Krishan and Others vs Rattan Singh and Another

Jitendra Chauhan, J.—The present revision petition has been filed for setting aside the order and charge sheet dated 10.4.2012, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul, vide which, the charges were framed against the petitioners under Sections 323/ 149, 506/ 149, 148 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act read with Section 149 of IPC. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the complaint false and baseless allegations have been levelled against the petitioners. He further submits that the respondent party was the aggressors and caused injuries to petitioner Nos. 1 and 3. He further submits that the said case is a counter-blast of the FIR lodged by the petitioners. He further submits that initially a DDR No. 18 dated 8.9.2006 was lodged against the co-accused of the petitioners and thereafter, by improving the version, the complainant filed a complaint and named all the petitioners. In the DDR, no allegation punishable u/s 3 of the Act has been levelled against the petitioners by the complainant. He cites Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. and Others, and submits that mere utterance of offending words will not itself constitute an offence under the Act, in the absence of intention of mens rea to humiliate the member of the scheduled caste in public view.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that there are sufficient evidence against the petitioners. In the complaint, the allegations have been specifically made against the petitioners. The learned trial court has rightly framed the charges against the petitioners.

Heard.

As per MLR Ex. CW1/B and Ex. CW2/B, the petitioners gave several injuries to Naresh and Rattan Singh. In the complaint, there are specific allegations against the petitioners that they caused injuries to the complainants. It is further averred that the accused threatened the complainants and used derogatory words in the name of their caste. Both the parties are the residents of the same village. Material on record is capable of prima facie inferring strong suspicion about the commission of offence and sufficient for framing the charge. At the time of framing of charge, only material produced by the prosecution is to be considered.

In State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under:-

Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

In State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that at the time of framing of the charge, the trial court can consider only the material produced by the prosecution.

In the case of Radhey Shyam Vs. Kunj Behari and Others, , Hon''ble the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in going into meticulous consideration of evidence and appreciate documents and statements filed by the police at the stage of framing of charge and went on to held in para 9 that:-

The High Court has also deemed it necessary to quash the charge against respondents No. 1 to 3 because in its opinion the evidence proposed to be adduced by the prosecution, even if fully accepted, cannot show that respondents No. 1 to 3 committed any offence and referred in that behalf to the decision in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh. We find that the High Court''s conclusion about the inadequacy of the evidence against respondents No. 1 to 3, besides being a premature assessment of evidence, is also attributable to the wrong premises on which the High Court''s reasoning is based.

Similarly, in Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sanjay Choudhary and Others, in paras 10 and 11, it is held:

After analysing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case is to be applied.

The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the Court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed.

At the stage of framing of charge, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about prospect of conviction. The said distinction has been clearly laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Lal Suraj @ Suraj Singh and Another Vs. State of Jharkhand, Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul is not required to give any reason while charging the accused in the case as laid down by section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The facts cited in Gorige Pentaiah''s case (supra) are distinguishable from the present case.

No case for quashing of impugned order dated 10.4.2012, framing charge against the petitioners is made out.

Dismissed. However, anything stated hereinabove shall have no bearing on the merits of the case.