High CourtsDivision Bench

Kidambi Sambamurthi Aiyar vs E. Ramakrishna Aiyar and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 13 September 1928 · Citation: AIR 1929 Mad 43 : (1929) ILR (Mad) 337 : 114 Ind. Cas. 847 : (1929) 29 LW 60 : (1928) 55 MLJ 837

HON’BLE JUDGES
Pakenham Walsh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 — Section 27
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Judgment

15 paragraphs · 370 words

Pakenham Walsh, J.—This is an appeal against the judgment of Jackson, J., in appeal against the order of the District Court of Madura in

C.M.A. No. 201 of 1926, which was preferred against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul, dated 7th August, 1926 in M.P. No. 223

of 1925. The original order granted an extension of the time during which to apply for discharge u/s 27 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. On appeal

to the District Court this order was reversed. The appeal against the order of the District Court is laid to the High Court. Mr. Justice Jackson held

that no appeal lay evidently u/s 75(2). Section 75 (2) runs as follows:

Any such person aggrieved by any such decision or order of a District Court as is specified in Schedule I, come to or made otherwise than in

appeal from an order made by a Subordinate Court, may appeal to the High Court.

2.

This order is one made under Schedule I and quite obviously on the terms of this section there is no second appeal in the matter. It has been

sought however to argue from the second proviso to Section 75(1) that the order can be taken to be one u/s 4 of the Act and a second appeal lies

against any order passed u/s 4 on a question of law. To say that this order is passed u/s 4 amounts to saying that every order under the Act can be

brought u/s 4 and that therefore a second appeal lies on a question of law against every order passed under the Act. That is to render the schedule

and the plain proviso of Section 75 (2) meaningless. A sort of analogy was sought to be drawn from the Civil Procedure Code, but that does not in

our opinion apply. There is nothing in the decisions quoted in that analogy which renders one part of that Act inconsistent with another, whereas the

effect here is to wipe out a definite proviso as to appeal. It is a settled principle of construction that an Act must be construed, if possible,

consistently with itself. We therefore find against the contention and dismiss the appeal with costs.