Kishun vs Union of India and Others

Ajai Lamba, J.—Kishun has approached this Court through his next friend to seek issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus for his release and also for declaring detention order dated 30.10.2014, passed under National Security Act, 1980 (for short, Act of 1980) arbitrary and bad in law.

Facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.

It appears that the petitioner is an accused in Case Crime No. 309 of 2014 under Section 302 I.P.C., P.S. Nawabganj, district Gonda wherefore, First Information Report was registered on 2.8.2014, in context of an incident of 2nd August, 2014.

Perusal of First Information Report indicates that it has been lodged by father of deceased Meraj alias Saddam with the allegation that he along with his wife and son Siraz, accompanied with Meraj was coming from Hyderabad to their house. When they reached near the house of Chhedi, Chhedi alias Vinod son of Mathura, Girja Devi wife of Chhedi, Kishun son of Swarup, Vishnu son of Kishun armed with lathi danda and with pre- meditation, sitting in wait, attacked Meraj alias Saddam with intention to kill him. When Meraj wanted to flee, the above named accused persons followed him in the rice field and caused injuries so as to kill him. An alarm was raised whereupon, Guddu son of Mustafa and Jokhu son of Mustafa also came there. The accused could be seen in torch light. Meraj was brought to the hospital. On the way, Meraj died.

The motive for incident has been given in the First Information Report itself that the accused were inimical on account of a dispute in relation to agricultural land.

It appears that the petitioner was arrested and applied for bail. Application for bail was rejected on 21.10.2014 by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for bail before the Sessions Judge, Gonda which too was turned down by order dated 18.12.2014 (Annexure CA-11 to the counter affidavit of District Magistrate, Gonda)

Impugned order of detention under Section 3(2) and 3(3) of Act of 1980 was passed on 30.10.2014.

In order dated 30.10.2014, the allegations made in the First Information Report have been noticed. Notice of the investigation process has also been taken, whereafter it has been recorded that after rejection of order of bail, the petitioner has been making attempts to be released on bail. It has been recorded in the order that atmosphere in the entire area has been vitiated. On account of the incident, public accumulated at the police station. Public order has been disturbed by the action of the petitioner. District Magistrate has recorded that it is believed that on being released on bail, the petitioner would indulge in similar activities.

It appears from the record that the impugned order dated 30.10.2014 has been passed taking into account recommendation of Superintendent of Police, Gonda dated 24.8.2014 wherein it has been indicated that on account of incident, the atmosphere in neighboring villages had been disturbed. Traffic movement had been disrupted.

Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. R.P. Mishra, essentially, is that for an incident of 2nd August, 2014, order of detention has been passed on 30.10.2014, i.e. after 90 days. There is not a whisper of allegation that in the intervening period, there was any communal riot or incident that could indicate reasonable apprehension of disturbance of public order.

On the second count, it has been argued that offence allegedly committed by the petitioner is not on account of any religious belief etc; rather it is the admitted case of the complainant that there was enmity between the parties on account of some land dispute. It has been argued that the incident is of late night when nobody from the public was available. The ground for detention mentioned in the impugned order, therefore, is without any factual basis.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has argued that at best, it can be deciphered that a law and order issue has been raised by murder of an individual. Disturbance of public order is not made out, which is quite distinct from law and order situation.

Mr. R.P. Mishra, Learned counsel has relied on 1991 Lucknow Criminal Reports, page 27 Islamuddin versus The State (para 32) (Division Bench judgment of this Court), Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) and Mrs. T. Devaki Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, .

In Islamuddin''s case (supra) in para 32, this Court has held that merely because an incident took place in morning hours in a congested locality in a public street, it cannot be treated to have disturbed public order. It is solitary incident related to personal enmity. The Court has taken note of the fact that the incident was directed against members of the same community in connection with property and therefore, it has been concluded that it had no potentiality for the disturbance of public order. Paragraph 32 is extracted herebelow for exact reference:

"32. In view of the above we are clearly of the opinion that merely because the incident had taken place at 10-30 in the morning and that too in a congested locality on a public street it could not be treated to have disturbed the public order as the solitary incident related only to personal enmity. The assault was committed against two persons, namely, Aman Ilahi and Ahsan Ilahi who were done to death. No other person was sought to be assaulted. The incident was directed against the members of the same community for the reason that the deceased had failed to deliver possession to the assailants on a shop and a plot of land. The incident had no potentiality for the disturbance of public order."

