K.R. Saraswathi vs V. Vadivelu Chettiar

(1) The petitioner before me is the landlady. This petition arises under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The petitioner

filed an application for possession of her premises on the ground that the same was required for the business carried on by her husband. The

respondent-tenant contended originally that he was not the tenant, that the requirement of the petitioner was not bona fide and that in any event, the

application was not maintainable as the premises was only required by the landlady''s husband. In the appeal before the Court of Small Causes, the

relationship of landlord and tenant was not canvassed. Both the Rent Controller and the Court of Small Causes held that the petitioner required the

premises bona fide for use and occupation. The Rent Controller however held, on the question of maintainability that the petition was maintainable

by the landlady though the premises was required by the husband. But, on this question, the learned Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court differed

and held that the requirement by the landlady''s husband of the premises belonging to the landlady will not be a ground for eviction under S. 10(3)

(a)(iii) of Act 18 of 1960. He, therefore, dismissed the petition as being not maintainable. This revision petition is directed against the said order of

the learned Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court.

(2) The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to maintain her application as she is the landlady and that the word

landlady"" or ""landlord"" in Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) would include a dependent or a near relative. The appellate Court however held with some hesitancy

that the words ""landlord or his son"" appearing in the new Act are likely to indicate that the requirement must be for the use of the landlord or his

son and for the use of no other person. The main question for determination is whether the amending Act 18 of 1960 has in fact made any

deliberate change in the law as it existed before, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of Act 18 of 1960 reads as follows:--

Section 10(3)(a)(iii)--A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the

landlord in possession of the building.

(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or his son is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or his son is

carrying on a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own.

Section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 (Act XXV of 1949) reads as follows:--

7(3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in

possession of the building..........

(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, a non-

residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or

otherwise.

The only conspicuous change effected in the provision under consideration is, what was ""landlord"" in S. 7(3)(a)(iii) in Act XXV of 1949 has been

changed to ""landlord or his son"" in Act 18 of 1960. Of course, the latter portion of S. 7(3)(a)(iii) of Act XXV of 1949 has been omitted and the

omission is not relevant for purposes of this case.

(3) What exactly the word ""landlord"" in the old Act connoted was the subject-matter of two decision of our High Court. In Kolandaivelu Chettiar

v. Koolavana Chettiar, 1961 1 MLJ 184, Venkatadri J. held that the word ""landlord"" cannot be intended or treated as rigid, but elastic. The

learned Judge held that the word would include a dependant as well. This decision was rendered after the passing of the new Act 18 of 1960.

Under Sec. 35 of the new Act, the earlier Act XXV of 1949, was repealed and the statute obligated that all decisions to be rendered after the

coming into force of the new Act shall be so done under the provisions of the new Act. Bearing this in mind, Venkatadri J. observed that he had to

decide the case which had arisen under the old Act under the relevant provisions of the new Act of 1960. It is very clear that the word ""landlord

was interpreted by Venkatadri J. in the above decision in the light of the amended provisions of Act 18 of 1960, namely, S. 10(3) provisions of

Act 18 of 1960, namely, S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the new Act. The Chief Judge, Small Cause Court, fell into an error when he held that the decision

reported in 1961 1 mLJ 184 was given under the old Act. While respectfully agreeing with the interpretation given by Venkatadri J. in the above

case, I would add that it would be indeed delimiting the fair sense and meaning of the word ""landlord"" in S. 10(3)(a)(iii) in the new Act 18 of 1960

if it were to be interpreted as a rigid and inelastic word. At this stage the decision of Veeraswami J. in K.I. Kangu Vs. Ahmed Unnissa Begum,

may be usefully referred to. The learned Judge quoted with approval the decision of Venkatadri J. in 1961 1 MLJ 184. He continued to say:

In Kolandaivelu Chettiar v. Koolavana Chettiar 1961 1 MLJ 184, Venkatadri J., with reference to the views expressed in the cases just referred

to, held that the requirement of a landlord''s son may well come within the words ''for his own occupation''. With respect I am also inclined to take

the view that the words ""his own occupation"" should receive a liberal interpretation. If that is so, there is no reason why a different principle should

apply to clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Sec. 7. The words ""if he requires"" in that provision should in my opinion be understood in the same liberal

sense as the words ""his own occupation"", in clause (a) of that sub-section have been understood. What is meant, as I think by the words ""his own

occupation"" or ""if he requires"" is that the requirement is not that of a stranger. It is not necessary to attract those words that the need should be

personal to the landlord. But where the line should be drawn will depend on the particular facts in each case. It may, however, be generally stated,

without intending to be precise or exhaustive, that the need of close relations who happen to live with the landlord or landlady may well satisfy the

words ""his own occupation"" or ""if he requires"". I do not say that the relationship is the only test. Dependency, social customs, and habits, usage,

practice of a particular community and like considerations may well be taken into account in determining whether the requirement of those words is

satisfied.

The above decision was obviously given after the passing of the new Act and therefore should be deemed to have been rendered under the new

Act. I respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Judge extracted above.

