Kondapalli Parasuramareddi and Others vs Malereddi Venkayya and Another By Their Mother and Guardian Kotamma

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—Mr. Ramadoss bas again raised the question whether the consent of the next presumptive reversioner is conclusive

evidence of an alienation having been made by a widow for justifiable necessity. He is justified in the state of the authorities in raising it.

Speaking for myself, I see no reason to re-consider my decision in Nachiappa Gounden v. Rangasami Gounden 26 Ind. Cas. 757: (1915) M.

W. N. 53, It is not because I am unwilling to go back upon my views that I say this, but because the later pronouncements of the Judicial

Committee on the question are not in conflict with what I then said. Two decisions of that Tribunal have been quoted before us. In Hari Kishen

Bhagat v. Kashi Parshad Singh 27 Ind. Cas. 67417 Bom. L. R. 426: (1915) M. W. N. 511, the expression ""stringent equity"" was used by the

Board. A good deal of discussion has been directed to explain its meaning. It is said, that by these words the Judicial Committee intended to lay

down that the consent rendered the transaction unimpeachable1. I am unable to accept this construction and to hold that the Privy Council

intended to, depart from the rule which until, Bajrangi Singh v. Manokar-nika Bakhsh Singh 12 C. W. N. 74 was regarded by the Courts in India

as having been enunciated by them, namely, that the consent is only presumptive evidence of the necessity.

The equity is stringent against the consenting party because the consent to a transaction by a widow at a time when the reversioner has only a

spec successionis is sought to be used against him after, the property has vested in him. It is stringent also in the sense that an artificial value is

sought to be given to conduct which ordinarily should only have been understood as suggesting that the widow was justified in dealing with her own

rights* but which is subsequently sought to be used to bind his own interests in the property. I do not think the words should be given any larger

significance than what I have indicated. Reading Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Parshad Singh 27 Ind. Cas. 674: 19 C. W. N. 370: 28 M. L. J. 565:

(1915) M. W. N. 511, once again, I am of opinion that the Judicial Committee only laid down that a thought-less reversioner should have a door

of escape from an uncomfortable position. Rather than bind him down conclusively by the stringency of the equity brought about by his conduct, it

was intended to afford him an opportunity to rebut the presumption.

In Har Chandi Lal v. Sheoraj Singh 39 Ind. Cas, 343: (1917) M. W. N. 290: 21 M. L. T. 292: 21 C. W. N. 765: 39 A. 179, the Judicial

Committee had not to consider the value of the consent. All that they said was a widow was competent to deal with the property, if there was

consent.

In my opinion, it is desirable that there should be some finality in this Court upon this vexed question.

Mr. Ramadoss, not without cause, broadly hinted that an impression prevails that the result of appeals in such matters is dependent upon the

luck of the party in securing a particular Bench to hear the case. He suggested a further reference to a Full Bench. But this is a matter on which the

Privy Council should pronounce an'' authoritative opinion. I do not think any good would* be served by referring the question once again to a Full

Bench. I should not be understood as merely counting beads; but I do not think I am wrong in saying that the weight of authority in Madras is in

favour of the view of the majority who heard Nachiappa Goundesn v. Rangasami Gounden 26 Ind. Cas. 757: (1915) M. W. N. 53: 2 L. W. 69,

Since then Coutts Trotter and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ., have given their adhesion to that view. My learned brother Mr. Justice Napier is now

inclined that way. Mr. Justice Phillips is also of the same opinion. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar has taken the view that the

consent operates as an estoppel. The learned Chief Justice was originally of that opinion; but I have not been referred to any case in which he has

refused to accept the opinion of the majority of the Full Bench. I do not understand Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and Mr. Justice Ayling to have taken

up the same uncompromising attitude as Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar. In these circumstances, until the Privy Council gives an authoritative decision

on the question, I would not be justified in not following the Full Bench ruling in Nachiappa Qounden v. Rangasami Gounden 26 Ind. Cas. 757.

I would, therefore, dismiss the second appeal with costs.

Napier, J.

I agree. In South Indian Export Co., Ltd. v. Subbier (1915) M. W. N. 488, I expressed no decided opinion on this point. I had some doubt

whether latest decision of the Privy Council in Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh 27 Ind. Cas. 674: 17 Bom. L. R. 426: (1915) M. W.

N. 511, did, not indicate that in the view of the Board, there was an ""equity"" arising out of the consent and not merely evidence of necessity, thus

carrying the matter further than was decided by them in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Grindra Nath Mukerji. 23 Ind. Cas. 162: 16 Bom. L. R. 425:

(1914) M. W. N. 430, That case has been considered by other Benches of this Court as pointed out by my learned brother, vide Malla Suriah v.

Suran Naidu 32 Ind. Cas. 993, and Mulugu Kotayya v. Mudigonda Ohandramowli Sastri 36 Ind. Cas. 407 (1916) 2 M. W. N. 137, and I am

not prepared to differ from the conclusion arrived at by them, that the Board did not intend to lay down anything.