K.R. Ramaswamy and Others vs P.R. Kannappan and Others

Natarajan, J.—These are connected appeals and they arise from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Erode in Appeal Suit

No. 171 of 1975 on the file of his Court. The former appeal has been preferred by Defendants 1 to 4 and the latter appeal has been filed by the

fifth Defendant, they having sustained their defence before the trial Court, but having lost their case before the lower appellate Court. For the sake

of convenience the parties in the two appeals will be referred to in this judgment in the manner they were arrayed before the trial Court.

The suit relates to a strip of land measuring about 12� cents in T.S. No. 423/1 in Erode Municipality and said to be parcelled out as three

items, the first and second items each measuring 4 cents and the third item measuring 4� cents. It is common ground that the suit property

originally formed part of G.S. No. 406/B which was of an extent of 7-52 acres. One Santhana Rowth and one Pavadai Naicker were the original

owners of G.S. No. 406/B In the year 1934 those two persons parcelled out the land in G.S. No. 406/B into several house sites and prepared a

lay-cut as found in exhibit A-11 printed plan. Santhana Rowth and Pavadai Naicker submitted an application Exhibit B-10 to the Erode,

Municipality, viz. the fifth Defendant, for approval of the lay-out. The Municipal Council, at its meeting held on 15th June 1954, approved the lay-

out and exhibit B-11 is an extract from the proceedings of the said meeting in the lay-out submitted for approval, the roads that were intended to

be formed and the space left for there had been duly indicated. After the lay-out was approved by the fifth Defendant, Santhana Rowth and

Pavadai Naicker sold several items of house-sites to various parties. On the western extremity of G.S No. 405/B, which portion has been

subsequently assigned T.S. Nos. 423/1 and 423/2, the original owners had made provision for a north to south road which would connect two

public road, viz., Pavadai Naicker road on the south and Brough Road on the north. Originally, the western boundary for G.S. No. 406/B was the

Government Head-quarters hospital. But some time in the year 1962 the Government acquired a portion of G.S. No. 406/B viz. some house-sites

and a portion of the road for expansion of the hospital. As a consequence of the acquisition, the northern portion of the road ceased to exist, but

the southern portion of the road, comprised in T.S. No. 423/2, which now forms the suit property was left undisturbed. The Plaintiffs have

purchased this portion from the heirs of Santhana Rowth. Initially, the first Plaintiff purchased a common half-share in the suit property from one

Jayaraj, one of the heirs of Sanathana Rowth, under exhibit A.2 dated 9th July, 1972. Subsequently, both the Plaintiffs have purchased the

remaining half-share in the suit property from Balasubramaniam, another heir of Santhana Rowth under the sale deed, exhibit A-4 dated 7th

December, 1972. The vendees under the two sale deeds claimed to have derived title to the property in terms of a partition arrangement entered

into between them and Pavadai Naicker on 29th May, 1952 under a registered partition deed, of which exhibit A-1 is a registration copy. It is on

the basis of exhibit A-2 and A-4 the Plaintiffs claim title to the suit property.

The first Defendant, who was a municipal councillor is said to have unlawfully, occupied the northern portion of the suit property some time

during 1972 and put up a thatched shed. This was questioned by the first Plaintiff in a suit Original Suit No. 44 of 1976 and the dispute was

eventually compromised with the help of mediators. As per the compromise, the first Plaintiff purchssed the superstructure from the first

Defendants for a sum of Rs. 2,150 and the Plaintiffs case is that since then they have been in possession and enjoyment of the property as absolute

owners. The second and fourth Defendants, who are respectively the wives of the first and third Defendants, own the land immediately east of the

suit property. On the said land the first and second Defendants have put up a house and the third and fourth Defendants have put up another

house. According to the Plaintiffs, the main entrance for the houses were on the northern side and the rear entrances were on the southern side and

there was no opening or entrance on the western side of the properties. However, just before the filing of the suit the Defendants committed

encroachment to an extent of 4 feet on the suit property and, in addition, they had also newly provided entrances on the western side of their

houses. Further more, they are also said to have opened two drainage holes on the western wall of their houses for enabling them to drain water

into the suit property. The fifth Defendant is also said to have committed encroachment by laying underground pipelines in the suit property in order

to provide tap connection to the houses of the Defendants. In addition, the fifth Defendant, at the instigation of the first Defendant who was a

municipal councilor at the time of the filing of the suit, is said to have permitted its staff members to trespass upon the property and cut the thorny

plants on the land. The Plaintiffs prayed in their suit that their title to the suit property should be declared and a permanent injunction granted against

the Defendants restraining them from interfering with the use and enjoyment of the property by the Plaintiffs and also a mandatory injunction

granted for directing Defendants 1 to 4 to close the entrances and the drainage holes on the western wall of their houses and directing the fifth

Defendant to remove the underground piper lines.

