Krishana Devi and Others vs Gram Sabha Lahora

I.S. Tiwana, J.—The question of law of some significance which has come before us on a reference by D.S. Tewatia, J., relates to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge to entertain a revision petition against an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 21/23 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. While making the reference, the learned Judge doubted the correctness of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mahan Singh and Another Vs. Rana Partap, . We mention here at the outset that during the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for neither of the parties assailed the correctness of the said decision and rather were of the categoric opinion that a reference to the same is not even relevant for the decision of this petition. We, therefore, do not feel it necessary to examine the correctness of the said judgment.

Briefly the facts giving rise to the above-noted question of law are that Gram Sabha, Lohara, Union Territory, Chandigarh, issued a notice dated June 8, 1968, asking the Petitioners to remove the boundary wall constructed by them around a certain area which resulted in obstruction in a public passage known as ''Rasta Dhanaswala Dharamsala''. The Petitioners filed their objections to this notice alleging therein that the notice was not only vague and indefinite, but similar earlier notices issued by the Panchayat had already been met successfully by them and the Panchayat should not harass them by repeatedly issuing such notices. The proceedings which continued to be pending for a considerably long time in one Panchayat or the other on account of transfer orders by the competent authorities, ultimately were transferred to the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chandigarh, under the orders of Sessions Judge presumably passed by him u/s 408 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . The matter was finally decided by Shri J.P. Gupta, Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh,-vide his order dated July 30, 1977, holding that the Gram Sabha could not take any further action against the Petitioners on the basis of the notice dated June 8, 1968.

The Gram Sabha, Lohara, preferred a revision petition u/s 397, Code of Criminal Procedure, against this order of the Judicial Magistrate dated July 30, 1977. During the course of pendency of the revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge, the Gram Sabha probably realising the weakness of their case withdrew the said impugned notice with an undertaking that the Gram Panchayat shall not proceed on this notice and shall issue a fresh notice giving the boundaries of the property if they decided to proceed against the Respondents again. As a result of this undertaking, the Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the petition before him with the observation that the Panchayat shall not proceed to get the obstruction removed on the basis of the impugned notice but it would be open to it to give a fresh notice describing the boundaries of the property and to proceed against the Respondents if it so liked. It is this orders of the Additional Sessions Judge which is now challenged before us.

The primary, rather the sole contention of Mr. Harbans Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, is that no such revision petition was competent before the Additional Sessions Judge as according to the learned Counsel, Shri J.P. Gupta, Magistrate, had only decided the proceedings u/s 21/23 of the Gram Panchayat Act as ''a Panchayat'' and applicability of Code of Criminal Procedure as such has specifically been excluded by the provisions of Section 66 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. In a nutshell the learned Counsel submits that when a Judicial Magistrate tries or concludes proceedings under the Gram Panchayat Act, the jurisdiction he exercises and the procedure he follows is that laid down under the Gram Panchayat Act and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure . If that is the situation, contends the learned Counsel, then no revision u/s 397, Code of Criminal Procedure, was competent against the order of the Judicial Magistrate. He points out that at the most the Chief Judicial Magistrate could cancel or modify the order in exercise of his supervisory jurisdiction u/s 51 of the Gram Panchayat Act.

To us it appears that the argument of the learned Counsel is based on misapprehensions and misreading of the relevant provisions of the Gram Panchayat Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is beyond dispute that the proceedings initiated u/s 21/23 of the Gram Panchayat Act are in the nature of criminal proceedings and the Panchayat, while exercising its jurisdiction under those sections, is a Court. The rest of the argument of the learned Counsel that once those proceedings are transferred to the Court of a Judicial Magistrate, the said judicial Court would be reduced to the status of a Panchayat, is not based on any principle or precedent. The Gram Panchayat and the Judicial Court of a Magistrate are two independent and parallel forums of competent jurisdiction to try and decide those proceedings. This aspect of the matter is more than clear by a reference to Section 51 of the Panchayat Act itself which reads as under: -

Supervision of Criminal Proceedings by Chief Judicial Magistrate.

(1) The Chief Judicial Magistrate, if satisfied, that a failure of justice has occurred, may of his own motion or on an application of the party aggrieved by order in writing after notice to the accused, or the complainant as the case may be, cancel or modify any order in a judicial proceeding made by (a) Panchayat or direct the retrial of any criminal case by the same or any other Panchayat of competent jurisdiction or by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to him.

(2) ....

A bare reading of the above noted provision would reveal that a Chief Judicial Magistrate, while cancelling or modifying an order in a judicial proceeding made by a Panchayat, may direct the retrial of the case by the same or the other Panchayat of competent jurisdiction or by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to him. Section 66 of the Gram Panchayat Act excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the proceedings pending before the Panchayat and not before a Court of competent jurisdiction. In fact such a court of the Magistrate is created under the Code of Criminal Procedure and in all its actions and orders, is governed by the procedure laid down by the said Code. It cannot therefore, possibly be held on any principal that when a proceeding is transferred from the Court of a Panchayat of competent jurisdiction to the Court of a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure would not apply to the latter Court or the proceedings. In this view of the matter we fail to see how the Court of Sessions was not competent to call for and examine the proceedings of the Court of Shri J.P. Gupta, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chandigarh, which Court undoubtedly was an inferior criminal Court situated within the local jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge/Additional Sessions Judge. We, therefore, are clearly of the view that the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated September 29, 1978, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.

No other argument has been advanced before us by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners.

In the light of the discussion above, we do not find any merit in this petition and dismiss the same.