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Judgment
THIS revision petition has been filed under section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 23.12.2011 passed by the Madhya Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short ''the State Commission '') in FA No. 458/2009, "Gandhi Vocational College and Anr. versus Krinshbhan Yadav, " vide which while allowing appeal, the order passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Guna, M.P. was set aside and the complaint was dismissed.
BRIEF facts of the case are that complainant, Krinshbhan Yadav took admission in "Bachelor of Computer Applications " course in respondent no.1 college, which was affiliated to respondent no.2, Jeevaji University, Gwalior. It has been alleged that there were six semesters for the said course, but the respondents had not given him the marks-sheet for the third semester, although he has been declared pass. In the absence of the degree, he is unable to apply for a job also. The respondents have thus committed deficiency in service by not giving him the marks-sheet for the third semester. The petitioner/complainant filed a consumer complaint no. 196/2008 which was allowed by the District Forum on 20.01.2009 and the respondents were directed to pay Rs.25,000/- to the complainant jointly and severally. They were also asked to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- to the consumer welfare fund. An appeal against this order was allowed by the State Commission which held that the respondent was not a consumer, because the University while discharging the statutory functions of conducting the examinations, does not render service and, hence, the complainant could not seek redressal under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been filed. At the time of hearing before us, it was found that the petition has been filed in the National Commission with a delay of 108 days. An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed along with the petition. When asked to explain the reasons for delay at the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the father of the petitioner died on 26.07.2011 and hence he was held up to perform his family duties and responsibilities. The impugned order was passed on 23.12.2011 and its certified copy was received by his counsel on 2.1.2012 and thereafter, it was despatched to the petitioner through post but it was not delivered to him. The petitioner contacted his Advocate in May 2012 and he came to know about the order passed against him and then, he asked his Advocate to apply for duplicate certified copy of the order which was received on 09.05.2012. The petition was within time, if the date of receipt of the order is considered as 09.05.2012.
WE have examined the material on record and given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced before us. It has been admitted by the petitioner that copy of the order was received by his counsel on 2.1.2012, i.e., after about 10 days of passing of impugned order dated 23.12.2011. The petitioner has not been able to give any convincing explanation as to why he waited for such a long time to contact his Advocate and file the present revision petition. In the application for condonation of delay, the column, ''number of days '' has been left blank. Moreover, the petition was submitted on 18.07.2012, whereas as per the version of the petitioner, the duplicate certified copy also was received by him on 09.05.12. No reasons have been given to explain the further delay of more than two months after receiving the duplicate copy of the order. It is clear, therefore, that a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the revision petition is not forthcoming.
IN a number of recent judgements/rulings Hon ''ble Apex Court has held that unless very convincing reasons are shown by a party for condonation of delay, the same should not be condoned. In the case R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition. "
In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed: "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. "
HON ''ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 as under; "We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. "
HON ''ble Apex Court in (2012) 3 SCC 563 - Post Master General and Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr. has not condoned delay in filing appeal even by Government department and further observed that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government departments. Hon ''ble Apex Court in 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC) - Ansul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority observed as under: "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras ".
IT is obvious from the facts of the case that there is no valid explanation for the delay in filing the petition and hence, as held by the Hon ''ble Apex Court in the cases quoted above, there is no ground for condonation of delay of 108 days. This revision petition is, therefore, ordered to be dismissed on the point of limitation and the order passed by the State Commission upheld with no order as to costs.