(4) As already stated, though the above cases arose under the old Act, the decisions having been rendered after the passing of the new Act and in

the light of its provisions, I am of the opinion that the word ""landlord"" appearing in S. 10(3)(a)(iii) should receive the same liberal interpretation

given in the above two cases. The reasoning and conclusion on which the learned Judges rested their decisions would apply mutatis mutandis to the

facts of this case as well while considering the word ""landlord"" appearing in the new Act in S. 10(3)(a)(iii). The learned Chief Judge of the Small

Cause Court did not appreciate this position. Veeraswami J. while disposing of the case reported in K.I. Kangu Vs. Ahmed Unnissa Begum, did

not expressly advert to S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the new Act, as it was not necessary for him to do so in that case. But in my opinion, it can be safely

assumed that the ratio decidendi in K.I. Kangu Vs. Ahmed Unnissa Begum, in so far as it concerns the interpretation of the word ""landlord"" is

applicable to the said word as it appears in the new Act. This by itself would suffice to hold that the expression ""landlord"" appearing both in the old

and the new Acts do bear the same meaning and connotation. It is desirable at this stage to consider the preamble to the Madras Buildings (Lease

and Rent Control) Act. This Act was passed in order to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and to amend and consolidate the law relating to

the regulation of letting of residential and non-residential buildings and the control of rents of such buildings. This Act has passed the test of

reasonableness, though it is designedly temporary. The sine qua non of this Act is that tenants ought not to be unreasonably evicted by landlords.

No doubt, the Act created inroads in the rights of ownership of Immovable properties. But, in the interests of the community at large, this piece of

legislation has been held to be a reasonable restriction of such vested rights in the citizens. Such being the main purpose and intent of this piece of

beneficial legislation can be curtailed by mere surmises? ""Landlord"" is of course different from the ""landlord''s son"". The expression ""son"", added on

in the Amending Act 18 of 1960, in my opinion, has been so added so that a son who may or may not be a dependent on the father or mother, as

the case may be, can be deemed to be a person who could assert himself to the benefits of the new section. It is for purposes of making such a

benefit more specific that the Legislature in its wisdom might have thought fit to include expressly the word ''son'' after the word ''landlord'' in S.

10(3)(a)(iii). The mere addition of the word ""son"" in the above provision and the exclusion of the enumeration of the other dependents as is

ordinarily understood in society cannot lead to the irresistible conclusion that the Legislature by necessary implication intended to exclude such

dependant from obtaining such benefit. I think, if such exclusion were to be inferred as a matter of course, it would lead to an unreasonable

restriction in the matter of an enjoyment of property by landlord.

(5) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., under the caption of ""Beneficial Construction"" states as follows:--

It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Even where the

usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the Legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if they

are fairly susceptible of it. The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the

words....... If, however, there are circumstances in the Act showing that the phraseology is used in a larger sense than its ordinary sense, that sense

may be given to it.

The same learned author under the caption ""Construction most agreeable to justice and reason observed as follows:--

In determining either the general object of the Legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention

which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed

to be the true one."" Veeraswami J. in K.I. Kangu Vs. Ahmed Unnissa Begum, considered elaborately the policy of the Madras Buildings (Lease

and Rent Control) Act. In his opinion, the words ""his own occupation"" should be read in a liberal sense. he accepted the view of Chagla C.J. that

in determining the scope of the words ""his own occupation"" one would be justified in looking into the customs of the society and the nature of

social ties which subsist between the different members of the family in India and that it was not necessary to bring within the ambit of the need that

the person who requires the premises must be dependent on the landlord. Thus, the learned Judge has broadly stated the intention of the

Legislature while considering as to what is plausibly meant by ""landlord''s requirement"". As already seen from the extract of the judgment

incorporated before, there are various factors such as dependency, social customs and other similar considerations which have to be necessarily

taken into consideration to determine whether the requirement of the word is satisfied.

(6) Here, I am concerned with the meaning of the expression ''landlord''. Should it in the light of the passage extracted, above by me be

circumscribed only to the personality of the landlord or should it be extended to his very near and dear relations? No doubt, the Legislature has

expressly included the word ''son"". I have made it clear that by such specific inclusion, it cannot be reasonably presumed that other dependants

such as wife in the case of a landlord or husband in the case of a landlady can be omitted from consideration while appreciating the need of the

landlord or landlady, as the case may be. In the instant case, it is the landlady who is seeking for eviction of the tenant on the ground that her

husband is carrying on a business and for such business of her husband her premises is needed. I do not think that a beneficial construction--a

construction in consonance with justice, equity, reason and good conscience--would exclude a request by a landlady for being put in possession of

her building for the use and occupation by her husband for his business. In Hindu society it is the legitimate duty of the wife to provide comfort to

her husband and a fortiori it is so for furtherance of the interests of the business of her husband in which it can safely be presumed that she is vitally

interested.

(7) Thus, the addition of the word ""son"" in Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act 18 of 1960 does not militate against the adoption of a reasonable and

beneficial construction of the word ""landlord"" appearing therein. In my view, therefore, the petitioner (wife) is entitled in the circumstances to ask

for possession of the premises from the tenant for the furtherance of the business of her husband which he is admittedly and indisputably carrying

on. The revision petition is therefore allowed and the judgment of the learned Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court is set aside and that of the

Rent Controller restored. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, there will be no order as to costs. The tenant is given six months''

time for surrendering possession of the premises to the petitioner.

(8) Revision allowed.