Krishna Kumari and Others vs State of Punjab and Another

Nirmaljit Kaur, J.—The present petition u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure has been moved for quashing of complaint No. 131 dated 29.3.2005 under Sections 323, 506, 504, 148, 149, 452, 120-B IPC and judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Dasuya as well as subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties.

The brief facts relevant in the present petition are that the complaint in question was filed by Respondent No. 2. The Petitioners were convicted in the said complainant. Thereafter, the Petitioners filed an appeal against their conviction before the appellate Court and the same is pending. During the pendency of the appeal, both the parties have entered into a compromise with the intervention of respectable of the village.

The parties are present in the Court alongwith their respective counsel. Learned Counsel for Respondents No. 2 has placed on record the affidavit of Respondents No. 2 authenticating the compromise. As per the said affidavit, Respondent No. 2 has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed.

The Apex Court in the case of Dr. Arvind Barsaul etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. 2008 (2) RCR 910 while quasahing the FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same held that the continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. In that case also the Petitioners were convicted u/s 498-A IPC and were sentenced to imprisonment of 18 months. An appeal was filed against the c onviction order and during the pendency of the appeal, the parties had settled their differences. However, they filed petition before the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the complaint as well as conviction order on account of the compromise. The High Court dismissed the same. Aggrieved, they challenged the same before the Apex Court. The Apex Court accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR and all the proceedings arising out of the same, as well as order of conviction.

This Court in the case of Sukhwinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2008 (3) RCR 991 who relying upon the judgment of Khursheed and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr. 2007(4) RCR 495 allowed the Petitioners to compound the offence u/s 452 IPC during the pendency of the appeal.

The Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Kulwinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2007(3) RCR 1052 has held that the compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice". Disputes which have their genesis not only in matrimonial discord but others as well, such compromise deserves to be accepted. It is further held as under:

The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Code of Criminal Procedure which can affect the inherent power of this Court u/s 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar u/s 320 of the Cr.P.C in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

Taking into account the facts of the present case as well as the fact that the parties have compromised the matter with the intervention of the respectable of the village, it would be in the interest of justice to accept the compromise and to allow the parties to live amicably which shall reduce the friction in the society and promote peace and harmony.

In view of the above and settled proposition of law, the parties are allowed to compound the offences. Accordingly, the parties are directed to appear before the Appellate Court where the appeal is pending. Thereafter, the Appellate Court shall pass appropriate orders in the light of permission granted by this Court to the parties to compound the offence.

Accordingly, the present petition is allowed in the above terms.