In Manu Bhusan Roy Pradhan''s case (supra) in paras 7 and 8, Hon''ble Supreme Court of India has taken notice of the earlier judgments on the issue to hold that individual liberty is a cherished and one of the most valuable fundamental rights, guaranteed by our Constitution to the citizens of this country. If that right is invaded, excepting strictly in accordance with law, the aggrieved parties are entitled to appeal to the judicial power of the State for relief. The authorities cannot deal with liberty of an individual in a casual manner. Such an approach does not advance the true social interest. Continued indifference to individual liberty is bound to erode the structure of our democratic society. The said paragraphs 7 and 8 are extracted herebelow :

"7. In our view, ground No. 1 which does not mention the names or details of the others along with whom the petitioner is alleged to have committed the assault, only refers to an assault, on an individual named Bulo Das Gupta on April 16, 1971 which prima facie appears to raise only a law and order problem. In Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) several instances of assaults were stated in the grounds of detention. Hidayatullah C.J. speaking for the Court observed in that case. "The submission of the counsel is that these are stray acts directed against individuals and are not subversive of public order and therefore the detention on the ostensible ground of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order was not justified. In support of this submission reference is made to three cases, of this Court : Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) and Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) . In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia''s case this Court pointed out the difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different." The learned Chief Justice, after referring to the lines of demarcation drawn by Ramaswami J., in W.P. 179 of 1968 between serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large and minor breaches of peace, which do not affect the public at large, and after noting the analogy drawn by Ramaswami J., between public and private crimes, cautioned against that analogy being pushed too far, observing, that a large number of acts directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. After referring to Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) the learned Chief Justice observed :

"It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed ? This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another."

This view was reaffirmed in Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ., Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) , Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) , Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) and Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court)

Ground No. 1 in the case before us merely mentions murderous assault by the petitioner on Bulo Das Gupta. It shows neither the nature of the weapon used nor the nature or extent of the injuries inflicted, nor does it disclose as to how long after the assault the injured person died. The motive for the purpose of the assault is also not stated. This kind of a solitary assault on one individual, which may well be equated with an ordinary murder which is not an uncommon occurrence, can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy, so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. It can only raise a law and order problem and no more; its impact on the society as a whole cannot be considered to be so extensive, widespread and forceful as to disturb the normal life of the community thereby rudely shaking the balanced tempo of the orderly life of the general public. This ground is, therefore, not at all relevant for sustaining the order of detention for preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Ground No. 2, however, is quite germane to the problem of maintenance of public order. But the question arises whether in the absence of ground No. 1 which, in our view, is wholly irrelevant, the detaining authority would have felt satisfied on the basis of the solitary ground No. 2 alone to make the impugned order. Can it be said that ground No. 1 is of a comparatively unessential nature so as not to have meaningfully influenced the decision of the detaining authority. Similar problem has faced this Court on a number of occasions and the decision has generally gone in favour of the detenu. This Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj Vs. The State of Delhi and Others, laid down that the requirement that the grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds. In Dwarka Dass Bhatia Vs. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, the principle deduced from the earlier decisions of this Court and also from the decision of the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) was stated thus:

"Where power is vested in a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken together, and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the very exercise of that power is bad. That is so because the matter being one for subjective satisfaction, it must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based. If some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the exclusion of those grounds or reasons. To uphold the validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity of some of the reasons or grounds would be to substitute the objective standards of the Court for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority. In applying these principles however the Court must be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. It is not merely because some ground or reason of a comparatively unessential nature is defective that such an order based on subjective satisfaction can be held to be invalid. The Court while anxious to safeguard the personal liberty of the individual will not lightly interfere with such orders. It is in the light of these principles that the validity of the impugned order has to be judged."

In Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) , it was observed:

"Since the detenu is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a right of being supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention. Similarly, if a vital ground is shown to be non- existing so that it could not have and ought not to have, played a part in the material for consideration, the court may attach some importance to this fact." In Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) , a decision by a Bench of six Judges, after reviewing the earlier decisions, this Court expressed its view thus :

"The defects noticed in the two grounds mentioned above are sufficient to vitiate the order of detention impugned in these proceedings as it is not possible to hold that those grounds could not have influenced the decision of the detaining authority. Individual liberty is a cherished right, one of the most valuable fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution to the citizens of this country. If that right is invaded, excepting strictly in accordance with law, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the judicial power of the State for relief. We are not unaware of the fact that the interest of the society is no less important than that of the individual. Our Constitution has made provision for safeguarding the interests of the society. Its provisions harmonise the liberty of the individual with social interest. The authorities have to act solely on the basis of those provisions. They cannot deal with the liberty of the individual in a casual manner, as has been done in this case. Such an approach does not advance the true social interest. Continued indifference to individual liberty is bound to erode the structure of our democratic society."

In T. Devaki''s case (supra) in paras 18 and 19, it has been held that there should be requisite degree of quality and potentiality in the incident in question so as to justify order of detention. A solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so much as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. Such a solitary incident can only raise a law and order problem and no more. In the said case, there was a murderous assault by the detenu and his associates on a Minister at a seminar, which was stated prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The entire consideration of the Court is in that context. Paragraphs 18 and 19, for convenience, read as under :

"18. The question which falls for consideration is whether single incident of murderous assault by the detenu and his associates on the Minister at the Seminar held at Dry Chilly Merchants'' Association Kalai Arangam Hall was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commission of a criminal offence is bound to some extent affect the peace prevailing in the locality and it may also affect law and order problem but the same need not affect maintenance of public order. There is basic difference between law and order'' and ''public order'', this aspect has been considered by this Court in a number of decisions, see: Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) and Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) . In these cases it was emphasised that an act disturbing public order is directed against individuals which does not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public peace and tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in the locality which determines the nature and character of breach of public order. In Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) the Court held that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of |aw and order, or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order, is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. This view was reiterated in Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) ; Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) and Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) .

In the instant case the detenu was placed under detention on the sole incident which took place on July 29, 1989 and in respect of which the detenu is facing criminal trial before a court of law. The alleged attempted murderous assault made by the detenu and his associates on Thiru Durai Murugan, Minister of Public Works Department may have been made on account of political rivalry. In fact, in his affidavit Thiru Durai Murugan has admitted that in the past the detenu had misbehaved with him even on the floor of the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu while participating in discussion. The attempted assault took place in the hall of Dry Chily Merchants'' Association Kalai Arangam where two Ministers, a number of officials including the District Magistrate, as well as members of the public were present. It is alleged that the attempted murderous assault on Thiru Durai Murugan created scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the persons present in the hall and the detenu''s action interrupted the "proceedings of the Seminar for a while" (emphasis supplied). This shows that the detenu''s activity disturbed the proceedings of the Seminar for a while but the seminar appears to have continued later on. The incident did not and could not affect public peace and tranquility nor it had potential to create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. How could a single murderous assault on the Minister concerned at the Seminar prejudicially affect the even tempo of the life of the community? No doubt in paragraph 4 of the grounds the detaining authority has stated that by committing this grave offence in public, in broad day light, the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected even tempo of life of the community. Repetition of these words in the grounds are not sufficient to inject the requisite degree of quality and potentiality in the incident in question. A solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so much as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. Such a solitary incident can only raise a law and order problem and no more. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that the reach and potentiality of the aforesaid incident was so great as to disturb the normal life of the community in the locality or it disturbed general peace and tranquility. In the absence of such material it is not possible to hold that the incident at the seminar was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In Keshav Talpade vs. EmperorAIR 1943 72 (Federal Court) this Court held that a solitary assault on one individual, which may well be equated with an ordinary murder which is not an uncommon occurrence, can hardly be said to disturb public peace and its impact on the society as a whole cannot be considered to be so extensive, widespread and forceful as to disturb the normal life of the community, thereby shaking the balanced tempo of the orderly life of the general public. The Court held that the detention order which had been made for preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, was not sustainable in law. On a careful consideration of the matter in all its aspects and having regard to the circumstances in which the alleged incident took place on July 29, 1989, we are of the opinion that the solitary incident as alleged in the ground of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."

