Khanna Improvement Trust, Khanna vs Jai Gopal Gupta

Harjit Singh Bedi, J.

The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby while quashing Annexure P/10 dated 11.8.1986 a direction to allot two plots to the respondents has been issued. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as under :

The Khanna Improvement Trust, Khanna, the appellant herein, framed a Scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") for the development of a residentialcumcommercial centre within that town. The land which was sought to be acquired included an area of 14 & 15 Marlas belonging to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. The land was finally acquired vide Award dated 25.11.1981. The State Government in exercise of the powers under Section 73(1)(xiii) of the Act framed rules known as the Utilisation of Land and Allotment of Plots by Improvement Trust Rules, 1975, (hereinafter called the 1975 Rules) which came into force on 1891975, which provided inter alia for allotment of plots at a reserved price to the persons, who had been displaced on acquisition of their land. Rule 2 of these rules defined a local displaced person in the following terms :

"Local displaced person'' means a person, who is owner of a property acquired by the Trust for the execution of a Scheme and has been such owner for a continuous period of two years immediately before the first publication of the scheme by the Trust under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1992."

The respondents believing themselves to be eligible for entitlement of two plots under the 1975 Rules, duly applied to the Trust for that purpose. The Trust thereafter vide letter dated 1671976 (Annexure P/1) informed the respondents that a decision to allot a plot each to the respondents had been taken. This fact was reiterated vide Annexure P/2 dated 25.1.1982. It appears that when no action was taken pursuant to the two communications aforesaid and the appellant on the contrary proceeded to dispose of the plots in question by way of draw of lots, the present writ petition was filed. In the meantime the 1975 Rule were replaced by the Punjab Town Improvement (Utilisation of Land and Allotment of Plots) Rules, 1983, which came into force from December 22, 1983, and the definition of a Local Displaced Person was modified and it was provided that a person would be entitled to be identified as one, only if the area acquired from him was more than half an acre. The learned Single Judge on a consideration of the matter found that the case of the respondents was covered by the 1975 Rules and as a decision had been taken vide Annexures P1 and P2 to provide them a plot each, they were entitled to succeed.

The learned counsel for the appellant has urged two basic points; firstly, that the 1975 Rules did not apply to the respondents as they did not qualify to be called Local Displaced Persons and secondly, that no final decision had been taken by the appellant or conveyed to the respondents with regard to the allotment of plots to them so as to confer an indefeasible right on them.

Mr. Hemant Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has however, relied on Annexures P/9, dated 25.2.1976, P/10 dated 20.4.1976 and P/11 dated 3.6.1976 which have been appended with Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 471 of 1992 in support of his assertion that a decision had been taken by the appellant to allot plots to the respondents and this decision could not be subsequently rescinded. However, Mr. Gupta has also urged that as the 1975 Rules were only guidelines, they could be relaxed, or even ignored by the appellant Trust.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the appeal deserves to succeed. It will be seen that Rule 2 of the 1975 Rules was wholly inapplicable to the case of the respondents as they became owners of the acquired land on 16th June, 1975, whereas the Notification under Section 36 of the Act had been issued on September 14, 1973, whereby they were required to be owners for a continuous period of two years immediately before the publication of the said Notification. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the respondents were covered by the Scheme is, therefore, totally erroneous. It is further apparent to us that the case of the respondents was not covered under the 1983 Rules for the simple reason that the land that had been acquired from each of them, was less than half an acre.

We have also considered and found merit in the argument of the counsel for the appellant that no decision had been taken to allot plots to the respondents. It is true that Annexures P/I and P/2 refer to some decision that had been taken, but this does not find its basis in any resolution of the Trust. As a matter of fact, Annexure P/9 to which reference had been made above and on which primary reliance has been placed by the counsel for the respondents, does not refer to the question of allotment of a plot to the respondents, but suggests a scheme whereby the land that was to be acquired from them could be exempted on payment of some development charges. In the absence of any resolution of the Trust, the communication Annexures, P/1 and P/2 could not clothe the respondents with any right to the plots in question.

Mr. Gupta has finally contended that the 1975 Rules were mere guidelines and as such could be deviated from, should the appellant so desire and as a matter of fact this had been done in the present case and the letters Annexures P/1 and P/2, though not preceded by a resolution of the Trust, could well be construed as letters of allotment. We have considered this aspect of the matter as well but find no merit in it. Admittedly the 1975 Rules have been framed under Section 73 of the Act and, thus, have statutory force. To hold that these rules were mere guidelines which could be deviated from or even flouted would do violence to the very purpose of the promulgation of the rules and give a carte blanche to the Trust to act in an arbitrary or mala fide manner in the allotment of plots. We are also of the opinion that if we were to accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondents, we would have to issue a writ of mandamus against the appellant and that direction would be contrary to the statutory rules. This surely cannot be done.

For the reasons recorded above, the present appeal is allowed; the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.