Krishna Kumar Soni vs U.P.Projects Corporation Ltd. & Anr.

On the services of the appellant being dispensed with, he approached the Labour Court on the ground that the said conduct was in violation of Section 6-N of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is the case of the appellant that he was a daily wage worker (muster roll) employee with the respondent-Corporation and had worked for various times from the year 2000-2001. He was initially engaged on payment of Rs.98/- per day in the month of June, 2001 and continued to work with breaks in service. The case of the appellant found favour with the Labour Court which made an award dated 12th April, 2007 published on 5th July, 2007.

The respondent-Corporation aggrieved by the same preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No.32584 of 2007 before the High Court of Allahabad and in terms of the impugned order dated 20th November, 2014 the award has been set aside opining that it is perverse.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the record before us and the additional affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent-Corporation. This is in context of the appellant relying upon various documents, and some arguments initially made over the issue of documents whether these documents are on record before the Tribunal or not. What has emerged is that while raising the some controversy about the attendance register (since according to the appellant, respondent worked only in the months of April, 2001 and January, 2002) that aspect need not be gone into in further detail. The reason for the same is that various other documents are on record issued by the Project Manager which go contrary to the plea of the appellant that the respondent had worked only for a limited period of time totalling to less than 240 days. These documents are evidence of the fact that right till 2005 the appellant was deployed with the Corporation as otherwise there would have been no occasion to issue documents relating to experience certificate, authorising the appellant to obtain certain documents etc.

We called upon learned counsel for the appellant to explain the position qua these documents but all that he could say is that as per service records, these documents have not been found though there is no dispute that the person issuing these documents was supervising the project in question.

We fail to appreciate as to how such documents would have been issued by the Project Manager if the appellant had ceased to work couple of years before that time as is sought to be canvassed by the respondent.

A perusal of the impugned order shows that what has weighed with the High Court is the appellant has not been able to establish the claim of having worked for more than 240 days. This finding is based only on the basis of the muster roll produced by the respondent-Corporation but ignores the documents referred by us aforesaid. The finding of perversity is thus predicated on this reasoning.

Needless to say that the occasion to exercise jurisdiction of issuance of writ of certiorari in matters of this nature would only arise if it is found that the award is perverse, without any evidence on record. This is not so in the present case. It appears that the various other documents have escaped the attention of the High Court. We are thus of the view that the impugned order is not sustainable and the finding of the Tribunal that appellant was removed from employment without following the due provisions of law is sustained.

The last question which has to be examined is as to whether the directions contained in the award of reinstatement with full back wages is to be honoured or is to be replaced by any other relief. Much time has passed since the last engagement of the appellant was in the year 2005. In the conspectus of the facts of the matters, we are of the view that grant of lumpsum compensation would be appropriate remedy for this case rather than reinstatement with back wages.

On this aspect also there has been some debate before us by the learned counsels and we are of the view that taking into consideration the amount already paid under Section 17(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, a further sum of Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees seven lakhs) be paid to the appellant to meet the ends of justice. We thus direct the respondent-Corporation to remit the amount of Rs.7,00,000/-(Rupees seven lakhs) to the appellant in full and final satisfaction of any claim of the appellant apart from the amount which has been paid under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same has to be remitted within three months from today.

The appeal is allowed and the impugned oder is set aside with the modification of the order of the Tribunal. Parties are left to bear their own costs.