Mr. Rishad Murtaza, learned Government Advocate has argued that no doubt, there has been some delay in passing the impugned order of detention, however, substantial justice demands that the petition be dismissed.

It has been argued that there is sufficient material available on record which demonstrates that there was likelihood of disruption of public order, if the petitioner was released. In this regard, reference has been made to documents placed on record with counter affidavit dated 21.2.2015 sworn by Mr. Ajay Kumar Upadhyay, District Magistrate, Gonda. Learned counsel for the State has also referred to a number of statements of persons recorded in the course of investigation under Section 161 CrPC and news items.

Mr. Murtaza has also argued that on account of the action of the petitioner in committing murder of a person from different community, there was general unrest in a number of villages. There was information from Local Intelligence Unit (LIU), of public unrest. Consequently, forces had to be moved to the area so as to bring the situation under control. Mr. Murtaza has referred to certain documents in that regard also.

We have heard learned counsel and gone through the impugned order, the documents supporting the impugned order and also the documents on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the parties.

Issue before this Court is whether the impugned order is required to be judicially reviewed or not. For the said purpose, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is required to consider whether on account of murder committed by the petitioner and his co-accused, there was only a law and order issue or there was a reasonable apprehension of disturbance of public order ? For the said purpose, the Court is required to refer to the material available on record.

Ordinarily, in case material on the basis of which detention order is passed, is available on record, the Court would not venture into assessing that material. Essentially, jurisdiction of invoking the provisions of National Security Act lies with the authorities concerned. Subjective satisfaction of the said authority is required to be recorded in the order. Such satisfaction is made on the basis of material available on record. The Court would not ordinarily substitute its own opinion in place of the opinion of the authority.

The law is very clear on the issue that facts and circumstances of each case are to be considered, in context of the material/basis for passing of detention order, while considering legality of a detention order.

In the case in hand, in the impugned order itself, it has been recorded that the petitioner was informed that on account of the murder committed by the petitioner and his co-accused, social peace and tranquility and communal harmony had been disturbed. Circumstances had arisen that indicate disruption of public order. On account of action of the petitioner, the persons living in the area were feeling insecure and unsafe. The daily activities of the people had been disturbed. People were unable to come out of their houses freely. The affected areas belonged to villages Kharauwa, Reeva, Kadipur, Akbarpur, Ramapur, Narayanpur, Hyderabad, Sikandarpur and surrounding areas. It has further been said in the order that the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC in the course of investigation also indicate that there was atmosphere of terror and communal tension. It has been stated that the petitioner has been making attempts to get bail. In case the petitioner is released on bail, the petitioner is likely to indulge in similar activities. Under the circumstances, free movement of the petitioner would not be conducive to public order and it shall not be in the interest of justice.

The documents supporting apprehension of the authority have been appended with the counter affidavit. We have specifically referred to the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC in the course of investigation, of Saleem son of Majeed Khan, Maqbul son of Wali Mohammad, Gufran son of Jaleel, Imtiyaz ali son of Mondi, Suhel Khan son of Ishhaq Khan and Amir Ali son of Raseed.

A perusal of the statements of the above named witnesses do indicate that after the incident, children and ladies bolted the doors from inside their houses, people of the area fled and hid in their houses and both the communities became fearful of each other. At night, a number of police personnel came. There was lot of tension prevailing in the area. People could not follow their daily chores. Although, police personnel were deployed, however, on account of apprehension of communal disharmony amongst the Hindus and Muslims, people hid themselves in their houses. Children were not going to their schools and only after passage of sometime, they, gradually, started to going to school.

The police personnel went house to house, to placate the residents of the area. It is only on assurance of the police that Muslims came out of their houses and could finally bury the deceased Meraj alias Saddam.

