Krishna Gopal and others vs Dattatraya

S.M.N. Raina, J.—This is a revision petition u/s 115 of the CPC against an order of the Claims Tribunal Gwalior constituted under the Motor Vehicle Act.

The non-applicant presented an application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 claiming compensation amounting to Rs. 15,250 for personal injuries sustained in a truck accident on 14-11-1967. The grievance of the applicant is that he has not been given due opportunity by the Claims Tribunal to adduce evidence in support of his case.

A preliminary objection has been raised by the non-applicant that this petition is not maintainable as the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court, and as such, no revision lies u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code. In order to appreciate this objection it is necessary to refer to the various provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act relating to the Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 110 of the Act provides that a State Government may constitute a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for a defined area for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicles. Subsections (2) and (3) of section 110-A lay down the form of application to be presented to the Claims Tribunal and the period of limitation within which the application is to be presented. Section 110-B provides that the Tribunal shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award. Section 110-C deals with procedure. Sub-section (1) provides that in holding any inquiry u/s 110-B the Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) confers certain powers of the Civil Court on the Tribunal. Sub-section (3) provides that the Tribunal may obtain assistance of one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry. u/s 111-A the Government is empowered to make rules relating to procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal and the powers of a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Tribunal. Section 110-F bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of any claim which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area.

It is to be borne in mind that where no Claims Tribunal has been established for any area the aggrieved party has to seek his remedy in a civil Court. The object of the aforesaid provisions is to take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of such claims and to establish a separate machinery for the adjudication of such claims. It is obvious that a Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court, because it exercises only such powers of a Civil Court as have been expressly conferred on it by the Act, or the Rules made under the Act. If the intention of the legislature had been that such claims should be tribal by the Civil Court, it was not necessary for it to establish a Claims Tribunal and the purpose would have been achieved by simply laying down special procedure for the adjudication of such claims by the Courts. It is no doubt true that u/s 110 of the Act Additional District Judges and Judges who are Presiding Officers of Civil Courts are appointed as Members of the Tribunal, but it is obvious that they do not function as a Civil Court.

The fact that the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court has also been made amply clear by section 110-C, which provides that the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court only for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 110-D provides for an appeal to the High Court. Thus, although the Claims Tribunal has the trappings of a Civil Court it is not a Civil Court for the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure. u/s 115 CPC revisional powers can be exercised in respect of any case decided by a Court. The word ''Court'' in section 115 evidently means a Civil Court. It is obvious from the provisions referred to above that a Claims Tribunal does not function as a Civil Court. It, therefore, follows that a revision petition against an order passed by the Tribunal is not maintainable, and the only remedy available to the petitioner is to challenge the order by a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution.

In Harbans Singh Vs. Atma Singh and Others it was held by the Punjab High Court that the Claims Tribunal is not a Court, but a persona designates.: In British India General Insurance Company Ltd, Margoa v. Chandbi Shaikh Abdul Kadar 1968 ACJ 322, a similar view was expressed by the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu. Jt was held in that case that the Claims Tribunal cannot be regarded as a Civil Court for the purposes of interference in revision u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code.

In Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Munnabai and Others, , it was held that although the Tribunal was not a Court in the strict sense of the term, the provisions of the Limitation Act were applicable. The question of applicability of the said provisions was considered in the light of the provisions of the Limitation Act and the question whether a revision u/s 115 of the Code would lie was not considered in this case. It is, therefore of no help.

Learned Counsel for the applicant has also relied on the decision of this Court in Radhabai Bhikaji Vs. Baluram Daluram, . But in that case the Court merely construed the expression "Civil Court" in section 3(5) of the Workmen''s Compensation Act. It is, therefore, of no help for the purpose of this case. Another decision of this Court on which reliance has been placed by the applicant is Hayatkhan and Others Vs. Mangilal and Others, In that case it was held that the word "suit" in section 6 of the Limitation Act was wide enough to include an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal which was in the nature of a suit. This does not, however, mean that the Tribunal is a Court for the purpose of section 115 Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, this decision is also not of much help.

It has, however, been brought to my notice that a revision petition against an order of the Tribunal was entertained by this Court in two cases, namely Gitabai v. General Manager, M. P. Roadways 1964 JLJ SN 88 and Messers Lucky Bharat Garage (Pvt.) Ltd. Raipur v. Shanti Devi 1969 JLJ SN 15. The full text of these decisions has not been made available to me, but it appears that the question whether a revision petition would lie against an order of the Claims Tribunal was not specifically raised, and, therefore, this Court had no occasion to consider it in all its aspects. The question is, however, of general importance and is likely to arise often in connection with such cases. It is, therefore, necessary that the following question should be referred to a larger Bench for decision :-

Whether the Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court and a revision petition would lie u/s 115 CPC against an order passed by it in the course of proceeding before it ?

Let the papers be laid before my Lord the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench for the purpose.