Defendants 1 to 4 resisted the suit and contended that the Suit property was a public road and as such, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to claim it

as their private property and their vendors too had no right to convey the suit property to the Plaintiffs. They denied that the entrances and drainage

holes had been newly provided on the western wall of their houses and alleged that the entrances and drainage holes had been provided even at

the time the houses were constructed. They denied that they committed any encroachment on the suit property. The Defendants raised further

objections such as, non-joinder of necessary parties, improper valuation of the suit for the purpose of court-fee etc., but we are not concerned

with those defences, as all of them have been rejected by the Courts below.

The fifth Defendants filed a written statement separately contending that the suit property is a road and hence the Plaintiffs are not entitled to

claim any title over the same. The fifth Defendant justified its laying of underground pipe-lines in the suit property and averred that its action was in

accordance with the rules, Thus in effect, the principal defence raised by Defendants 1 to 4 as wall as the fifth Defendant to the suit was that the

suit property was not private property, but was a road portion and therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the property, as belonging to

them or seek any reliefs in the suit.

The trial Court framed five issues for consideration. After a careful consideration of the case, the trial court held that the suit property had been

set apart for road formation by Santhana Rowth and Pavadai Naicker in the lay-out prepared by them, that on the Municipality passing a

resolution approving the lay-out, the road had become vested in the Municipality, that thereafter, Santhana Rowth and Pavadai Naicker or their

heirs had no manner of right to deal with the property and, consequently, exhibit A-2 A-4 sale deeds cannot confer title on the Plaintiffs over the

suit property and therefore, the Plaintiffs ate not entitled to be granted any relief in the suit.

On appeal by the Plaintiffs, the Subordinate Judge of Erode has reversed the judgment of the trail Court and decreed the suit. The Subordinate

Judge has held that though the suit property had been originally included in the space set a part for forming a toad, no vesting of the road in the

Municipality had taken place and therefore, the road portion of the land continued to be owned by the original owners of the property. After the

acquisition of the northern portion of the road by Government for expending the hospital, the southern portion of the road ceased to have any use

and members of the public, had not acquired any right to use the property as road. He further held that the Defendants had committed

encroachment and therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to all the reliefs asked for in the suit. It is as against the reversing judgment and decree of the

Subordinate Judge, the two sets of Defendants have filed these two appeals.

Mr. A.S. Venkatachalamurthy, learned Counsel for the Appellants in Second Appeal No. 256 of 1976 and Mr. M. Sahkir Ali, learned Counsel

for the Appellant in Second Appeal No. 615 of 1978 advanced various arguments to assail the judgment of the lower appellate Court. Their

principal contention was that the suit property undoubtedly formed a road which had vested in the Municipality and it had ceased to be the private

property of Santhana Rowth and Pavadai Naicker, the original owners of the land, and consequently the heirs of Santhana Rowth did not have

competence to sell the property to the Plaintiffs under exhibits A-2 and A-4. The main plank for the above said contention of the Counsel is exhibit

B-11 and exhibit B.11. As has already been referred to exhibit B-11 is an application, dated, 30th March 1935 submitted by Pavadai Naicker

and Santhana Rowth to the Commissioner Erode Municipality. Therein they have stated that the lay out prepared by them for G.S. No. 416/B may

be approved and that they were prepared to give to the Municipality their rights over that portion of the land which had been set part for formation

of roads in the layout plan. On the reverse of exhibit Bill the Commissioner has made an endorsement which reads as follows:

The parties have relinquished their right over the roads and streets formed in the field in favour of the Municipal Council, Town Surveyor for further

action.

The Town Surveyor had raised a query stating that the plan did not bear the seal of the office or the Chairman''s signature and, therefore, the

omission may be filled up and returned. The Commissioner has passed a further order as follows:

That is none of your concern. You had better carry out the necessary changes in the Town Survey records and return the papers.

