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Judgment
K.K. Lahoti, J.
This petition is directed against the order Annexure P/5 by Labour Court, Sagar in Case No. 8/ID Act/99 (Chandra Shekhar v. Zaidka Gas Services, Sagar) by which the Labour Court allowed the application filed by Respondent Chandra Shekhar u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and directed Petitioner to pay the difference of salary Rs. 87,382/- along with cost Rs. 500 /-.
Short facts of the case are that Respondent No. 2 was appointed as Clerk on 7.5.1988 by the Petitioner. Respondent worked upto September, 1998, but he was paid the salary which was below the minimum wages fixed under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. Apart from this since October 1998 to June 1999, the salary was also not paid. Respondent claimed minimum salary and the difference of the salary of the period between 7.5.88 and 26.10.98 and the salary of unpaid period.
The Petitioner opposed the application by filing reply. In nut-shell, the plea before the Labour Court was that Respondent was a part time Accountant clerk and was paid agreed wages. He worked upto 1996 and thereafter left the job without any information. In the year 1996-97, he was operating an auto riksha, after obtaining loan under Self-Employment Scheme. Then worked in a Corporation at Dhana in the year 1997-1998. In the year 1999, again Respondent approached and prayed for employment by the Petitioner. Respondent had not worked in the year 1996 to 1998. Previously the Respondent''s claim for the period of 1.4.90 to 30.9.90 has already been rejected by the competent Court. So the claim filed by the Respondent is not maintainable.
The Labour Court framed issues and after recording the evidence found that Respondent No. 2 is entitled for the difference of salary, as he was not paid the minimum wages as required to be paid under the provisions of Minimum Wages Act. The plea of limitation was also turned down and Petitioner was directed to pay Rs. 87,382/- along with cost.
The aforesaid order has been challenged by the Petitioner before this Court on following grounds:
(1) That the aforesaid application u/s 33-C of the Act was not maintainable before the Labour Court and Respondent No. 2 ought to have filed an application under the provisions of Minimum Wages Act.
(2) The application filed by Respondent was barred by time and the Labour Court erred in allowing the claim for a period of near about 12 years.
Contending the aforesaid, the learned Counsel for Petitioner submits that the order impugned is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.
The learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2 supported the order passed by the Labour Court, contended that the application was maintainable before the Labour Court. As Respondent No. 2 was claiming minimum wages as per provisions of Minimum Wages Act and Respondent was entitled to receive from the Petitioner the amount which was capable of being computed in terms of money. Consequently, the Labour Court was having jurisdiction to entertain the application u/s 33-C of the Act. So far as question of limitation is concerned, no limitation is prescribed for filing an application u/s 33-C of the Act. In the circumstances, the application filed by the Respondent was rightly allowed and cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
The learned Counsel for both the parties have relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co. op. Mktg. cum processing Service Society Ltd.: 1999 LAB I.C. 1345 and contended that the case be decided in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court. The main distinguishing feature in the arguments advanced by both the counsel is that on the ground of delay, the relief granted to the Respondent may be moulded by refusing back wages or part of back wages may be awarded. While the learned Counsel for Respondent relying on para 10 of the judgment contended that on the ground of limitation, the application cannot be rejected. The Respondent was entitled for the wages as per provisions of Minimum Wages Act and the Petitioner was under obligation to pay the wages to Respondent as per the provision, but failed to pay the adequate wages. In the circumstances, Respondent No. 2 is entitled for the difference of wages. Apart from the aforesaid argument, the learned Counsel appearing for Respondent has relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Natwarlal Amrutlal Shah V. Employees State Insurance Scheme: 2002 LAB I.C. 837, Single Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of Pathan Jamlkhan Mohmmed Khan v. Director of Agriculture and Anr. 2002 Lab.I.C. 839 and contended that merely on the ground of delay, claim of Respondent/employee cannot be rejected. u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, no limitation is prescribed. In the circumstances, the relief as granted by the Labour Court may be affirmed and there is no question of any curtailment in the back wages of the employee. The order passed by the Labour Court is just and proper and deserves to be sustained by this Court.
To consider the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to look into provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act which reads as under ;
33-C Recovery of money due from an employer-
(1)......................................
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period not exceeding three months):
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.