ORDER

S. B. Sen, J. (17-3-71)

The following question has been referred to a larger Bench by Raina, J :

Whether the Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court and a revision petition would lie u/s 115 C.P.C against an order passed by it in the course of proceedings before it ?

The circumstances under which the question has cropped up are follows. One Dattatrya. presented an application before the Claims Tribunal, Gwalior, constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, u/s 110-A for compensation amounting to Rs. 15,250 for personal injuries sustained in a truck accident on 14-11-1967. The claim was against Krishna Gopal and others who are petitioners in the present civil revision. In the usual course the Claims Tribunal proceeded with the case. On 25-6-70 the case was fixed for evidence. We are not mentioning as to what happened previously as it is not necessary for the purpose of this reference. On that date parties appeared Krishna Gopal examined four witnesses and filed two applications for further time to produce: more witnesses. This petition was objected to by the respondent Dattatrya. The Tribunal rejected the prayer. Against this order rejecting the prayer to produce more witnesses this revision petition has been filed u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code.

When the petition came up before Raina, J., a preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Dattatrya that the revision is not maintainable as the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court. The learned Judge after referring to various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act was of the opinion that although the Claims Tribunal has the trappings of a Civil Court it is not a Civil Court for the purposes of section 115 Civil Procedure Code. It was further observed by the learned Single Judge that under that section revisional powers can be exercised in respect of any case decided by a Court. He was of the view that all the provisions of the CPC would not apply and the Claims Tribunal does not function as a Civil Court. He opined ultimately that the revision petition against an order passed by the Tribunal is not maintainable and the only remedy available to the petitioner may be to challenge the order by a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge referred to M. Bhoopathy (Died) and Others Vs. M.S. Vijayalakshmi and Another, in which it was held by the Punjab High Court that a Claims Tribunal is not a Court but persona designate. He also relied on a decision reported as British India Gen. Ins. Company, Ltd. Margo v. Chandbi Shaikh Abdul Kadar 1968 ACJ 322, In view of the fact that certain revision petition have been entertained by this Court in which the questions were not directly raised, the learned Single Judge felt that the question should be decided finally by a larger Bench. He considered that the question was of general importance and was likely to arise often. Ultimately the question mentioned above has been referred to by him to the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench for the purpose. The case has, therefore, come before us.

There cannot be any doubt that there is no decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court directly dealing with the question under the Motor Vehicles Act. But there are decisions on other statutes having similar provision. They will be of help in deciding the question referred to Section 115 CPC may be quoted here:

Revision.--The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears -

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.

The High Court may call for the record of any case decided by "any Court subordinate to such High Court." Therefore, before the application of section 115 CPC two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the case must be decided by any Court and secondly, it must be a Court subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, the mere subordination of the Tribunal to the High Court will not be enough. The Tribunal must be a Court.

Before we enter into the two questions we may mention here that we are not entering into the maintainability of the revision petition on the ground that a revision petition, even assuming section 115 is applicable, would fail. What we mean is that we are not considering the nature of the order against which the revision petition has been filed. To be clear the order impugned, that is refusal to grant adjournment for production of certain witnesses cannot as a matter of course be challenged u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code. If the Court has granted time to the petitioner and they have failed to take advantage of that and if there is no justification for calling the witnesses the Court would be justified in refusing to grant adjournment. In such cases the power being purely discretionary and ''it being not a case which has been decided'' in the sense contemplated u/s 115 a revision petition would not lie. It may however be argued that we have to decide first whether we should entertain the revision petition as section 115 is not applicable or after entertaining the petition we should hold that the petition should be dismissed because the other condition namely "It is not a case decided" is not fulfilled. But in the reference the question referred to is specific and we need not go into other matters.

Undoubtedly as stated already there is no decision of this Court nor for any other High Court in this matter with reference to the Motor Vehicles Act, but the decisions on other Acts, which are in pari material would be guiding us. Probably the only decision of the M.P. High Court which has considered the jurisdiction u/s 115 CPC in a similar statute, namely Workmen''s Compensation Act is in Shaikh Amir v. Sardar Beg [1] Unfortunately it has not been fully reported but is short noted as No. 68 in 1970 M.P.L.J. The Court considered the various pro-visions of Workmen''s Compensation Act and ultimately came to the conclusion that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain application for revision against an order passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act. We may therefore, refer to the provisions of the Workmen''s Compensation Act as well as the provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act to see whether on the same reasons we can entertain revision against an order passed by the C aims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act.

In order to have an easy comparison of the relevant sections in the two enactments and the relevancy of the decisions on one to the interpretation of the other, we are quoting below the relevant provisions side by side:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

WORKMEN''S COMPENSATION ACT

110-C. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.--(1) In holding any enquiry u/s 110-B, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witness and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V-of 1898).

The Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of taking evidence on oath (which such Commissioner is hereby empowered to impose) and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling production of document and material objects, the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

110-D. Appeal--(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand.

