Konjiti Venkateswarlu vs District Panchayat Officer, Guntur and others

Bhimasankaram, J.—The petitioner seeks the issue of a writ mandamus directing the respondents 3 to 9 to bear from electing a president from among the selves to the village panchayat of Chinaling(sic) palem. The respondents 3 to 9 have been ele(sic) members of the panchayat in an election w(sic) took place on 2-5-1956. u/s 21 of Act as It stands amended now, the members 1 got to elect one among themselves, as president The petitioner contends that the election of t(sic) respondents as members is invalid for two (sic) sons.

Firstly, he says that the allotment of an a (sic) tional member to one of the wards necessity by the amendment should not have been mac(sic) the District Panchayat Officer, without consul the panchayat as required by Section 9 (1) o. Madras Village Panchayats Act. Secondly, maintains that in making the actual allot(sic) there is a violation of Article 14 of the Condition in that the voters in one of the wards elected four members obtained special adva(sic) over the voters in the other two wards who (sic)ed the other three members between them he challeges the validity of the whole election cess he has impleaded also the District Panchayat Officer, Guntur, and the Deputy Panchayat (sic)cer, Bapatla (North), as respondents 1 and 2 were responsible for the allotment of the seat to ward No. 1 and the election respective.

So far as the first ground is cone it is already covered by our decision in Panchayat Pandrapadu and Others Vs. State of Andhra and Others the reasons given there we cannot entertain objection.

The second contention however re(sic) more serious consideration. The necessary are these: This village was Originally (sic) u/s 9 (1) of the Act into three Ward No. 1 consists of 813 voters, ward No(sic) 442 and ward No. 3 of 204 voters. The first was to elect 3 members, the second ward 2 (sic)bers and the third ward one member. After(sic) Amendment Act, the District Panchayat allotted to the first ward the extra seat ne(sic)ted by the president also having to be a m(sic).

The result was that four members of the panchayat have been elected by 813 voters. 2 m(sic) by 442 voters and one member by 204 voters It is said that this meant that every voter the first ward exercised four votes; every voter the second ward two votes and every voter third ward only one vote. Now, the prese(sic) doner himself belongs to the first ward. difficult to see what his grievance is. On the above facts, it is the voters In the second and (sic)rd wards that could have a just cause for complaint. The truth seems to be that the petitioner attempting to invalidate the whole election because those, In whom he is interested, have not been successful.

The issue of the constitutionality of a law cannot be allowed to be raised at the instance of person whose rights are not directly affected by (sic)e law which he impugns. Apart from this fact, (sic)e powers exercisable by the High Court under Article 226 should not, in my opinion, be drawn (sic)on at the instance of a petitioner inspired by direct motives. In this view, it is unnecessary (sic)r me to discuss at length the decisions of the (sic)preme Court of America purporting to follow which, my learned brother Chandra Reddy J., (sic)ld In Sri P.M. Ratna Sabhapathi Rao and Others Vs. The State of Madras and Others, that (sic)estions relating to delimitation of wards and (sic)otment of seats thereto are not justiciable (sic)atters being solely within the ambit of executive power. It was a case relating to a municipality. There the division into wards and the (sic)otment of seats was made u/s 43 of (sic)e Madras District Municipalities Act, provision (sic)ry similar in terms to section 9 (1) of the Mad-(sic) Village Panchayats Act. The learned Judge (sic)de the following observations In that case:

It Is for the Government to arrange the distribution of wards taking into consideration vari(sic)s factors such as compactness of area, the population and the electoral strength, etc. There is (sic)nd to be disparity between one ward and another in the matter of voting strength as due re(sic)rd has to be had to various other factors, (sic)e voting strength Is not the sole criterion in case matters.

It follows on this decision that the redistribution of wards is not a (sic)tter that can be brought up for a writ of cer(sic)rari before this Court. Any interference by arts with electoral process is not warranted under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(sic)rlier In his judgment he referred to Colegrove (sic)Gree, (1946) 90 Law Ed 1432 : 328 US 549 (C), (sic)d South v. Peters, (1950) 94 Law Ed 836 : 339, 276 (D), both decisions of the Supreme Court the United States of America. It is to be notice that in the first of these cases'' the Judges of Supreme Court were sharply divided in their (sic)nions three Judges being of one opinion on merits and three others being of the contrary (sic)nion. The decision really turned on the view the only other Judge who participated in the (sic)ring that the case was not one in which the (sic)ity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ought to exercised. The latter decision also exhibits a (sic)llar divergence of views. The RATIO of the (sic)ision of the majority in the latter case may out thus:

A Federal Court properly refuses to exercise equity powers where a state statute providing (sic)t county unit votes shall determine the out-(sic)e of a primary election, that each county is (sic)tted a number of unit votes, and that the can-(sic)ate who receives the highest popular vote in county is awarded the appropriate number of (sic) votes, is attacked as violating the Fourteenth Seventeenth Amendments of the Federal Condition.

Two Judges who were in a minority thou(sic) on the other hand that the right to vote at (sic)rimary election

is protected by the Fifteenth Amendment, (sic)ch prohibits a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race, colour, or previous conditions of servitude.

This is therefore no authority for the proposition that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide questions of that character. Indeed in another case which came up between these two, reported In Macdougall v. Gree, (1948) 93 Law. Ed 3 (E), a majority of the. Supreme Court Judges expressed their view in these terms:

It would be strange indeed? and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying.such broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated countries & those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former. The Constitution - a practical instrument of Government - Makes no such demands on the States.

Rutledge J., whose view was decisive of the issue in (1946) 90 Law Ed 1432: 328 US 549 (C), stuck to his former view however. In doing so, he said : "As in Colegrove v. Green (C), supra, I think the case is one in which for the reasons stated, this Court may properly, and should, decline to exercise its Jurisdiction in equity. Accordingly but solely for this reason. I agree that the judgment refusing injunctive relief should be affirmed.

Three other Judges who heard the case expressed an opinion opposed to the majority view and observed thus:

The theme of the Constitution is equality among citizens in the exercise of their political rights. The notion that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to our standards for popular representative government.

It must be noticed that these decisions relate to delimitation of constituencies and distribution of voting strength for the purpose of elections to State and Federal Legislatures. I do not think that these cases throw, any light on a question which relates to the electoral process, concerning purely local bodies.

It is to be noted that under Article 327 of our Constitution, Parliament is entrusted with the power to make provision.

with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with elections to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State including the preparation of electoral rolls, the delimitation of constituencies and all other matters necessary for securing the due Constitution of such House or Houses.

But, even this power is, it must be noted, made subject to the provisions of the Constitution, that is to say subject INTER ALIA to Part III of the Constitution. There is no such limitation in the Constitution of the United States of America One may therefore venture to doubt whether the American decisions, based as they are on the language of their own organic instrument, should be followed.

In any case, it would be difficult to hold that the division of a local constituency into wards for the purpose of election to a local body poses the decision of a political question for consideration. Furthermore, we are not here dealing with a legislative provision directing unequal distribution but with the action of the Executive purporting to act under the terms of a statute.

The Legislature itself has not authorised any Inequality. We are not therefore dealing with the power of the Legislature but with the power of the Executive to act in contravention of the equality rule..If the Executive is free to do these things even without authorization from the Legislature and be immune from judicial review the door will be open in my opinion for what is called in political parlance gerrymandering.

It is however unnecessary, to discuss this point for the purposes of the present decision. This writ petition must fail on the ground that the petitioner has ho grievance. It is therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-.

Satyanarayana Raju, J.

I am in agreement with my learned brother that this petition must fail on the short ground that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved. In this view it is unnecessary to go into the other questions raised before us.