Krishna Reddy vs K. Ramulamma and others

This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the order dated 10-4-1991 made in I. A. No. 422 of 1988 filed in O.P. No. 89 of 1986 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional District Judge), Maheboobnagar, for short Act, impleading the petitioner herein as respondent No. 3, in O.P. No. 89 of 1986.

Few facts which are necessary for the disposal of the revision petition are: Husband of the first respondent father of the second respondent and son of the third respondent, namely, one late Chennaiah met with an accident on 7-1-1986 and consequently died on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the tractor bearing registration No. APM 3098. Respondents 1 to 3 filed O.P. No. 89 of 1986 against respondents 4 and 5 in the ACT. Although the respondents 4 and 5 who were respondents 1 and 2 respectively in O.P. No. 89 of 1986 were served with the notice, they remained unrepresented. Therefore the ACT on 27-2-1987 passed an ex parte award against the respondents 4 and 5. After the ACT passed the award on 27-2-1987 the respondents and 5 filed an application for setting aside the ex parte award made on 27-2- 1987 on the ground that they are not the owners of the vehicle involved in the accident. The said application was allowed and ex parte award was set aside by the ACT. There afterwards the claimants-petitioners came to know that the real owner of the vehicle involved in the accident is one Krishna Reddy who is the petitioner in this revision petition. Therefore the claimants filed an application, i.e., I.A. No. 422 of 1988 in O.P. 89 of 1986 under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC seeking permission of the ACT to implead him as respondent No. 3 in the claim petition. The respondents 4 and 5 herein who are respondents 1 and 2 in the ACT did not file any counter to the application of the claimants made under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proposed respondent the petitioner herein filed a counter mainly contending that Order I, Rule 10 of the CPC has no application to the proceedings initiated under the Motor Vehicles Act and the application is barred by limitation. The ACT after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties and considering the rival claims of the parties negatived the contentions of the revision petitioner and allowed I.A. No. 422 of 1988 permitting the claimants to implead the revision petitioner as respondent No. 3 in O.P. No. 89 of 1986. Hence this revision by the respondent No. 3.

The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner was heard.

The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the order under revision firstly on the ground that Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC has no application to the proceedings initiated under the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore the application is misconceived and the ACT ought to have rejected the application in limine. The learned counsel further contended that the accident admittedly occurred on 7-1-1986 and there was a delay of 830 days in filing the application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC and therefore the application was hopelessly barred by time. The learned counsel elaborating her contentions referred to provisions of Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rule 473 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and contended that neither the provisions of the said section nor the provisions of the said Rule make the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC applicable to the proceedings intiated under the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned counsel also submitted that the limitation precribed for filing application for compensation and u/s 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was six months from the date of accident. The revision petitioner was sought to be impleaded as party respondent after a lapse of 830 days and therefore the application is otherwise liable to be rejected in limine as it is hopelessly barred by time.

There is no merit in any of the two contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 deals with procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunals. Sub-section (1) of''Section 169 provides that"in holding any enquiry u/s 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of Section 169 of the Act further provides that the Claims Tribubal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974).