(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely-

(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or part for a lump sum ;

(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of half monthly payment;

(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;

(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or

(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to condition :

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b) unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees.

I have quoted the above sections because the decisions which have been placed at the Bar are based practically on the above sections.

Let us start with the decision of this High Court in Civil Revision No. 224 of 65 (supra). That was a case in which the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act proceeded ex parte against the party under a wrong belief that it had been served. The party, however, appeared subsequently and filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order to enable him to defendant his case. The Commissioner was satisfied about the grounds of his absence and ordered setting aside of the ex parte order on payment of Rs. 40/ as costs. While passing this order the Commissioner, however made a condition that he could participate in the proceedings subsequent to the date of the setting a side of the ex parte order. The petitioner therefore, came to the High Court u/s 115 CPC as he found certain witnesses 1 ad already been examined. An objection was raised about the applicability of section 115. It was held that section 115 would apply. The learned Judge was inclined to accept the views held by the different High Courts, in particular Mohanlal Prabhuram Vs. Fine Knitting Mills Co. Ltd., Abdulrashid v. Hanuman Oil and Rice Mill AIR 1951 Ass 88 , Mt. Dirji Vs. Smt. Goalin, and AIR 1938 855 (Lahore)

We are, however, considering the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. For the sake of gravity we will refer to the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act as merely ''Commissioner'' and the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Art as "Tribunal'' only. The reasons which weighed for coming to the conclusion that the Commissioner is a Court are applicable also to the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. We have seen that under the Workmen''s Compensation Act appeal lies to the High Court and that is the reason why the Commissioner is subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, I do not see any reason why a Tribunal should also not be subordinate to the High Court in the sense that has been used u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code.

A decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, is, somewhat relevant in order to find out as to the jurisdiction superior Court exercise u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code. It was held by the Supreme Court that the right of the appellate Court u/s 115 is a part of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. It will be better to quote the relevant paragraph :

The right of appeal is one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and inter-position to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which are required to constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. When the aid of the High Court is invoked on the re-visional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the CPC circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the, Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense.

This means that when there is appellate power the jurisdiction to exercise revisional power is inherent therein.

There cannot be any two opinions that the High Court has not appellate power over the decisions of the Tribunal u/s 110-D. There is no restriction for filing an appeal except on valuation. No appeal lies when the amount is less that; Rs. 2.000. In Radhabai Bhikaji Vs. Baluram Daluram, , it was held by the Division Bench that Civil Court includes any Court competent to notice the injury and grant compensation and, therefore their Lordships have included the Statutory Tribunal like the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal as a Civil Court. So also in Hayatkhan and Others Vs. Mangilal and Others, , another Bench held that a claims petition u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a petition which for all material proposes is like a plaint pertaining to the dispute ordinarily triable in a Civil Court and they, therefore, applied the law of limitation--section 6 of the Limitation Act. In Babulal and others v. Mahila Sarjubai 1970 JLJ 25 , it was held that a Claims Tribunal has the power to issue commission for the examination of a witness though power to issue commission is not specifically given. There is another case in Maghanamal Narumal and Others Vs. Moolchand Gianchand, in which it was held that a Tribunal appointed u/s 4 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 was subject to a revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It was also held that it was a Court, though the Act was complete by itself with its procedure.

Thus we see that there are decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court inclined to take the view that the Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court. The only difficulty that has been felt is that there is no decision holding that the Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court. Only two things are necessary for application of section 115 (i) it must be a Court and (ii) it must be subordinate to the High Court. As it is the consistent view of this Court that the Tribunal is a Court we have now only to see whether it is subordinate to the High Court.

So far as that is concerned we have seen that there is no decision of this High Court. The decision as we have seen is in C. R. No. 224 of 1965 (supra) decided under the Workmen''s Compensation Act in which the provisions are the same as in the Motor Vehicles Act- I see no reason, therefore why the Claims Tribunal should also not be held subordinate to the High Court. In Gitabai v. General Manager, M. P. Roadways of the Gwalior Bench decided by Sharma, J., on 14-9-1963 1964 JLJ SN 88 a miscellaneous appeal was filed against a claim which was dismissed in default. Preliminary objection that no appeal lies was upheld and his Lordship Sharma, J., observed;

But a revision would lie against an interlocutory order passed by the Claims Tribunal in such cases.

His Lordships heard the case as a revision and set aside the order of dismissal in default. In lucky Bharat Garage (P) Ltd. Raipur v.Shanti Devi Shrivastava and others 1969 JLJ SN 15, similarly a revision against the order of a Claims Tribunal was entertained and allowed. It is true that no question was directly raised about the maintainability of any petition for revision u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code.

A reference was made at the Bar to the decision Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, . That was a case under the Contempt of Court Act. While discussing the essential tests of a judical pronouncement their Lordships also observed :

It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trapping; of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

It is clear that a claims Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act as well a Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act have power, a part from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal to give a decision or a definite judgment which has finality and authorititativeness. Both the authorities act as Courts and are subordinate to the High Court.

