Kikar Singh vs Union of India

M.S. Liberhan, J.

This judgment shall also dispose of Civil Revision No. 3111 of 1988 as common question of law and fact is involved in both these Revision Petitions.

For the purpose of disposing of these Revision Petitions, facts which are pari materia with the facts of Civil Revision No. 3111 of 1988, are taken from this Revision Petition.

The factual matrix is that the land of the petitioner was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Compensation was awarded by the Collector. The petitioner preferred objections under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and prayed for reference to the Additional District Judge, who finally disposed of the reference vide his order dated 9th January, 1985. While disposing of the said reference, the Additional District Judge awarded 30% solatium and 9% per annum interest as envisaged by the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The petitioner preferred an application under sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming that the award of the Additional District Judge be modified and the petitioner be awarded interest at the rate of 15% after the expiry of one year from the date on which the possession was taken till the amount was deposited with the Additional District Judge. Amendment of the award was sought in the above terms in view of the provisions of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner further claimed for modification of the award to the effect that 12% per annum be awarded on the compensation from the dated of notification under section 4 till the award was made in terms of section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended.

The Additional District Judge vide order dated 22nd October, 1988 awarded 12% per annum interest for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of notification under section 4 till the date of award in terms of section 23 (1A). He, however, declined to grant the interest at the rate of 15% observing :

"Bare perusal of the judgment sought to be amended shows that provisions of the amended Act pressed into service were very much within the knowledge of the Court while delivering judgment on 9th January, 1985, when it granted solatium at the rate of 30% instead of 15% interest at the rate of 9% instead of 6%. The fact that Court did not allow interest at the rate of 15% touching the period after the expiry of the year of the acquisition does not mean, even by stretch of imagination, that provisions of the amended Act qua interest were not within its notice."

From the above, it was concluded that interest of 15% had been expressly declined and the remedy of the petitioner was by way of appeal.

The counsel for the petitioner challenged the said observation of the Court and contended that it was the duty of the Court to award the decree in terms of the statute and the application had been made only requiring the Court to discharge its statutory obligation. If any error had crept in the award on account of the error on the part of the Court, the party should not suffer. The Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. In order to support the said submission, the counsel for the petitioner relied on Bhag Singh and others v. Union Territory of Chandigarh through the Land Acquisition Collector, Chandigarh, 1985 R.L.R. 458 : 1987 R.R.R. 473 : 1986 R.R.R. 606 and Matu Ram (Since now Dead) represented by his L. Rs. v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1988(1) R.L.R. 22 : 1988(1) R.R.R. 182.

The counsel for the respondent half heartedly opposed the contentions of the petitioner and relied on Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai and others v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and another, A.I.R. 1987 Bombay 214.

In my considered view the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner has a force. It is well accepted norm that a party should not be allowed to suffer on account of the error on the part of the Court. There is no gain saying that awarding of the statutory solatium as well as other statutory benefits like interest was the statutory obligation of Court. If the Court had failed to do so, it was the incumbent duty of the Court to rectify the same and, in particular, when it was brought to its notice.

In Matu Ram''s case (supra), it has been observed :

"It is, thus, clear that when the applicant have moved the application requiring the Court to discharge its obligation by giving to them the benefit under section 23(2) and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Act, 68 of 1984, their application cannot be termed as an application for review. As already stated, subsection (2) of section 30 clearly implies that the benefit of subsection (4) of section 23 and amended section 28 has to be given by the Court even in those appeals which had been decided by it after 30th April, 1982, and before coming into force of Act 68 of 1984 (dare of enforcement being 24th September, 1984). The section has not fixed any timelimt for this purpose. In the circumstances, the application moved requiring the Court to discharge its statutory obligation cannot be said to be barred by limitation merely because it has not been filed as an application for review within 30 days of the date of the judgment."

Even the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh''s case (supra) has observed that denial of payment of market value so determined to claimant tantamount to permitting State Government to acquire land on payment of less than true market value. It was further observed that the State Government must do what is fair and just to citizen and should not take up a technical plea to defeat legitimate and just claim of the citizen.

Thus, it is obvious that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in holding that the remedy available to the petitioner was only by way of appeal for claiming interest which appears to have been erroneously not granted while passing order dated 12th November, 1988. Provisions of sections 151, 152 and 153 confer jurisdiction on the Court to modify its own judgment or decree in order to rectify any error which had crept in on account of some error on the part to rectify any error which had crept in on account of some error on the part of the Court. Thus, the lower appellate Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.

The judgment cited by the counsel for the respondent is not relevant on the subject in this revision petition.

In view of my above observations, the revision petition is allowed and the award of the Additional District Judge is modified to the extent that the petitionerclaimant shall be entitled to the interest in terms of Section 28 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, i.e. the claimant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date the possession of the land was taken till the date the amount awarded was deposited with the Additional District Judge. The revision petition is allowed with costs. Costs Rs. 500/.