The Municipal Council is said to have granted permission to the original owners to form the lay-out and exhibit B.11 is a certified copy of the

proceedings of the Municipal Council, Erode. According to exhibit B-11 the Municipal Council approved the lay-out on 15th June, 1934. It is not

clear whether the year has been wrongly opted as 1934 instead of 1935 or whether the original owners had submitted a lay-out for approval by

the Municipality in the year 1934 itself. It appears to me that it is more likely that exhibit B.10 was the only application that was made by the

original owners and the Council''s resolution should have been passed on 15th June, 1935 and not on 15th June, 1934 as found in exhibit B-11.

Be that as it may, the road portions agreed to be relinquished by the original owners in favour of the Municipality have been accepted by the

Municipality and thereafter, new town survey numbers have been allotted to the road portion. The northern portion of the road has been numbered

as T.S. No. 423/1 and this southern portion, with which we are now concerned, has been numbered as T.S. No. 423/2. This fact is established by

exhibit A.11 the Revenue map for Ward No. III, Block 12, in Erode town printed by the Erode Municipality. It is mentioned in the plan that the

surveying and mapping had been done in 1938 and the plan had been published in 1941. When such is the case, it is not understandable how

Pavadai Naicker and the sons of Santhana Rowth could have treated the suit property as their private property and effected a partition between

themselves in 1952. The trial Court had taken the view that the vesting of the roads in the Municipality had become a fait accomply and, therefore

the original owners were not entitled to go back on their relinquishment and treat the suit property, which is admittedly part of the north to south

road, on the western side of G.S. No. 406/B as a partible item. On the other hand, the lower appellate Court has taken the view that the

undertaking given by the original owners in exhibit B. 10 will only constitute an offer and in the absence of acceptance of it by the Municipality, the

vesting would not have been complete. The view taken by the appellate Court cannot be sustained because it fail to see that the offer of the original

owners has been accepted by the Municipal Commissioner and new town survey numbers, viz., T.S. Nos. 423/1 and 423/2 have been assigned

for the road portion. After the Municipality had approved the lay-out plan and given sanction to the original owners to sell the house sites in

accordance with the plan submitted by them and after the portion of land made available for the formation of roads had been accepted by the

Municipality, the original owners or their heirs are estopped in law from going back on their undertaking and treating the portion of the road space

as their private property and dividing it between themselves or selling it to third parties.

Mr. K. Parasaran, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs, advanced various contentions to sustain the view taken by the Subordinate Judge, viz. that

the roads comprised in the lay-out had not vested in the Municipality. In the course of his arguments, Mr. K. Parasaran submitted that the road in

question was only a private road and not a public street and it is only public street, that will automatically vest in the Municipality as per Section 61

of the District Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 178 states that if any private street is not levelled, paved, mettalled,

drained or lighted etc., to the satisfaction of the executive authority., the said authority may call upon the owners or occupiers of the buildings or

lands fronting or abutting on such street to carry out the desired items of work and if they fail to carry out the work the executive authority may

himself carry out the work and recover the cost thereof from the owners of the buildings and lands. The Counsel would say that the Commissioner

had not taken any action u/s 178 to call upon the original owners of the land or the persons to whom they had sold plots near the road in questions

for forming the road. It is apposite to mention here that the suit property, though vacant, had not been formed into a pucca road all these years and

the Advocates Commissioner, who inspected the property noticed only a beaten track of a foot-path running along the land. Passing on to Section

179, the section say that if any street has been levelled, paved metalled, flagged, etc., etc., under the provisions of Section 178, such street shall,

on the requisition of not less than three-fourths of the owners thereof, be declared as a public street. Relying upon this section, the Counsel argued

that, not only had the street not been levelled, paved, metalled etc., but there had not also been a requisition from not less than three-fourths of the

owners of the plots in the lay-out to declare the road a public street and therefore, the road portion continued to be the private property of the

original owners and did not become vested in the Municipality at any time. I am unable to accept these arguments, because Section 178 of the Act

only deals with the powers exercisable by the executive authority to compel the owner if the land or owners of houses having frontage on the

private street, to lay a pucca road on the space provided for the formation of the road so that the street can provide safe and easy access to its