This we see that the conditions laid down u/s 115 CPC are fulfilled in the case of a Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. it is a ''Court'' as has been held in a number of cases mentioned above. It is subject to the appellate jurisdiction is also clear from the Statute itself. The power to revise is exercisable whether we take that that revisional power is included in the appellate power as observed in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1 or because it fullfill the two conditions mentioned u/s 115 Civil Procedure Code.

We may also observe here that CPC contains a bundle of rules and procedures to be observed by a Tribunal. The legislature takes out some rules of procedure from the CPC and makes them applicable in case of particular Tribunal those are specifically mentioned, but these are certain inherent powers which need not be mentioned specifically. The revisional jurisdiction of the superior authority in this case the High Court is inherent and, there fore, it need not be specifically mentioned. The power to hear appeals is a larger power than to hear revision. if appeals can be heard, revisions can certainly be heard unless there is an express bar to the same. In AIR 1950 Nag 14, a case also arose under the Payment of Wages Act. It was held therein that the High Court had no revisional juries diction as it has no power to hear appeals, but as soon as appeal lay to the District Court the High Court had jurisdiction to hear revision against the order of the District budge. That was because the District Judge was subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court notwithstanding the fact that the case was under the Payment of Wages Act which did not provide any revision to the High Court.

Considering all the cases mentioned above my answer to the question referred to is that "the Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court and a revision petition would lie u/s 115 CPC against an order passed by it in the course of proceedings before it. "Even if section 115 CPC may not be applicable strictly but the principles will apply in view of the fact that this is a Tribunal which decides civil disputes and subordinate to the High Court".

Raina, J. (27-4-71)- 29 My learned brother has dealt exhaustively with the question posed by me in the order of reference, in the light of various authorities, but with great respect I must confess that I am unable to persuade myself to agree with him for the following reasons. My learned brother has rightly pointed out in paragraph 4 that in order to attract the application of section 115 CPC two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the case must be decided by a Court within the meaning of section 115 Civil Procedure Code, and secondly, it must be a Court sub-ordinate to the High Court. There can be hardly any room for doubt that the Claims Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court, because an appeal against an award of the Tribunal lies to the High Court u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). Thus one of the conditions is satisfied and the only point for consideration is whether the Claims Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of section 115 Civil Procedure Code.

My learned brother has also held that it is a Court within the meaning of section 115 CPC and has referred to a number of authorities on this point. He has rightly observed in paragraph 6 of his order that there is no decision of this Court directly bearing on this question with reference to the Motor Vehicles Act. In some cases namely, Gitabai v. General Manager, M. P. Roadways 1964 JLJ SN 88 and Messrs Lucky Bharat Garage (Pvt.) Ltd. Raipur v. Mst. Shanta Devi Shrivastava, 1969 JLJ SN 15, though it was assumed that the Court was competent to entertain a revision petition against an order of Tribunal u/s 115 CPC the question does not seem to have been either specifically raised or decided. In Sheikh Amir v. Jardar Beg 1970 MPLJ SN 68 this Court in a case under the Workmen''s Compensation Act came to the conclusion that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain applications for revision against an order passed by Commissioner under the said Act. No doubt the provision of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, relating to the Commissioner are to a certain extent in Pari materia with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act relating to the Claims Tribunal and in certain cases referred to by my learned brother other High Courts have held that a revision lies. But I think the matter requires reconsideration from a new angle particularly because there is no decision of the Supreme Court on the point. Before I proceed to do so I may briefly refer to the decisions of the other High Courts on the point relied upon by my learned brother.

In Mohanlal Prabhuram Vs. Fine Knitting Mills Co. Ltd., it was held by the Bombay High Court that Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act is a Court within the meaning of section 115 Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships referred to an earlier decision of that Court in which a contrary view was expressed, but did not follow it for the reasons given therein. In Mt. Dirji Vs. Smt. Goalin, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court left the question open whether a Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act is a Court within the meaning of the expression a ''Court'' in section 115 Civil Procedure Code. In Abdul Rashid v. Hanuman Oil & Rice Mills AIR 1951 Ass 88 their Lordships relied on an earlier decision without much discussion and held that the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act was a Court within the meaning of section 115 Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, it does not throw much light on the question. In Firm G. D. Gyanchand v. Abdul Hamid AIR 1938 Lah, 856 it was held by a Single Bench that a Commissioner appointed under the Workmen''s Compensation Act is a Court within the meaning of section 115 CPC but the authority of this decision no longer subsists in view of the recent decision of the Punjab High Court in Harbans Singh v. Amba Singh 1956 ACJ 172 which is a direct authority on the point.