In exercise of the powers conferred under the Act the Governor of Andhra Pradesh has framed the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 473 of the said Rules provides that Order 5, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order 9; Order 13, Rules 3 to 10; Order 16, Rules 2 to 21; Order 17 and Order 28, Rules 1 to 3, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. It is true that neither Section 169 of the Act nor Rule 473 of the Rules specifically makes Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal initiated under the Motor Vehicles Act. But, on that count it cannot be said that the application made by the Claimants under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC to implead the revision petitioner as respondent No. 3 in the main O.P. is not maintainable in law. At this stage, it is relevant to note the significant phrase i.e., "follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit" occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the Act. In the absence of any restraining provision, the Claims Tribunal is at liberty to follow any procedure that it may choose to evolve for itself so long as it is consistent with the Rules of natural justice and does not contravene the provisions of law. Section 169 expressly empowers the Claims Tribunal to formulate its own procedure. Since the Claims Tribunal has all the powers of a Civil Court, it may choose to. follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. In holding an enquiry u/s 168 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is empowered to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. The intention is that the, enquiry should not take the shape of an elaborate and long drawn proceedings of a regular civil suit, but should be concluded as much speedily as possible. The nature of the enquiry should be more or less like a judicial enquiry. There can be no gainsaying that vast power exists in the Claims Tribunal to determine its own procedure in dealing with claim applications. The Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court and the proceed- ings before it closely resemble to the proceedings in a Civil Court. Moreover, it is quite clear that the legalislature purposely did not make all the provisions of the CPC applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, which are of a summary nature, as the whole intention of the legislature is to ensure aspeedy disposal of the claim applications filed by the injured persons or the legal representatives of the deceased. u/s HOC (now Section 169), the Claims Tribunal is empowered to evolve its own procedure and for the purpose of dealing with a claim application it can resort to any provisions of the CPC on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is no bar to adopt the procedure provided under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

There is no dispute between the parties that O.P. No. 89 of 1986 was presented in the ACT within the limitation prescribed u/s 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. If that is so, adding of the revision petitioner as party-respondent No. 3 in the Original Petition subsequently and beyond the period of limitation cannot be termed as an improper or illegal act on the part of the ACT. It is relevant to note that the limitation prescribed under the Act is to file claim application and when once the claim application is instituted in time, addition of necessary parties at a subsequent date could be made. Besides, under the provisions of the Act and the Rules it is the duty of the Claims Tribunal to act and issue notice to all necesssary parties. In the present case admittedly the revision petitioner is the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident and therefore he is absolutely a necessary party to the claim petition and in fact he does not dispute this position. His only grievance is that he ought to have been impleaded as a party respondent in the year 1986 itself when the original petition was filed or at any rate before the expiry of six months from the date of accident, before the Claims Tribunal. As pointed out supra this contention is untenable because the limitation prescribed under the Act is for instituting the petition and not for adding the necessary parties. It is quite clear on a reading of the Form CID prescribed under Rule 514 of Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehciles Rules, 1964 or Form CID prescribed under Rule 455 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 for making a claim for compensation that they do not direct the claimants for compensation to include in the application any party as defendant and/or opposite party. I think that all the relevant facts are in this connection left to be ascertained by the Claims Tribunal which has been entrusted with very responsible and onerous duties of finding out all the parties who may be liable to pay compensation by recording evidence to be produced by the parties concerned. Formal defect of failure to mention appropriate names of the parties who would be liable to pay ultimately compensation to the claimants was never intended to defeat the claims filed under the Act. In arriving at this opinion, I am fortified by the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court rendered in the case of Basappa and Another Vs. K.H. Sreenivasa Reddy and Others, and the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rendered in the case of Bessarlal Laxmichand Chirawala Vs. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Greater Bombay, . In my considered opinion, the ACT has rightly allowed the claimants to implead the revision petitioner as a party to the proceedings and his joinder during the pendency of the claim petition could not attract the bar of limitation prescribed u/s 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 when the original claim petition was filed well within the period of limitation prescribed. Even on the ground of public policy enshrined in the Act and keeping in view the aims and objects of the Act, impleding of owner of the vehicle at some subsequent stage in the claim petition cannot render the claim petition as barred by limitation because in motor accidents such eventualities are not uncommon that the dependents of the deceased who are claimants, who have suffered in an accident are either unaware of the names of driver or owner of the vehicle involved in it and/ or may require some further time to make enquiries to ascertain their names and addresses. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that joinder of an additional party in a pending claim petition after expiry of period of limitation prescribed u/s 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot render the claim petition barred as against the newly added party.

For the reasons stated supra, I do not find any ground to interfere with the order of the ACT impunged in this Civil Revision Petition. Consequently it fails and is dismissed. No costs.

The Original Petition was filed as far back as in the year 1986. Therefore the ACT is directed to dispose of the petition within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Registry is directed to send a copy of this order forthwith to the ACT.

Revision dismissed.