High CourtsSingle Bench

Krishan Lal vs Labour Court and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 6 October 1986 · Citation: (1987) 2 LLJ 110

HON’BLE JUDGES
D.V. Sehgal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 10 · MOTOR TRANSPORT WORKERS ACT, 1961 — Section 25, 37 · Payment of Wages Act, 1936 — Section 15
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Judgment

14 paragraphs · 1,700 words

D.V. Sehgal, J.—This judgment shall dispose of Civil Writ Petition No. 5823 of 1985 and Civil Writ Petition No. 1277 of 1986 as the petitioner in both the petitions is the same person and the orders impugned therein involve similar questions of law.

2.

The facts in brief are taken from Civil Writ Petition No. 5823 of 1985. The petitioner was employed as a conductor with respondent No. 2 and had put in more than 24 years of service. His services were terminated and an industrial dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court u/s 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"), to the effect whether termination of services of the petitioner was justified and in order, and if not, to what relief/exact amount of compensation he was entitled. The Labour Court made its award dated 16th January, 1984, annexure P. 1, holding that termination of his services was not justified or in order but since the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation, it was held that he was not entitled to reinstatement. He was instead awarded wages up to 25th December, 1980, on which date he attained the age of 58 years, i.e. the age of superannuation. It was further directed that respondent No. 2 shall pay to the petitioner Rs. 4,272 as his dues up to October, 1977. This award was brought into question by respondent No. 2 by filing a Civil Writ Petition No. 4672 of 1984 in this Court which was, however, dismissed in limine by a Division Bench, vide order dated 15th February, 1985, annexure P. 2.

3.

The petitioner filed an application u/s 33C(2) of the Act for computation of his wages from October, 1977, to December, 1980, in accordance with the direction given in the award, annexure P. 1. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, respondent No. 1, without going into the merits of the case dismissed this application, vide order dated 15th October, 1985, annexure P-3, holding that it was not maintainable. It was observed therein that since respondent No. 2 is a motor transport undertaking and the petitioner was a workman employed under it, he was covered by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, which is a special enactment and is bound to prevail over the Act. Following a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. D.D. Gupta and another, it was held that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the application of the petitioner. Aggrieved against this order, the present writ petition has been filed by the workman-petitioner. He has questioned the legality of the order, annexure P-3, and has sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the same.

4.

Respondent No. 1 was duly served. But no one appeared on his behalf and he was proceeded against ex parte. Respondent No. 2 opposed the writ petition by filing a written statement. The averments in the petition narrating the facts have not been disputed. It has, however, been contended therein that the petitioner is governed by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, which is a special legislation for industrial labourers working in motor transport undertakings and he, therefore, could not maintain the application u/s 33C(2) of the Act. Support was sought from D.D. Gupta''s case, (supra).

5.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length. I am of the view that these petitions must succeed. Respondent No. 1 has wrongly refused to exercise his jurisdiction u/s 33C(2) and afford necessary relief to the petitioner after due adjudication of the application. It is necessary here to reproduce the provisions of Sections 25 and 37 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961

25.

Act IV of 1936 to apply to payment of wages to motor transport workers�The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), as in force for the time being, shall apply to motor transport workers engaged in a motor transport undertaking as it applies to wages payable in an industrial establishment as if the said Act had been extended to the payment of wages of such motor transport workers by a notification of the State Government under Sub-section (5) of Section 1 thereof, and as if a motor transport undertaking were an industrial establishment within the meaning of the said Act.

37.

Effect of laws and agreements inconsistent with this Act�.(1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in the terms of any award, agreement or contract of service, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act:

Provided that where under any such award, agreement, contract of service or otherwise a motor transport worker is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the motor transport worker shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as precluding any motor transport worker from entering into an agreement with an employer for granting him rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act.

6.

It was, no doubt, held in D.D. Gupta''s case (supra) that on reading of Section 25 of the Motor Transport Workers Act. 1961, it is clear that it incorporates the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act in it. Section 37 lays down that if there is any inconsistency between the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act incorporating the Payment of Wages Act and any other law, then the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act would prevail It was observed that there is an inconsistency between the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act on the one hand and the Payment of Wages Act on the other and since the Motor Transport Workers Act is a special Act by which the workmen of the motor transport undertaking are governed, the same would prevail over the Act.

7.

With due respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, I am not inclined to agree with their conclusion. The provisions of Section 25 or 37 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, do not exclude the applicability of Section 33C(2) of the Act to a claim made by the workmen for the wages due from the employer. Section 25, no doubt, incorporates a provision by which the Payment of Wages Act is made applicable to the Motor Transport Workers and Section 37 gives overriding effect to those provisions over the provisions of any other law or terms of any award, agreement or contract of service but subject to the exception mentioned in the proviso of Section 37 which, in fact, is quite important. A reading of the said proviso makes it clear that a workman is entitled to the benefit under any award, agreement, contract of service or otherwise which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under the Motor Transport Workers Act. 1961. He shall be entitled to those more favourable benefits notwithstanding the provisions to the contrary contained in the said Act. Instead of generalising the proposition, if we come to specifics of the present case, we find that the award, annexure P. 1, was made by the Labour Court on 16th January, 1984, which gave a right to the petitioner to recover his dues from respondent No. 2. The management procrastinated by filing a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed in limine on 15th February, 1985. It was thereafter that an application u/s 33C(2) of the Act was filed by the petitioner before the Labour Court. If he is confined to the remedy u/s 15 of the Payment of Wages Act then the same would have been clearly barred by time as a claim for wages under the said provision is required to be made by an applicant within one year from the date of accrual of cause. This would mean that the petitioner would be left without remedy and the award, annexure P. 1, in his favour would be rendered ineffectual. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature while enacting the Motor Transport Workers Act.

8.

It has been held by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mandegam Radhakrishna Reddy Vs. Sri Bharathi Velu Bus Service and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur, , that even assuming that the right to a remedy does not fall within the ambit of a benefit contemplated under the proviso of Section 37 there is no reason as to why the principle underlying the proviso should not be applied in respect of a right to remedy given to a workman u/s 33C(2) of the Act, if such a remedy is more favourable and efficacious than the one provided under the Payment of Wages Act. It has been further observed therein that remedy of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and Section 33C(2) of the Act are independent and alternative. One does not exclude the other. In such a situation, the principle generalia specialibus non derogant will not be applicable as each one of the aforesaid Acts is a special enactment in its own sphere and one cannot be said to be special in nature vis-a-vis the other. 1 am in full agreement with the above observations made in Mandegam Radhakrishna Reddy''s case (supra).

9.

I, therefore, allow this writ petition, quash the order dated 14th October, 1985, annexure P. 3, passed by respondent No. 1 and direct him to restore on his file the application u/s 33C(2) of the Act filed by the petitioner and adjudicate upon and decide the same on merits and in accordance with law. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.

10.

The parties through their counsel have been directed to appear before respondent No. 1 on 1st December, 1986.