The word ''Court'' has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But whatever meaning we may assign to it, it must apply equally to all the provisions in the Code wherever the word ''Court'' occurs. The word Court'' occurs throughout in the Code in numerous provisions and I do not think, this permissible to construe it in one sense for the purposes of one provision and in a different sense in regard to other provisions. In Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya Vs. The State of Bombay, their Lordships observed in paragraph 6 that the words are generally used in the same sense throughout in a statute unless there is something repugnant in the context. Thus it will not be permissible to construe the word ''Court'' in section 115 in a different sense in the absence of any thing to the contrary in the Code to show that it was not used in the same sense throughout. This is the main reason why I am unable to accept the proposition that the Claims Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of section 115 Civil Procedure Code. If we hold that it is a Court for the purposes of section 115 we must hold that it is Court for the purpose of other sections as well, and this will, immediately lead us to certain consequences which are patently not tenable. This may be demonstrated by reference to the following provisions in the Code

Section 9 of the Code lays down that the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is obvious that the Claims Tribunal is not a Court falling within the purview of section 9. The Claims Tribunal does not exercise a general jurisdiction in civil matters. It is established under the Motor Vehicles Act for the limited purpose of determining claims to compensation arising out of motor accidents in accordance with the provisions of that Act.

I need not refer to other provisions in the Code which though applicable to a Civil Court in general are undoubtedly inapplicable to a Claims Tribunal. In fact, there would have been no question of conferring on the Claims Tribunal the powers of a Civil Court in the matter of taking evidence, enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc, under sub section (2) of section 100-C of the Act, if it were a Civil Court within the meaning of the Code because it could exercise such powers under Order 16 and Order 18 of the Code. Similarly, there are various other powers of a Civil Court under the Code which a Claims Tribunal is not competent to exercise unless they are expressly conferred on it by rules framed by the State Government u/s 111-A of the Act. The said section empowers the State Government to make Rules regarding the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal. If the Claims Tribunal were a Civil Court within the meaning of the Code there would be no necessity for making any provision for conferment of such powers by the rules.

Section 110-F which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts reads as follow:

110-F. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts--Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court.

From the aforesaid provision it is clear that the legislature intended to make a clear distinction between the Claims Tribunal and a Civil Court and the entire scheme of the Act relating to such Tribunals indicates that the Claims Tribunal is not a Court within the meaning of the Code.

Thus in my opinion although the Claims Tribunal has the trappings of a Civil Court inasmuch as it deals with civil matters and also exercises some of the powers of the Civil Court which are expressly conferred on it by the Act or the Rules, it is not a Civil Court for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure. As pointed out above, I think, it is not consistent with the settled principles of construction of statutes that we may hold that although the Claims Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of section 115 it is not a Court so far as the provisions of the Code are concerned, in the absence of any indication in the Code to the contrary. I am, therefore, of view that the Claims Tribunal is not a Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code, and, therefore, it follows that a revision petition against the order passed by the Tribunal is not maintainable.

From a careful perusal of the various provisions of the Act relating to the Claims Tribunal it appears to me that the object of the Legislature in establishing Claims Tribunal was to provide a cheap and expeditious remedy to the persons concerned in a forum to which the usual lengthy procedure of Civil Courts was not applicable. In fact, sub-section (1) of section 110-C provides that in holding an inquiry u/s 110-B the Claims Tribunal may, subject to Rules, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It is well known that revisions against interlocutory orders merely serve to prolong the duration of a case. Provisional powers may be necessary in civil cases dealing with complicated civil matters. But it appears that it was the clear intention of the Legislature not to provide for any revision against interlocutory orders of the Tribunal. The provisions of the Act contemplate that the Tribunal should proceed unhampered until it makes an award against which an appeal is provided. While exercising its appellate jurisdiction all material errors which have effected the award on merits can be duly considered by the Court. I am, therefore, of the view that it was not the intention of the Legislature to provide for any revisional jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders of the Tribunal. I urn, therefore, of the view that section 115 CPC is not applicable to an order of the Claims Tribunal.

My learned brother has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, & has concluded on the basis of the said decision that when there is appellate power, the jurisdiction to exercise revisional power is inherent therein. I have carefully read that decision, and, in my opinion, it does not lay down any such general proposition. Their Lordships were concerned in that case mainly with the question of the merger of the order of subordinate Court in that of the order of the superior Court passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction and in that context made certain observations while comparing the appellate jurisdiction with the revisional jurisdiction. The revisional of jurisdiction may be similar in many respects to the appellate jurisdiction and we may not make a distinction between the two for certain purposes. But to say that where appellate jurisdiction is conferred on a Court it can also act as a Court of revision is an extreme proposition which has not been laid down in that case. To accept any such proposition would mean that even District Court can exercise revisional jurisdiction in respect of the decisions of the subordinate Court because, it is their appellate authority. It is no doubt true, that while the District Court is hearing an appeal against a decision of the civil Court its powers are plenary and it can also set aside interlocutory orders of the subordinate Court although it was not competent to entertain any revision petitions against such order. But that is another matter.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not a Civil Court within the meaning of section. 115 CPC and therefore, the High Court is not competent to entertain a revision petition against the orders of the Claims Tribunal under the said section. The only remedy available to a party aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal would be to challenge the order by a petition under Art. 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution of India.