From the perusal of Section 33-C(2) of the Act, it does not provide any limitation for filing of application. The industrial Disputes Act is a special Act which also provides special provision for recovery of the money due to a workman. Provision of the law of Limitation should not be imported to the Industrial Disputes Act where there is no provision of limitation for the recovery of money due to the workman. When the legislation itself has not provided any period of limitation and if the relief is curbed because of aforesaid objection of the limitation, then it will be something, which is to be read in the statute while it is not specifically provided. Even the provision of Section 137 of the Limitation Act will not apply in the present case as it is applicable to the suits and not to the application u/s 33-C(2) of the Act. This is a beneficial provision in favour of the workman. The Parliament in its wisdom has not provided any period of limitation which could be provided by the legislation. In these circumstances, when the legislature itself has not provided the limitation, it cannot be made applicable because of judicial legislation. The entire object of the provision is to endorse the entitlement of a workman against the employer in terms of money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The Apex Court while considering the provision of Section 33-C(2) and similar provision in Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act (1948) in Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. Vs. Rameswar and Others, held:
These applications were made in 1962 though they related to claims for the years commencing from 1948 and onwards. The contention therefore was that part of these claims, at any rate, must be held to be barred either by limitation or by reason of laches on the part of the workmen. The answer to this contention is clearly provided in the case of Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva and Others, where a distinction was drawn between considerations which would prevail in an industrial adjudication and those which must prevail in a case filed under a statutory provision such as Section 33C(2). This Court pointed out there that whereas an industrial dispute is entertained on grounds of social justice and therefore a Tribunal would in such a case take into consideration factors such as delay or laches, such consideration are irrelevant to claims made under statutory provision unless such provision lays down any period of limitation. The Court held that there is no justification in inducting a period of limitation provided in the Limitation Act into the provisions of Section 33C(2) which do not lay down any limitation and that such a provision can only be made by legislature if it thought fit and not by the Court on an analogy or any other such consideration. It is matter of some significance that though the legislature amended Section 33C by Act 86 of 1964 and introduced limitation in the section, it did so by means of a proviso only in respect of claims made under Sub-Section 1 but did not provide any limitation for claims under sub.s.(2).........
The Apex Court in Punjab Co-op. Bank Limited v. R.S. Bhatia:
The Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. R.S. Bhatia (Dead) through Lrs., held:
The second plea on behalf of the Appellant that the claim of the Respondent u/s 33-C(2) of the Act was barred by limitation or was not fit to be entertained on the ground of undue delay or laches on the part of Respondent No. 1 has rightly been rejected by the Labour Court following the decisions of this Court in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva and Others, and Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. Vs. Rameswar and Others, .
In Ajab Singh (supra), the Apex Court held:
It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Corut can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases directed the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages..........
In the instant case, the Respondent-management is not shown to have taken any plea regarding delay as is evident from the issues framed by the Labour Court. The only plea raised in defence was that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference and the termination of the services of the workman was justified. Had this plea been raised, the workman would have been in a position to show the circumstances preventing him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or even to satisfy the Court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the Government. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, were not justified in holding that the workman had not given any explananation as to why the demand notice had been issued after a long period. The findings of facts returned by the High Court in writ proceedings, even without pleadings were, therefore, unjustified. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the Courts were bound to render an even handed justice by keeping balance between the two different parties. Such an approach totally ignores the aims and object and the social object sought to be achieved by the Act. Even after noticing that: it is true that a fight between the workman and the management is not a just between equals," the Court was not justified to make them equals while returning the findings, which if allowed to prevail, would result in frustration of the purpose of the enactment. The workman appears to be justified in complaining that in the absence of any plea on behalf of the management and any evidence, regarding delay, he could not be deprived of the benefits under the Act merely on technicalities of law. The High Court appears to have substituted its opinion for the opinion of the Labour Court which was not permissible in proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
Considering the aforesaid settled position by the Apex Court, though the application filed by the workman was belated, but the fact remains that it was the statutory duty of the employer to pay minimum wages to the employee. He was not paying adequate wages to the employee. It is a common knowledge that employment in these days is very difficult. The employer taking the benefit of this situation if not paid adequate wages to the employee and has deprived statutory right of the employee, then if the employee has not approached before the appropriate forum immediately or within the period of three years, then his application cannot be thrown merely on the ground that he has not approached the appropriate forum for endorsement of his rights. Because if an employee approached to any forum, he has to face adverse circumstance from the employer even circumstances may arise when the employer may deprive the employee from the employment. In these circumstances, there is always hesitation to the employees to approach immediately any Court for redressal of the grievance. Initially he tries to pursue his employer for his dues and to some extent he usually adjusts himself with the situation, but the employer cannot take benefit of the aforesaid situation. He is duty bound to comply with the statutory provisions which are expected to be of his knowledge. The provisions of Minimum Wages Act are enacted to provide sufficient wages to the employees and the employer has to pay the minimum wages to the employee. Merely in Minimum Wages Act, there is provision of Limitation will not debar the Court to enforce the statutory liability which is computable in terms of money u/s 33-C of the Act. In the aforesaid circumstances, if the Labour Court has allowed minimum wages to the Respondent/employee for a period of 1988 to 1999, then it cannot be said that the Labour Court exceeded to its jurisdiction in granting relief to the Respondent.
Considering the aforesaid, I do not find any jurisdictional error, material illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Labour Court which in my opinion is in consonance with Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed with cost. Counsel''s fee is quantified Rs. 1000/- payable by the Petitioner.