Krishen Lal Trikha vs Jupiter General Insurance and others

Dr. Adarsh Sein Anand, J.—This appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act is directed against the dismissal of the claim application u/s

110-A of Motor Vehicles Act filed by the appellant.

The material facts for the disposal of this appeal are: On 16-7-1970, the appellant was on his checking duty on the National High-Way at a

place known as Jekhiani, near Udhampur and was checking the motor vehicles. At about 1300 hours when the petitioner was standing near a

stationary jeep belonging to NPCC and bearing registration No. DLI 2537, a truck bearing No. J & K 9947, attached with Punjab Transport

Company, Jammu and owned by respondents 2 to 5 came from the Jammu side and struck against the stationary jeep which consequently struck

against the appellant and caused him serious bodily injuries. As a result of the said accident the petitioner suffered some injuries. He accordingly

lodged a claim petition before the Tribunal claiming compensation to the extent of Rs. 30,000/- on 15-7-1971. In the claim petition itself, the

appellant prayed for the condonation of the delay caused in the filing of the claim petition. The claim petition was registered and notices were

issued to the respondents. The respondents resisted the claim of the petitioner on various grounds including the one that the petition was barred by

time and as such not maintainable. The Tribunal framed the following preliminary issues:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to condonation of delay and on what grounds.

......O. P. petitioner

In support of this issue the appellant examined Kirthi Bhushan, Krishen Saroop, Krishen Singh and Dr. V. M. Soodan as his witnesses and himself

appeared as his own witness also but the respondents did not examine any witness in rebuttal.

The learned tribunal after the examination of the grounds urged in support of the application for condonation of delay refused to exercise its

discretion in favour of the appellant and rejected his claim petition. The appellant has come up in appeal to this Court.

It is an admitted fact that the accident took place on 16-7-70 and the claim petition was instituted on 15-7-71. u/s 110-A (iii) of the M. V. Act,

no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the date of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso

to this sub-section lays down that a Claim Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that

the claimant was prevented by ""sufficient cause"" from making the claim petition within time. The claim petition was admittedly filed beyond the

period of six months.

The case of the appellant before the Tribunal as also before this Court is that although the Govt. had constituted a Tribunal under Sec. 110 of

the M. V. Act yet he could not learn about its existence till after eleven months from the date of occurrence and that since under the Fatal Accident

Act, the period prescribed for filing a claim for compensation is one year from the date of accident, he was of the impression that his petition was

within time. It is urged that the appellant has not been negligent or careless in pursuing the remedy. While explaining ""sufficient cause"" the Learned

Counsel for the appellant has urged that in addition to the ignorance about the existence of the Tribunal which delayed the filing of the petition the

appellant was ill and confined to bed as a result of the injuries suffered due to accident and could not file the petition in time.

Two questions fall for our determination in this appeal:

(1) Since there has been no adjudication on merits, is the order of the Tribunal rejecting the claim application on the ground of its being barred by

time an ""award"" within the meaning of Sec. 110-D of the M. V. Act against which an appeal lies to this Court.

(2) Is there any ""sufficient cause"" to condone the delay in the filing of the claim petition.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of an 'Award' as a ""Judicial decision"". u/s 110-B of the M. V. Act on the presentation of a

claim petition u/s 110-A of the M. V. Act the Tribunal is to hold an enquiry. Since an enquiry must result in a decision that in our opinion would be

a judicial decision. It is immaterial whether the decision determines the compensation payable to a party or dismisses his claim petition. In either

case that decision would be a determination and a judicial decision and as such would be an ""Award"". Any other meaning to the term 'Award'

would defeat the very purpose of the enactment (Motor Vehicles Act) and render S. 110-D of the M. V. Act providing for appeals to the High

Court nugatory. In our opinion, there is no warrant for discriminating between the claimants whose petitions are dismissed on merits and those

whose petitions fail on some other grounds. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that the order rejecting a claim petition on the ground that the same

is barred by limitation would be an 'award' and appealable u/s 110-D of the M. V. Act. With respect, we find ourselves unable to accept the

reasoning of K. V. Asthana, J. of the Allahabad High Court in Satish Chandra and Others Vs. State of Utter Pradesh, wherein his Lordship held:

It is doubtful that an order refusing to condone the delay and rejecting the claim as time barred, amounts to an award. An award is an adjudication

by the Claims Tribunal after hearing and considering the case on merits. An order refusing to condone the delay or rejecting the claims petition on

any technical point would not be an award, as it does not involve adjudication of the claim on merits.

The interpretation given in Satish Chandra's case (supra) gives a very restricted meaning to the terms 'Award' for which we do not find any

justification or warrant in law.