OPINION OF THE THIRD JUDGE

Bhave, J.--40. On a reference the following question came before a Division Bench (S. B, Sen and Raina, JJ.) for decision :

Whether the Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 510 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a civil Court and a revision petition would He u/s 115, Civil Procedure Code, against an order passed by it in the course of proceedings before it ?

There was a difference of opinion between my learned brothers S.B. Sen, J. and Raina, J. Hence the case has been placed before me. Sen, J. has held that the Claims Tribunal is a ''Civil Court'' and a revision u/s 115 of the CPC lies against its orders, while Raina, J. has taken a contrary view. On careful consideration of the whole matter I am inclined to agree with the conclusion reached by Sen, J. My reasons for agreeing with Sen, J. are these.

u/s 115 of the CPC the High Court is empowered to send for the record of any Court subordinate to it and may make such order in the case as it thinks fit if certain conditions specified in the section are satisfied. The revisional power of the High Court thus depends on two conditions namely, (1) that the order to be revised must be that of a ''Court''; and (ii) that the Court must be subordinate to the High Court. The expression ''Court'' has nowhere been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. 9 IA 174 That matter came for consideration before the Privy Council in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadur v. Taranath Mukerjee 9 IA 174. Under Act X of 1859 (Bengal Rent Act) certain rent suits were made cognizable by the Collectors and that except for the appeal provided under that Act no cognizance could be taken of the suits by any other Court. The question arose as to whether the decrees in the rent suits passed by the Collectors could be transferred for execution beyond the jurisdiction of that Court. The High Court took the view that the Collector''s Court not being a Civil Court the provisions of transferring the decree from one Court to another contained in the CPC could not be attracted. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, after considering the provisions of Act X of 1859, came to the conclusion.

It must be allowed that in those sections there is a certain distinction between the Civil Courts there spoken of and the Rent Courts established by the Act, and that the Civil Courts referred to in section 77, and the kindred sections mean Civil Courts exerting all the powers of Civil Courts, as distinguished from the Rent Court which only exercise powers over suits of a limited class. In that sense there is a distinction between the terms; but it is entirely another question whether the Rent Court does not remain a Civil Court in the sense that it is deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights, and whether being a Civil Court in that sense, it does not fall within the provisions of Act VIII of 1859 (the CPC in force at that time). It is hardly necessary to refer to those provisions in detail, because there is no dispute but that, if the Rent Court is a civil Court within Act VIII of 1859, the Collector has u/s 284, (of Act VIII of 1859) the power of transferring his decrees for execution into another district.

In this view of the matter, it was held that the provisions of section 284 of Act VIII of 1859 were applicable to the decrees passed by the Rent Courts. This decision clearly indicates that there may be Civil Courts which enjoy general jurisdiction to decide all civil disputes between individuals inter se or between citizens and the State, and there may be Civil Courts whose jurisdiction is confined to certain specified disputes and in that sense they are somewhat different from the general Civil Courts established in the country. But the Special Courts still maintain their character as Civil Courts'' in spite of the fact that the matters entrusted to those Special Courts are excluded from the general jurisdiction of the regular Civil Courts and that the provisions of the CPC would apply to the proceedings of the Special Courts also unless specifically excluded,

The CPC of 1859 was amended from time to time and the last consolidated Code was enacted in the year 1908 which is the present Code. It must be noted that even in this Code ''Court'' is not defined and the legislature may be taken to have accepted the interpretation put by their Lordships of the Privy Council on that word in Rajah Niimoni Singh Deo Bahadur v. Taranath Mukerjee. 9 IA 174 (178-159)

In Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309, it was observed :

It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

Similarly, it was held in Huddart, Parker and Company v. Moorchead (1909) 8 CLR 330:

I am of opinion that the words ''judicial power'' as used in section 71 of the Constitution mean the powers which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.

Both these passages were quoted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, with approval, in Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank AIR 1967 SC 149 . In the same decision their Lordships quoted other two passages from Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad and Others Vs. Akram Ali, which are to the following effect :

It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide;n a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it, And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses ail the attributes of a Court.

A true judicial decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites: (1) The presentation of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) If the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes off the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required ruling upon any disputed question of law.

A sovereign State is required to discharge three functions; legislative, executive and judicial. The sovereign State in discharge of its judicial functions may appoint Courts of general jurisdiction or it may appoint Courts the jurisdiction of which is confined to certain specified matters only. And the Courts may be designated as ''Tribunals''. Similarly, in discharge of its executive functions the sovereign State may appoint tribunals. The tribunals appointed to discharge executive functions may also be required to act quasi-judicially and they may have all the trappings of a Court of judicature inasmuch as they are also required to take evidence, at times decide questions of law and decide disputes between individuals inter se or between individuals and the State. But in doing all that the tribunals discharge the executive functions of the sovereign States and are guided by the State policy. From the decisions quoted above, it thus becomes clear that a tribunal constituted under any statute by whatever name it is described, would be treated as a ''Court of judicature'' if it is called upon to discharge the judicial functions of the sovereign State, untrammeled by executive considerations, and in reaching its conclusions it is required to follow the well recognized judicial principles.

