criminal force, or show criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or

to omit to do what he legally entitled to do. Same is the situation present in this case according to the unrebutted and unchallenged evidence present in

the record of the trial Court. Therefore, I am of this view that the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court have not committed any error in

the orders passed, therefore, this revision petition is dismissed and disposed off.

With these observations, this Criminal Revision stands disposed off.