Krishnadoss Vittaldoss vs Ghanshamdoss and Others

Coutts-Trotter, C.J.—No one, it seems to me, using language in its natural sense would ever think of describing this plaint (after the excision

of two prayers which Mr. Grant gave up) as being a suit for land. But it is said that there are decisions of this and other Courts which compel such

a construction to be put upon those words as would bring the present suit within them. It is sufficient for me to say that I do not think that any of

the authorities cited has that effect. I only desire to say one thing, and that is chiefly in reference to the case of Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Kannappa

Chetti 33 Ind. Cas. 906 : 30 M.L.J. 120. If that case is to he supposed to say that you are entitled to look at the amended C.P.C. for the purpose

of construing the words of the earlier Statute, namely, the Letters Patent with which we are concerned, I do not agree with it. But I am by no

means convinced that; that case is an authority for the pure position for which it was cited. The appeal must be dismissed. The appellant will pay

plaintiffs-respondents costs. The memorandum of objections is dismissed, no order as to costs.

Srinivasa Iyengar, J.

The expression ""suit for land"" it seems to me must be construed as an action, the primary object of which is to establish claims regarding the title

to property or possession of property and no suit can be described as a ''suit for land'' as the result of the decision in which the little to, or

possession of Immovable property will not in any manner or measure be directly affected. Further, the proposition ""for"" in the expression ""suit for

land"" would seem to indicate that the title to or possession of, Immovable property must be the primary object of the action. A suit for an office or

for the removal of a person from an office is a well-known form of action. This is a suit merely for the accounts of the management of a trust and

for the administration of a trust. The decision of this Court, confirmed by the Privy Council in the case of Srinivasa Moorthy v. Venkatavarada

Iyengar 11 Ind. Cas. 447 : 15 C.W.N. 741 : 8 A.L.J. 774 : 13 Bom. L.R. 520 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 375 : 14 C.L.J. 64 : 21 M.L.J. 669 : 10

M.L.T. 263 is that an action for administration of an estate is not a suit for land, even though the whole of the Immovable property belonging to the

estate may be outside the local limits of the Court. I do not see how on principle the present suit differs from an administration action. This being a

suit for an account of the management of a trust by the first and second defendants and really a suit for the administration of a trust referred to in

the plaint, it seems to me that the same principle applies and it cannot possibly be described as a ""suit for land,"" and, therefore, excluded from the

jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Judge was right in that decision; I may also add that the original application made on behalf of the first

defendant to the learned Judge was to revoke the leave to sue granted by the Court. Leave to sue could not possibly have been granted in a case

in which the whole of the property, the subject-matter of the suit, was outside the jurisdiction if the suit was a suit for land. Leave to sue was

applied for and obtained in this case, because all the defendants did not reside within the jurisdiction and part of the cause of action may be said to

have arisen beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. That leave to sue was granted in the first instance ex parte. To revoke that leave would not be to

confer or take away any jurisdiction possessed by the Court in respect of the suit if it was a suit for land. Even if the order of the learned Judge

refusing to revoke the leave to sue be set aside, the question would still remain, whether this Court had jurisdiction in respect of the suit. But Mr.

Grant on behalf of the respondent, intimated that this appeal might be dealt with, as though it was an appeal from a decision on a preliminary

question whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the action; and, by consent of both the appellant and the respondents, the, appeal was so

treated. The result of our decision, therefore, is that the Court has jurisdiction in this particular case having regard to the nature of the suit. I agree

that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.