The provisions u/s 110 onwards of the Motor Vehicles Act have not abrogated the right of a Citizen to sue for damages arising out of accidents by a motor vehicle. What has been done is that a special tribunal has been appointed to decide those disputes and the jurisdiction of the general Civil Courts is taken away so far as those claims are concerned. The tribunals so appointed are, however required to decide the claims on the basis of well known judicial principles and to follow the procedure specially prescribed under the Act. Though the procedure prescribed is somewhat summary in nature to secure quick disposal of the claims, yet the procedure prescribed is well known judicial procedure wherein the parties are allowed to put up their claims, adduce evidence in support of or in opposition to them and to submit arguments. The tribunal is also required to decide the dispute untrammeled by any executive consideration. There should not, therefore, be any difficulty in holding that the Claims Tribunal is a ''Court of judicature''. This is so in-spite of the fact that section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act bars the jurisdiction of the general Civil Courts so far as the claims in question are concerned. In fact, at least in two Division Bench cases of this Court it has been held that the Claims Tribunal is a ''Civil Court''. The decisions are:

(i) Radhabai Bhikaji Vs. Baluram Daluram, and (ii) Hayatkhan and Others Vs. Mangilal and Others, . In Radhabai case it was held by the Division Bench that a ''Civil Court'' ''includes any Court competent to notice the injury and grant compensation and that the Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court, In Hayatkhan''s Case, another Bench held that a claims petition u/s 110 of Motor Vehicles Act is a petition which for all material purposes is like a plaint pertaining to the dispute ordinarily tribal in a Civil Court and the Division Bench therefore applied section 6 of the Limitation Act in the case of claim proceeding also. On similar reasoning, in Balubhai and Others Vs. Mahila Sarjubai, , it was held that the Claims Tribunal had the power to issue commission for examination of witnesses, though the power was not specifically given to the Tribunal. I, therefore, do not find any difficulty in holding that the Claims Tribunal is a ''Court of judicature''.

Raina, J., however, found difficulty in invoking the jurisdiction u/s 115 of the CPC on a different ground. His Lordship''s objection may be quoted in his own words:

The word ''Court'' has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But whatever meaning we may assign to it, it must apply equally to all the provisions in the Code wherever the word ''Court'' occurs The word ''Court'' occurs throughout in the Code in numerous provisions, and I do not think it is permissible to construe it in one sense for the purposes of one provision and in a different sense in regard to other provisions... Thus it will not be permissible to construe the word ''Court'' in section 115 in a different sense in the absence of anything to the contrary in the Code to show that it was not used in the same sense throughout. This is the main reason why I am unable to accept the proposition that the Claims Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of section 115 Civil Procedure Code. If we hold that it is a Court for the purposes of section 115 we must hold that it is a Court for the purpose of other sections as well, and this will immediately lead us to certain consequences which are patently not tenable. This may be demonstrated by reference to the following provisions in the Code.

Section 9 of the Code lays down that the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred, It is obvious that the Claims Tribunal is not a Court falling within the purview of section 9. The Claims Tribunal does not exercise a general jurisdiction in civil matters. It is established under the Motor Vehicles Act for the limited purpose of determining claims to compensation arising out of motor accidents in accordance with the provisions of that Act.

I do not think that the difficulty envisaged by Raina, J is a real difficulty.

The CPC does not provide for constitution of Civil Courts, defining their powers and jurisdictions. That has been done by several statutes, like the Civil Courts Acts passed by the various States. Subsection (4) of section 2 of the CPC only defines a ''civil district'' and the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction'', described as ''District Court''. Section 3 of the Code then lays down that for the purposes of the Code the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and the District Court. Section 6 then provides that save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing contained in the Code shall give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction. But that jurisdiction is to be provided for by other Acts. Sections 7 and 8 deal with Small Cause Courts. Section 9 then provides that the Courts shall, subject to the provisions contained in the Code, have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The function of section 9, therefore, appears to be declaratory. It only means that if Civil Courts are established by the sovereign State, they shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. This section, however, does not take away the right of the State to constitute Courts for the trial of suits of specific nature and does not declare that such Courts are not Civil Courts to be governed by the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. What section 9 contemplates is a general declaration of the authority of the Courts to try all civil matters if their jurisdiction is not, in any way, limited to any particular matters. Even if section 9 confers jurisdiction on the Civil Courts to try all civil matters, it is clear that a Court cannot entertain a suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction; nor can it act beyond its territorial jurisdiction. Courts with limited jurisdiction are thus contemplated even u/s 9 of the Code. Similarly section 9 also contemplates taking away the jurisdiction of the general Courts in certain matters and conferring that jurisdiction on special Courts. In this view of the matter, when we read section 9 in interpreting the expression ''Court'' in that section, we will have to interpret the word ''Court* in the context that Courts might be constituted with limited jurisdictions or Courts might be constituted without defining their jurisdiction and that section 9 is attracted only in the case of those Courts whose jurisdiction has not been defined by the statute constituting them.