That takes us to the next question as to whether the appellant has shown ""sufficient cause"" for the condonation of delay.

According to Mr. Bhalgotra, Learned Counsel for the appellant, the appellant did not come to know about the existence of the Tribunal and

therefore he could not file the petition within time. It is urged that apart from this, the appellant was also prevented, on account of the injuries

sustained by him, from pursuing the remedy and both these grounds were sufficient to condone the delay and that the tribunal had erred in refusing

to condone the delay.

The learned Tribunal while refusing to grant the application of the appellant for condonation of delay seems to have proceeded on the doctrine

that the appellant seeking condonation of delay has to explain the cause for delay for the entire period just as is required under Sec. 5 of the

Limitation Act. The Tribunal in this connection observed that ""there was some justification for the petitioner in not filing the petition for about six to

eight months from the date of the operation"" but that the petitioner had not explained the delay from April 1971 to 15th of July 1971. This appears

to have weighed heavily with the Tribunal in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to condone the delay.

The proviso to S. 110-A (iii) of the M. V. Act enjoins that the claim Tribunal may entertain a claim petition after the expiry of the period of six

months, if it is satisfied that the claimant was prevented from making the petition in time due to ""sufficient cause."" The phrase 'sufficient cause"" in the

said proviso, in our opinion should not receive a narrow construction and should not be treated at par with the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation

Act, as appears to have been done by the Tribunal in the instant case. The appellant had led evidence to explain the cause for delay. The petitioner

deposed on oath that it was after about 11 months of the accident that he came to know about the existence of the Tribunal. This part of his

statement was not challenged in the cross-examination and no evidence was given in rebuttal of this statement. There was nothing on the record

which could have justified the rejection of this part of evidence by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has ignored this statement or its effect, in explaining

sufficient cause"" while rejecting the prayer of the appellant to condone the delay. It is not unknown or uncommon that the notifications issued by

the Govt. and published in the Gazette are not readily available. We have often experienced that the members of the bar, who are very diligent, are

often not able to discover notifications in the Gazette as copies are not readily available. The Constitution of the Tribunal under the M. V. Act was

a new scheme for the State and we cannot blame the appellant that he remained ignorant about the constitution of the tribunal u/s 110 of the M. V.

Act. There is no material on the record to show that in any other J manner, apart from the publication of the notification in the Gazette, the

constitution of the Tribunal was publicised from which it could be inferred that the fact of the constitution of the tribunal could have been known to

the public. This in our opinion was ""sufficient cause"" within the meaning of Section 110-A (3) of the M. V. Act requiring the tribunal to exercise

discretion in favour of the petitioner to condone delay. Whereas it is an accepted principle that ignorance of law is no excuse, yet the rules and

regulations contained in Government notification are only piece of delegated legislation and cannot be equated with the laws enacted by the

legislature which, by their very nature receive utmost publicity and came to the notice of the general public. Moreover, the constitution of the

Tribunal, a new scheme for the public, cannot be treated as law--it is a forum only and ignorance about its formation, without anything cannot lead

us to attribute any negligence on the part of the appellant. This apart, the appellant remained confined to bed as a result of the injuries sustained by

him. He was unable to think properly and walk properly. Dr. Soodan, the medical expert who had attended on the appellant deposed on oath that

on account of the injuries sustained by the appellant he was likely to be prevented from moving about freely for about 'one year' from the date of

the occurrence. This part of the evidence was not challenged either in cross-examination or by leading any rebuttal evidence. We fail to understand

as to why in the light of this uncontroverted evidence, the tribunal did not exercise the discretion to condone the delay. The aforesaid reason given

by the appellant for delay corroborated by the doctor would show the existence of ""sufficient cause"" entitling the tribunal to condone the delay. The

words ""sufficient cause"" occurring in proviso to Sec. 110-A(3) of the M. V. Act have to be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice

and when so construed we are of the opinion that the tribunal did not exercise the discretion for condoning the delay either properly or judiciously.

As a result of the discussion above, we hold that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay. In our opinion, the tribunal fell into an

apparent error in its approach to the determination of the question of existence of ""sufficient cause"". This appeal is accordingly allowed and the

award of the tribunal is hereby set aside and the delay in filing the petition is hereby condoned.

The Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition at the preliminary stage without adjudicating upon the merits of the case. We remit the case to the

Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law.

The Tribunal shall issue notice to the parties and after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims,

expeditiously dispose of the claim petition.

Since nobody has appeared for the respondent in this case there will be no order as to costs.

I.K. Kotwal, J.

I agree.