High Courts

Kn. Pr. Periakaruppan Chettiar vs R.M.S.R.M. Ramaswami Chettiar and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 18 January 1928 · Citation: AIR 1928 Mad 491 : (1928) 27 LW 418

ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 151
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Judgment

25 paragraphs · 588 words
1.

The first question in this appeal is whether a subordinate Court in British India has power to restrain by injunction a party from prosecuting a suit

in a foreign Court (though within the British Empire). The Chartered High Courts have such power, not by reason of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2,

Civil P.C., but by reason of the equity jurisdiction they inherited from the old Supreme Courts: Rash Behary Dey v. Bhawani Charu Bose [1907]

34 Cal. 97 and Munglechand v. Gopalram [1907] 34 Cal. 101. Those decisions were followed in Uderan Kesaji v. Hyderally [1909] 33 Bom.

469, though the remarks of Woodroffe, J., in Hukumchand Boid v. [1909] 33 Bom. 469; Kamalanand Singh [1906] 33 Cal. 927 about the

inherent powers of a Court now governed by Section 151, Civil P.C., were also relied on. But it is noteworthy that Woodroffe, J., himself in Rash

Bihari Dey v. Bhawani Chan Bose [1907] 34 Cal. 97 does not rely on the inherent powers of a Court but only on the equity jurisdiction inherited

from the Supreme Courts. The decision in Tikanchand Santokchand v. Santokchand Singh [1920] 24 C.W.N. 735 and Mulchand Baichand v. Gill

and Coy [1920] 44 Bom. 283 do not carry the matter further. Mr. Patanjali Sastri, the learned vakil for the respondent, admits that he has not got

a case in which it has been held that a Subordinate Court can exercise such a power.

2.

But, assuming that the Subordinate Judge has such a power, the question arises whether this is a fit case for the exercise of jurisdiction. In this

case the appellants'' suit in the Supreme Court of Ipoh was the first suit, and though this fact is not conclusive in favour of his bona fides, certainly

the burden on the respondents of showing that the prosecution of the suit at Ipoh is vexatious and acts oppressively towards him is heavier.

3.

In the present case, of the two respondents respondent 2 was not a party to the Ipoh suit. Respondent 1 was impleaded as defendant 1, but did

not file a written statement, defendant 2 and 4 only filing a written statement alleging that the agency and partnership of the plaintiff terminated in

October 1923. The suit in the Devakottah Court is filed on 25th November 1926. But these facts are not enough to satisfy the tests laid down in

Cohen v. Rottifield [1919] I K.B. 410, by Scrutton, L. J., where he says:

Unless the appellant satisfies the Court that no advantage can be gained by the defendant by proceeding with the action in which he is plaintiff in

another part of the King''s dominions the Court should not stop him from proceeding with the only proceedings which he as plaintiff can control.

The principle has been repeatedly acted upon.

4.

The same principle was enunciated by Lord St. Leonards in Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren [1858] 5 H.L.C. 416. In the face of this statement of

the law, it is futile to argue that Nattukotai Chetties, whose home is Southern India, have no business to file a suit in the Court of the Federated

Malay States. The grounds given by the Subordinate Judge do not satisfy the tests laid down by Scrutton, L. J., in Cohen v. Rottifield [1919] I

K.B. 410 and by Lord St. Leonards in Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren [1858] 5 H.L.C. 416. We allow the appeal and dismiss the petition of the

respondents with costs throughout (costs including typing of papers.)