Raina, J. has not referred to other sections of the CPC to show how any difficulty would arise in the interpretation of other provisions of the Code. If it is kept in mind that Courts of different jurisdictions can be constituted by the State authority, there would not be any difficulty in interpreting the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be pertinent to note that section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958 provides:

In addition to the Courts established under any other law for the time being in force, there shall be following classes of Courts, namely,...

This section clearly envisages other classes of Civil Courts apart from the Civil Courts of general jurisdiction constituted under the said Act. There should not, therefore, be any difficulty in holding that the Claims Tribunal was established as a Civil Court to deal with specific mutters only; and it being a Court of limited jurisdiction, there is no question of its exercising jurisdiction over other matters. The distinction between Courts of general jurisdiction and Courts of special jurisdiction was noted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bhadur v. Taranath Mookerjee (supra). Venkataraman Aiyer, J. (as he then was) of the Madras High Court in Kalavagunta Sriramarao Vs. Kalavagunta Suryanarayanamurthi and Others, ) interpreted the observations of the Privy Council to mean:

Courts constituted for deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights must be considered to be civil Courts, notwithstanding that they are created by a special statute and are mentioned in that statute as distinct from Civil Courts. The true import of such a distinction is that while special Courts have jurisdiction over a limited class of suits specified in the statute the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not limited to any class of suits. To this extent there is distinction between the two classes of Courts but in respect of the class of suits actually entrusted to the jurisdiction of special Courts they perform in relation to them functions which but for the special Act would have been performed by Civil Courts and to that extent the special Courts can be said to be Civil Courts in a different attire. Kalavagunta Sriramarao Vs. Kalavagunta Suryanarayanamurthi and Others,

In this view of the matter, there should not be any difficulty in holding that section 9 of the CPC only refers to those Courts whose powers have not been defined by the statute constituting them and the expression ''Court'' in section 9 in that context should be confined to those Courts only. If this distinction is kept in mind, that Courts with general jurisdiction as well as Courts with special jurisdiction are constituted by the State, on difficulty should be envisaged in interpreting the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In order to determine as to whether the Claims Tribunal was a Court subordinate to the High Court Sen, J. had referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, wherein their Lordships had observed:

The right of appeal is one on entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which are required to constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the telation of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. When the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below, Section 115 of the CPC circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider, and larger sense

In as much as an appeal is provided for against the decision of the Claims Tribunal to the High Court, Sen J., relying on the above said decision, held that the Claims Tribunal was subordinate to the High Court and it could exercise revisional powers u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the exercise being basically and fundamentally exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Rain a, J. held that in Shankar Ramchandra v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were concerned mainly with the question of the merger of the order of subordinate Court in that of the order of the superior Court passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction and in that context made the above-said observations and that the said decision did not lay down any such general proposition that the appellate power included within itself the exercise of revisional power as well. Raina, J. observed that the revisional jurisdiction may be similar to the appellate jurisdiction; but that is not the same thing to say that the conferral of appellate jurisdiction amounts to conferral of revisional jurisdiction as well--Raina, J appears to be right in this criticism. But that does not, in any way, affect the matter. Once it is held that the Claims Tribunal is a Court of judicature, it must follow that u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is general in terms, the High Court is entitled to revise the orders of that Court. Section 3 of the Code clearly lays down that all Courts constituted within a Civil District are subordinate to the District Court and are also subordinate to the High Court. The Claims Tribunal must, therefore, be held to be subordinate to the High Court. Both the conditions u/s 115 of the CPC are thus satisfied. There is, therefore, no sescape from the conclusion that the orders passed by the Claims Tribunal can be revised u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I need not refer to the various cases cited by Sen, J. wherein tribunals constituted under different statutes were held to be ''Civil Court'' amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts. In Shriramarao v. Surya-narayanamurthi (supra), Venkatarama Aiyer, J. held that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies deciding disputes between members of a co-operative society acted as a Court'' and that his orders were revisable u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proposition that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies acts as a Court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Jugal Khhore v. Sitarhmrahi Central Cooperative Bank (supra), though the case was decided u/s 3 of the Contempt of Court''s Act. In Maghanamal Narumal and Others Vs. Moolchand Gianchand, Shiv Dayal J. had also held, for similar reasons, that the Tribunal appointed u/s 4 of the Displaced persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 was a ''civil Court'' amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I derive support for my conclusions from this judgment also.

I, therefore, hold that the Claims tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court and a revision petition would lie u/s 115 of the CPC against an order passed by it in the course of proceedings before it. Let the case be now placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal.