Krishan Kumar Khurana, Labour Department vs Dharampal Kakkar

V.K. Jhanji, J.—This shall dispose of Civil Revisions No. 4223 of 1994.

This is landlord''s revision petition. K.K. Khurana (petitioner herein) filed a petition u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applicable to Union Territory, Chandigarh, for eviction of Dharam Pal Kakkar (respondent herein) from the ground floor of five-marla house, namely, House No. 1283, Sector 22-B, Chandigarh. In his petition, petitioner averred that he as a landlord had inducted respondent as tenant during the month of March, 1985 on rent of Rs. 600/- per month, payable in advance. He sought ejectment of the respondent on the ground of personal necessity. He argued in his petition that premises are required by him for his own use and for his family members. Inasmuch as his mother is aged 70 years and being a heart patient wants to get treatment from P.G.I., Chandigarh. His son, Vineet Khurana has joined B.Sc. Chemical Engineering Course at Chandigarh and thereafter, wants to stay in the said premises. Rent was also claimed w.e.f. 1.10.1988. In his ejectment petition, petitioner specifically averred that he had not vacated any other premises or was in occupation of any other house in Chandigarh after the commencement of the Act. On notice of the petition, respondent filed written statement denying the requirement of the premises by the petitioner for his own use and also for his family members. He however, tendered the rent. He did not specifically deny the averment of the petitioner in the petition that petitioner had not vacated any other premises or was in occupation of any other house Or premises within the area of Chandigarh. Subsequently, petitioner vide an application dated 6.4.1982 sought permission of the Rent Controller to bring on record the additional evidence to show the change in circumstances. In the application, he stated that he stood transferred to Chandigarh as Assistant Director (Head-quarters) w.e.f. 31.7.1991 and though on transfer he is residing on first floor of the house which was got vacated on 15.2.1992, yet accommodation in his occupation is insufficient for his requirement and also for his family members. He also stated- that his status is a Class-II Gazetted Officer of long standing and as such accommodation in his possession is too meagre and insufficient for his requirement. Application to lead additional evidence by way of an affidavit was allowed on payment of costs. Rent Controller on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed the following issues :-

Whether the tender made by the respondent is insufficient and invalid? OPA.

Whether the petitioner requires the premises in dispute for his bonafide personal use and occupation? OPA.

Since the respondent had tendered the rent on the first date of hearing, issue in regard to arrears of rent was decided in favour of the tenants. In regard to the issue of the landlord requiring the premises for his bona-fide personal use and occupation and also for his family members, the Rent Controller found as follows :-

"Admittedly, the petitioner is landlord, but as Laid down in 1992(1) RCJ 280, (supra), the tenant cannot challenge the title and landlord can maintain this petition. The respondent has not examined any other witness, the petitioner has proved by leading cogent evidence, that he has been transferred to Chandigarh and his son is studying in B.Sc. Chemical Engineering and his three children are also staying with him. Although, the Ist floor and barsati portion have been vacated as per the RW- 1, yet it is the choice of the landlord to live as per the requirements and the respondent has not challenged the version given by the petitioner that the mother is old and is living with him, which further proves that the aged mother of the petitioner cannot bear the brunt of going upstairs every now and then."

Consequently, the respondent was ordered to be ejected from the premises in dispute. In appeal by the tenant, the appellate Authority though did not differ with the finding of the Rent Controller in regard to bona-fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own use as well as for his family members, yet allowed the appeal of the tenant and dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord has to be the owner of the property before seeking ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement. In this regard, he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Delhi High Court in Kishan Lal v. Rajan Chand 1992(2) R.C.R. 390.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order of the appellate Authority is not sustainable inasmuch judgment in Kishan Lal''s case (supra), on the basis of which ejectment petition of the petitioner has been dismissed, has no application to the facts of the present case as the said judgment relates to Delhi Rent Control Act which cannot be applied to a building in Chandigarh.

After hearing the learned counsel, I am of the view that the revision petition deserves to succeed. Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applicable to Chandigarh, confers a right on the landlord to recover possession of a residential building on the ground of personal necessity. It will be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of the Act, applicable in this case, to adjudicate the controversy posed herein.

Section 2(c) :

"landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, of, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord." Section 2(i) :

"tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building, or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed our leased by a municipal, town or notified area committee."

Section 13(3) (a) :

A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession -

(i) in the case of a residential building if -

(a) he requires it for his own occupation,

(i-a) in the case of a residential building, if the landlord is a member of the armed forces of the Union of India and requires it for the occupation of his family and if he produces a certificate of the prescribed authority, referred to in section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, that he is serving under Special conditions within the meaning of section 3 of that Act."

It is clear from the definition of ''landlord'' as contained in section 2(c) of the Act that the term "landlord"means a person to whom the rent is payable and includes a person who is entitled to receive rent either on his own account or on behalf or for benefit of any other person. A person claiming to be the landlord may or may not be the legal owner of the property. There is also no indication in Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the Act that the a person who seeks to eject his tenant must be the owner. Rather a reading of the section makes it abundantly clear that the only requirement is that the landlord is entitled to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession. It is not necessary that the landlord must also be the owner before he applies to the Controller for an order of ejectment against his tenant. In the present case, the tenant has contended before the appellate Authority that the landlord has to be the owner before seeking ejectment on, the ground of bona-fide requirement. Appellate Authority in para 13 of the judgment found this contention not to be tenable. However, after repelling this contention, the learned appellate Authority gave a totally contradictory finding in para 14 of the judgment by stating that before seeking ejectment on the ground of personal necessity the landlord has to be the owner of the premises. This is what the appellate Authority has said in para 13 and 14 of the judgment :

"13. The second contention of the tenant that the landlord has to be the owner of the demised premises before seeking ejectment on the ground of bona-fide requirement is not tenable as the tenant once accepted the landlord in his own right and paid him the rent, later on he cannot dispute that he is not a specified landlord reference was made to R.K. Khanna Vs. Janak Raj Singh,

The facts mentioned in this authority are not attracted to the facts of the present case. No doubt for the purpose of claiming rent etc. The landlord need to be the owner of the property but for the purpose of seeking ejectment on the ground of personal requirement, the landlord has to be the owner of the property as observed in Kishan Lal''s case (supra)."

The findings of the learned appellate Authority for seeking ejectment of the premises the landlord has to be the owner, is apparently wrong as neither the definition of ''landlord'' as contained in Section 2(c) nor Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) which confers a right on the landlord to seek ejectment on the ground of personal necessity, requires that the landlord has to be the owner. The judgment relied upon by the learned appellate Authority in Kishan Lal''s case was given under the Delhi Rent Control Act in the context of section 14(1)(e) which provides "that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any other member of his family dependent on him, if he is the Owner thereof, (emphasis mine) or for any other person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation". However, as already noticed, under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, it is not necessary for the landlord to be the owner for the purpose of seeking ejectment of his tenant on the ground of personal necessity. The learned appellate Authority if had taken trouble in reading the definition of the ''landlord'' and also the provisions of section 13(1) of 1949 Act vis-a-vis the provisions of Delhi Rent Controls Act on the basis of which he denied the landlord his right to recover possession from the tenant on the ground of personal necessity, I am sure, he would not have come to the conclusion he recorded in para 14 of the judgment. Because of this casual approach of the learned appellate Authority, the landlord has been denied his right to seek immediate possession on the ground of personal necessity. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate Authority being not sustainable in law has to be set aside.

Consequently, this revision petition is allowed, judgment of the appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored with costs, which are quantified at Rs. 2000/-.