Krishnan vs P. Krishnakonar

Srinivasan, J.—The revision is directed against an order of. Sub-Court, Tiruchirappalli, dismissing an appeal filed against an order of the

District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli, dismissing the application for restoration of an application pending in that Court. Petitioner herein who is the second

defendant in O.S. No. 175 of 1988, filed I.A. No. 1074 of 1988 for restoration of the earlier application I.A. No. 977 of 1988 which was

dismissed for default.

The District Munsif dismissed I.A. No. 1074 of 1988 holding that sufficient reasons were not given for restoration. Against the order, the petitioner

filed CM.A. No.28 of 1992 on the file of Sub-Court, Tiruchirapalli. The Subordinate Judge followed ray judgment in Swamambal v. K. Thambi

and two others (1990 TLNJ. 409 = 1994-1-L.W.285). I had reconsidered my view taken in an earlier case in V.P. Nagarajan v. Prabhavathi

(1989 I L.W. 543) and held that an appeal was not maintainable as against the order dismissing the application for restoration of a proceeding. I

have considered the provisions of O. 43, R.1(c), CPC as well as S.141, CPC. I had also referred to earlier authorities on this aspect of the matter.

In this revision petition, it is contended that the view taken by me in Swarnambal''s case (1990 TLNJ 409 = 1994-1-L.W.285) required

reconsideration. According to learned counsel, Section 141, C.P.C has widened the scope of the meaning of the word ""suit"" found in O. 43,

R.1(c). According to him, after the amendment of S.141, CPC, in 1976, the explanation introduced by the amendment defines ""proceedings"" as

inclusive of proceedings under O. 9, but not inclusive of any proceeding under Article 226of the Constitution of India, It is contended that when

once section 141makes the procedure provided under the Code applicable to all proceedings inclusive of proceedings under O. 9, C.P.C,

automatically R.1(c) of O. 43, CPC. should be construed as applicable to all applications and not merely the applications to set aside the dismissal

of the suit. It is submitted that the expression ""suit"" found in O. 43, R.1(c) should be given wider meaning and otherwise, the amendment of

S.141would become ineffective and futile. Reference is made to the following passage in Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.

Singh, Fifth Edition, at page 28:

Lord Denning approving Farwell, J. stated the principle thus:

But when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the Courts

have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.

And it was said by Lord Dunedin:

It is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be operative, and not inept, and nothing short of impossibility should

in my judgement allow a judge to declare a ""status unworkable"".

Reliance is also placed on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Assam and others, . The

Supreme Court referred to the dictum of Lord Dunedin extracted above and observed that the Courts strongly lean against any construction which

tends to reduce a Statute to a futility and the provisions of a Statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative.

Neither the ruling of the Supreme Court nor the passage in the text book of Justice G.P. Singh would apply to the present case. Be construing the

word ""suit"" in Order 54 Rule 1(c) as not to include applications, the provisions of S.141, CPC. or the provision under Order 43 Rule 1(c) does

not become ineffective or inoperative. The provision in the rule is unambiguous. It remains unchanged even after the amendment of 1976. The

contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is wholly without substance. I do not find any reason to re-consider my view taken in

Swarnambal''s case (1990 TLNJ 409 = 1994-1-L.W.285). There is no merit in this revision petition and the same is dismissed.