ussers. That section has nothing to do with the vesting of a private street in the Municipality. So far as Section 179 is concerned it only prescribes

one of the modes by which a private street can be taken over by the Municipality as a public street. It is not therefore correct to treat the section as

providing the only mode for taking over a street as a public street. In the instant case, we have to bear in mind that the original owners of the land

had themselves unconditionally offered to relinquish the road portions in the lay-out in favour of the Municipality. In such circumstances, there was

no need for three-fourths of the owners to have moved the Municipality to declare the street a public (sic) because, at the inception itself, the street

was offered by the owners to be used as a public street. It will not be out of place to refer, at this juncture, to Section 180-A of the Act. The

section reads as follows.

All streets vested in or to be vested in or maintained by a municipal council shall be open to persons of whatever caste or creed, (emphasis

supplied).

This section clearly says that not only streets already vested, but also streets to be vested in the Municipality as well as those maintained by a

municipal council shall be open to all members of the public irrespective of caste or creed. Therefore, even assuming for argument''s sake that a

formal vesting had not taken place which in my opinion, is not the case here, persons, who formed the layout or their successors in-interest cannot

go back on the relinquishment of the roads to the Municipality and treat the property as private land and either put up constructions thereon or sell

the land to-third parties. The original owners of the land must also be deemed to have impliedly given an undertaking to the several persons, who

have purchased the house-sites in G.S. No. 406/B that all the roads demacrated in the lay-out would be made available to the house-owners for

being used as streets. From that point of view also, the vendors of the Plaintiffs cannot go back on the implied undertaking and sell the space

relinquished for formation of roads as if it was their private property.

Mr. Parasaran strenuously argued that even if it is taken that a certain amount of vesting had taken place in favour of the Municipality on

account of the undertaking given by Santhana Rowth and Pavadai Naicker in exhibit B-10 yet such vesting will have only limited operation and will

not have the effect of transferring the title over the suit property to the Municipality. In support of this argument, learned Counsel referred to Fruit

and Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. Delhi Improvement Trust, and relied on the following passage occurring at page 353 of the report:

It would thus appear that the word ''vest'' has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the

authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, o r it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it

may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A

when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a Municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily

mean that ownership has passed to any of them.

Elaborating this argument, Mr. Parasaran referred to the following cases--In Uppalapati Suryanarayaneswara Jogi Jagannadharaju Garu and

Another Vs. Taluk Board and Others, it was held that the vesting of a road in a Taluk Board u/s 60 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920, vests

in the Board only such property as is necessary for the control, protection and maintenance of the road as a highway for public use, the right of

control is different from full ownership and the trees are nowhere vested in the Taluk Board by the Act. In Surya Rao v. Cocanada Municipal

Council AIR 1963 Mad. 919, it was held that if a public pathway passed through zamindar''s land, the zamindar, as the general principal and as

owner of the adjoining land will be owner of the soil of the pathway and even, if the pathway is vested in the Municipality, the zamindar will

continue to be owner of the soil of the pathway and of the trees spontaneously growing on it. This decision has been followed in Province of

Madras v. Sri Vedaranyeswaraswami Devarthanam (1949) 2 M.L.J. 919 and it was held in that case that a road poromboke or Puntha porambok

is not a communal property and the right or reversion is in the land owner and not in the Government, and the principle will apply to cases of whole

village inam areas also. These authorities in my opinion cannot advance the case of the Plaintiffs in any manner. In the first two cases what was in

question was the right of ownership of trees standing on the sides of road which had vested in the Taluk Board or the Municipality, In that context

it has been held that the vesting of the roads in the Taluk Board or the Municipality as the case may be, will have limited operation only and it will

not extend to the conferring of ownership of the trees standing on either side of the roads. The third case deals with reversionary rights. What

arises for consideration in the present cases is whether the Municipality will be deprived of its right of control to form a road in the space which had

been unconditionally placed earlier at its disposal and make available the road for use by the members of the public, for which purpose the road

space had been provided in the lay-out prepared by the original owners. The controversy on hand goes to the rest of the matter, and does not

touch upon fringe benefits like a Taluk Board or Municipality claiming right to the ownership of the trees standing on the land on the basis that the

road portion had been vested in the local body for providing of street for the use of members of the public. Mr. K. Parasaran in the course of his

arguments, also, referred to the following passage occurring in the Law of Municipal Corporations in British India by P. Duraiswami Aiyangar

(volume III) at page 306. The passage is in the following terms:

Power is also given to the Corporations to declare in certain circumstances private streets to be public streets and after such declaration, the said

tree is become public streets. The corporation can adopt the streets, only when all the works specified by the statute have been satisfactorily done

either by the owners or the authority.

