Kishan Lal and Others vs DCM Limited and Another

DR. M.K. Sharma, J.—By this order I propose to dispose of the aforementioned petitions as they give rise to and involve similar issues which were urged before me.

The respondent/Delhi Cloth Mill is a company which owns 52 acres of land at Bara Hindu Rao, Kishan Ganj, Delhi and was running a textile mill at the said place. The mill had in all about 63 acres of land, out of which 52 acres were free-hold land whereas remaining 11 acres were lease-hold land. A master pain was drawn up and put into operation in 1962 by Delhi Development Authority for the entire Delhi in terms of which the mill was required to be shifted from the aforesaid location which was held under the Master Plan as a non-conforming area. In the said Master Plan it was also stipulated that the land on which the mill was located could be used for flatted factories and group housing residential schemes. Accordingly, the respondent applied to Delhi Administration for permission to close its mill and submit a scheme to Delhi Development Authority for re-development of the land into group housing and flatted factories. The aforesaid closure of the mill was sought for u/s 25-D of the Industrial Disputes Act. Delhi Administration However, refused to accord such permission which resulted in filling of writ petition in this court which was registered as C. W. P. 128/1985. The Full Bench of this court allowed the writ petition and the Lt. Governor of Delhi was directed to determine the application of the company for permission to close down the Undertaking u/s 25-D of the Industrial Disputes Act. The SLP filed as against the aforesaid order of this court was also dismissed and thus the respondent closed its textile mill w.e.f.1.4.1989.

Delhi Development Authority however, revoked its resolution dated 1.2.1993 whereby it had granted permission to the respondent to re-develop the land in terms of their request. The aforesaid action on the part of Delhi Development Authority also came to the challenged in a writ petition in this court which was registered and numbered as writ petition No. 2687/1986 which was also allowed by the Full Bench of this court on 2.5.1987 upholding the right of the respondent to re-develop the land as per Master Plan. Delhi Development Authority as also the Central Government challenged the said judgment in SLP which dismissed on 30.3.1990 directing the Delhi Development Authority to grant conditional approval. By the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court upheld the right of the respondent to re-develop the land. By its order dated 1.5.1991 the Supreme Court approved the scheme of the respondent for re-development of 52 acres of land at Bara Hindu Rao, Kishan Ganj, Delhi.

The respondents, thereafter, filed an application u/s 19(1)(a) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the ACC) seeking permission for eviction against the petitioner herein. The said applications were taken up for consideration and the competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance ) Act allowed that said application granting permission u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act, 1956. While allowing the said applications the Competent Authority (Slum Areas) considered the decisions of this court in Punny Ram and Others Vs. Chiranji Lal Gupta and Others, as also the orders of the Supreme Court delivered in respect of the aforesaid land and on consideration thereof proceeded to grant permission as sought for by respondent. Various pleas were raised by the petitioner before the Competent Authority, which after careful scrutiny were found to be Within any merit.

Being aggrieved by the said orders passed by the Competent Authority the present petitions have been filed by the petitioners, wherein similar pleas have been taken by the petitioners and were also urged before me at the time of arguments.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that it was necessary for the Competent Authority to consider the status of the tenants and their means to get an alternative accommodation so that if the tenant is evicted he would not create another slum and as the aforesaid factors and aspects have not been dealt with by the Competent Authority the decisions of such Competent Authority are vitiated. Counsel appearing for the petitioner referred to the provisions of Sections 19 & 20 of the Act and relying on the said provisions it was submitted that the Competent Authority failed to take into consideration the subsequent acts and the events after passing of the order dated 13.10.1992 by which the title of the respondent in respect of the land came to be affected in view of passing of the resolution by determining the lease of the land lease out to the respondent. He submitted that since the respondent had no title to the aforesaid land in view of determination of the lease of the land leased out to it no permission could have been granted to the respondent for initiating actions envisaged u/s 19 of the Act. He also submitted that section 20 of the Act provides for exercise of the option by the petitioner and Therefore, no such permission could have been granted by the Competent Authority ignoring the provisions of Section 20 of the Act.

Counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the orders of the Competent Authority are well reasoned orders and that there is no infirmity in the said orders. He submitted that after passing of the orders by the Full Bench of this court which were up-held by the Supreme Court the present petitions are not maintainable. He also submitted that the clauses (a) & (b) of Section 19(4) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 are disjunctive and Therefore, even if the tenant does not have means to acquire alternative accommodation permission has to be granted. In support of the aforesaid proposition the counsel for the respondent relied upon the case of Shri Punnu Ram and Others Vs. Shri Chiranji Lal Gupta (Dead) By L.RS. and Others, . In the said case the Supreme Court, after referring to the provisions of Section 19 and 20(A) of the Act considered the case of Jyoti Pershad Vs. Administrator of Union Territory of Delhi; reported in 1961 (2) SCR 125, held that the aforesaid two clauses are disjunctive. It was held that if the factor mentioned in clause (a) is satisfied i.e. If the alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant is available them there is no reason to held that second factor is required to be satisfied before granting permission under sub-section (3). It was further held that clause (b) provides that before granting such permission the Competent Authority should be satisfied whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas then permission for eviction can be granted. In such cases also, a tenant would not be put to any hardship it he is evicted.

The Supreme Court went on to hold that if the aforesaid two factors mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 19 are to be taken into account as alternative factors by the competent authority before granting permission to file a suit for eviction or to grant permission for execution of a decree against a tenant residing in a slum area, the tenant''s rights are not in any manner prejudicially affected, for he has an option u/s 20(a) of the Act under which he is fully protected. In view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act even if the building is required by the owner for demolition or re-construction or improvement the provisions of Section 20 provide ample safeguard to a tenant, for if the tenant so desires to be replaced in occupation of the building after completion of the work or improvement or re-erection of the building then he is required to file an application before the Competent Authority. In view of the aforesaid provisions it was held that if the tenant is evicted on the ground of improvement or demolition of the building in the slum area, then the tenant is required to be provided accommodation in the improved or re-constructed building.

In the present case however, the said stage has not arrived and Therefore, at the present moment and at this stage the said provision of section 20 of the Act could not be made applicable. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Therefore, that even the provision of Section 20 are violated, is found to be premature at this stage. The plea that the respondents have no right and title to the land due to cancellation of lease is also without merit as admittedly 53 bighas of land in question are free hold and Therefore, the respondents are absolute owners of the remaining land also. Except for the resolution no other documentary evidence has been placed on record to show that the respondents do not have right over the land. Admittedly, the respondents continue to be in possession of land and Therefore, in absence of evidence it appears that the resolution was not given effect to.

The two factor mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 19 have been held to be alternative factors which are required to be considered by the Competent Authority before granting permission to file a suit for eviction. In the present case the Competent Authority has considered the said factors and on consideration Therefore found that the permission as sought for is to be granted as the eviction is sought for in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. The scheme of the re-development submitted by the respondent has been approved by the decisions of the Full Bench of this court which have been upheld by the Supreme Court. It was found that the cases of the petitioners are fully covered by the Full Bench decision of this court in Punnu Ram and Others Vs. Chiranji Lal Gupta; reported in Act 1982 Delhi 431 and upheld by the Supreme Court. The aforesaid conclusions were arrived at by the Competent Authority on the basis of the findings that clauses (a) & (b) are alternative factors to be taken note of by the Competent Authority. The land from which eviction is sought for fails within the non-conforming area and redevelopment of the said land stood approved by this court as also by the Supreme Court.

In view of the aforesaid position the present cases squarely fall within the purview of Section 19 of the Act. I, Therefore, do not find any infirmity in the orders passed by the Competent Authority. The petitions have no merit and are dismissed accordingly.