Newspaper reports are also available on record which are suggestive of the fact that there was disruption of public order.

The report furnished by Local Intelligence Unit has been made available to the Court through counter affidavit which suggests that there was a general feeling of fear, and atmosphere of terror in the area. Common people were fearful of some unprecedented happenings.

Material has also been placed on record that indicates movement of forces to the general/village areas so as to maintain peace and harmony.

Consideration of statements of residents of the area recorded in the course of investigation, coupled with the news reports and report furnished by Local Intelligence Unit leave no room for doubt in the mind of the Court that, indeed, there was reasonable apprehension of disruption of public order, in case the petitioner comes out of jail. The material could not have been fabricated subsequently, and there is no suggestion coming from the petitioner that the material placed with the counter affidavit is a result of fabrication. The material to which reference has been made above, is relevant to the facts and circumstances of the case and sufficient for invoking the provisions of National Security Act.

We have also taken note of the judgments referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner.

Islamuddin''s case (supra) would have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case, for the reason that material was not considered by the Court or was not produced to indicate apprehension of disturbance of public order, whereas in the case in hand, sufficient material has been placed on record to establish that public order, in fact, had been disturbed. People were feeling unsafe in moving freely.

Manu Bhusan Roy Pradhan''s case (supra) likewise, does not support the plea of the petitioner for the reason that it has been held that an act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different.

The present case is not a case of one person killing another whereafter the community keeps moving at an even tempo; rather it is a case in which person from one community has caused murder of a person of another community creating chaos and disruption of public peace in the area. Both the communities have substantial presence in the area. The act, therefore, is clearly distinguishable from a plain murder case, which might be a heinous offence and crime, however, no potential cause to communal disharmony. In the present case, however, the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community.

Rather we are of the considered opinion that the material placed before the authority concerned was sufficient so as to draw a subjective conclusion that the petitioner is required to be detained.

Case of T. Devaki (supra) would also have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case, for the reason that in the said case, after assault on the Minister, the proceedings of the Seminar were disturbed for a while, but later the seminar continued. Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the incident did not and could not affect public peace and tranquility nor it had potential to create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the area.

In the case in hand, however, from the material noted above, it stands established that the action of the petitioner and his associates in causing murder of a person from another community caused communal disharmony. Forces had to be moved to the general area. Peace and harmony in a number of villages was disturbed. Children and women were not coming out for the fear of attacks by the other community.

So far as the delay in passing the order of detention is concerned, in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the said delay cannot be made the sole ground for holding the proceedings to be illegal or without jurisdiction.

The circumstances for invoking National Security Act, on account of overwhelming material available on record, were clearly there. The respondents have been able to demonstrate that there was a link between the acts of the petitioner detenu and the reason for which detention order has been passed.

The subjective satisfaction of the authority cannot be said to be suspect in view of the material referred to by us hereinabove. The impugned order had not lost its preventive purport at the point in time when it was passed. It cannot be said to be punitive because area of a number of villages was adversely affected by the action of the petitioner. By virtue of murder committed by the petitioner and his associates, smooth movement of the community at large was disrupted, and the life in the general area was not going the normal way. Only the presence of police and their assurance could bring the social life in the area to normalcy. So much so, the body of the deceased could be buried, only after the community was given assurance of security by the police force.

Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. R.P. Mishra has not pointed out any jurisdictional error in passing of the impugned order. There is no allegation of mala fide exercise of power. It is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned order has been actuated on account of political considerations.

It is settled law that each case has to be considered in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. In the considered opinion of the Court, the material on which reliance has been placed to pass the impugned order is relevant, as also sufficient so as to invoke the power under the Act of 1980. We are of the view that possibility of disruption in public order and communal disharmony, on release of the petitioner, could not be ruled out. Under the circumstances, we find that passing of the order in question under Act of 1980 is justified.

In view of above and keeping in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we find no illegality in impugned order dated 30.10.2014 which has been passed after taking into consideration relevant piece of material. Order requires no interference, and is upheld.

Consequently, the petition is dismissed.