It is upon the local authority to prove, when any question arises, that the street is a public street, and until the street in question becomes a public

street, the power of the local authority over the same is strictly confined to what is specified by the statute.

Even this passage will not improve matters for the Plaintiffs, because the dispute in the suit is not whether the suit property is a private street or a

public street. On the other hand, the question is whether the suit property is a private property or a street, be it public or private. Therefore, the

gamut of litigation here is on an entirely different footing. Even assuming that the street is a private one and not a public one, it cannot be denied that

the fifth Defendant can certainly exercise regulatory powers over it such as calling upon the owners of the houses and lands adjoining the road to

level the road and metal it to provide drains on either side of it, etc, etc., as contemplated in Section 178 of the Act. It therefore follow, that even if

the contention of Mr. K. Parasaran that a full vasting of title of the road in favour of the fifth Defendant had not taken place, is to be accepted,

there still remains the fact that a right of exercising control over the road had vested and even such limited, vesting will stand in the way of the

vendors of the Plaintiffs going back on that and treating the property as their private property and selling it to the Plaintiffs for being used as

agricultural land or house-sites.

During the course of arguments, considerable (sic) was laid on the fifth Defendant not having asserted its title over the road portion when a

portion of G.S. No. 406/B was acquired in the year 1962 by the Government for providing additional space for the Government Hospital. In

support of this contention, reliance was placed by the Plaintiff on exhibit A-12, which is a certified copy of the award passed by the Revenue

Divisional Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Erode. It is, no doubt, true a portion of the land including the northern portion of the north to

south road in the lay-out was acquired by the Government in the year 1962. In the acquisition proceedings the fifth Defendant has not been shown

as the owner of a portion of the property, i.e., the road portion. The land Acquisition Officer, has stated in his report that the patta for T.S. Nos.

423/1, 431/1, 440/1, stood in the names of Pavadai Naicker and late Santhana Rowth, that Santhana Rowth was reported to have left behind him

his two widows by name Vatsala and Bangaramma and two sons by name Jayaraj and Balasubramanian, that one of the persons appeared before

him for the enquiry, that therefore, he was not in a position to decide the actual ownership and enjoyment over the fields under acquisition among

the interested persons and hence he was depositing the compensation amount in court and making a reference u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

While there is no denying the fact that the fifth Defendant did not appear before the Land Acquisition Officer and make a claim for compensation

amount for the acquired area of the road portion being given to it, it must not also be lost sight of that Pavadai Naicker as well as the heirs of the

Santhana Rowth have also not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and ascerted their title to the land. Therefore, exhibit A-12 can be

considered only as a neutral document. Merely because the Acquisition Officer has not referred to the fifth Defendant having an interest in the land,

it can never be said that the title for the road portion did not vest with the fifth Defendant and hence the fifth Defendant was excluded from

consideration or recognition at the time of the acquisition of the land. This aspect of the matter has not been noticed by the Subordinate Judge.

Because the fifth Defendant had not been served with notice and had not been shown a an interested party in the acquisition proceedings, the

Subordinate Judge has rushed to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings support the case of the Plaintiff and disprove the case of the fifth

Defendant. On behalf of the Plaintiffs it was vigorously argued that the fifth Defendant itself had recognized the suit property as the private property

of the Plaintiffs and had collected property tax from the Plaintiffs as evidenced by the receipts, exhibits A-7 to A-9. These receipts are of the years

1972, 1973 and 1974. There is reason to think that these receipts should have been obtained by the Plaintiffs with ulterior motive. If really the suit

property was private land, then the property would have been subjected to assessment all along and the owners must have been assessed to tax

for a number of years. But the Plaintiffs have produced receipts only from the year 1972 onwards. Obviously, after getting the sale deed under

exhibit A-2, the Plaintiff themselves may have engineered to get a demand notice so that the title of the fifth Defendant for the road portion can be

defaced. The suggestion that has been put to P.W-1 in cross-examination is that the bill-collector, who issued the demand notices and collected

the taxes under exhibits A-7 to A-9, was a new hand and advantage had been taken of his inexperience to bring the suit property

underassessment. P.W-1 has denied knowledge about the bill-collector being a fresh hand or not, but has, never the less, admitted that prior to the

year 1973, the bill-collector had not com J and collected tax from him. As already stated, If the land was private property then it should have been

subjected to assessment for quite number of years and would not have been brought under assessment for the first time in the year 1972-73. I am,

therefore, unable to attach any significance or importance to the tax receipts filed by the Plaintiffs.

In the process of evaluating the contentions of the Plaintiffs their conduct in certain earlier proceedings as well as some of the admissions made

by P.W 1 in the witness-box have to be gives due consideration. It is for that purpose, Defendants 1 to 4 have filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition

No. 7828 of 1979 for a certified copy of the plaint in Original Suit No. 44 of 1972 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Erode being

received as additional evidence. That suit has been filed by the husband of the second Plaintiff in a representative capacity against the first

Defendant and another. That suit related to the identical property which is now under consideration. The contention of the second Plaintiff''s

husband in that suit was that suit property was a public street and the Defendants therein had no right to put up a superstructure on a portion of the

land and cause obstruction to the users of the road. The plaint schedule describes the property as a public road measuring 20'' east to west and

500'' north to south. It is significant to note that the plaint in that suit had been filed on 4th January, 1972 while the sale deeds, exhibits A-2 and A-

4, under which the Plaintiffs now claim title have come into existence on 9th July, 1972 and 7th December, 1972. The additional document sought

to be filed by the Defendants is a very material document for consideration in the instant case, because it completely expresses the falsity of the

case of the Plaintiffs. In the interests of justice and for a proper consideration of the case, the additional document deserves to be admitted,

because it forms a clinching piece of evidence. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 7828 of 1979 will therefore, stand allowed and the additional

document is marked as exhibit B-15. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs could not dispute the genuiness of the document, because it is a certified

copy of the plaint filed by the second Plaintiff''s husband. But, he tried to belittle its significance by saying that the written statement of the

Defendants in that suit should also have been filed by the Defendants in order to make the record a complete one. I am not persuaded by this

argument, because it is the Plaintiffs who have come to court for seeking reliefs and the onus of proof is initially on them to show that the suit

property is private land and not a street vested in the Municipality. It is thus clear that knowing full well that the suit property is a street vested in

the Municipality, the Plaintiffs have speculatively purchased the property from the sons of Santhana Rowth. That the purchases are a speculative

one is further established by the admissions made by the P.W.1 in the witness box. He has admitted that many persons used to walk along the suit

property, that even after the property was purchased under exhibits A-2 and A-4, the public were making use of the property as a path-way, that

he is a Municipal contractor, but nevertheless he did not make enquires in the Municipal office about the property being a street or not, that even in

the year 1971, i.e. before the purchase of the land the fifth Defendant had laid underground pipes in the property to give water tap connection to

the third and fourth Defendants and that besides giving tap connection to Defendants 1 to 4, the Municipality has also given tap connection to other

parties. If really the land belonged to the vendors of the Plaintiffs under exhibits A-2 and A-4, they would have raised objection when the

Municipality laid underground pipelines to provide water connection to several house owners in the locality. Similarly the Plaintiffs, having known

about the Municipality laying pipes in the year 1971 itself, would not have purchased the property without enquiring about the rights of the

Municipality to lay underground pipes in the land. There is thus host of circumstances to show that the Plaintiffs are nothing but speculative

purchasers and cannot therefore even be treated as bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the vesting of the suit property with the

Municipality for formation of a road.

An argument was advanced that the first Defendant should be held estopped from claiming that the suit property was a street, because he.

himself had put up a superstructure on a portion of the land and had subsequently sold it to Plaintiffs. There is absolutely no force in this contention.

The first Defendant may have put up a superstructure as a trespasser. In any event, what was sold was only the superstructure and not the land on

which the structure was put up, as found from exhibit A-5. In any even it the first Defendants action or even admission cannot have on adverse

impact on the rights of the fifth Defendant to claim the property as a street vested in it.