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Krishnasamy Pillai vs Arulmigu Adhi Saktheeswarasamy Devasthanam

Madras High Court · Decided on 31 March 2006 · Citation: (2006) 3 LW 207

HON’BLE JUDGES
T.V. Masilamani, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969 — Section 16A
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
S.A. No. 1447 of 1997 and C.M.P. No''s. 9135 and 14390 of 1997
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Judgment

74 paragraphs · 1,679 words

T.V. Masilamani, J.—The plaintiff is the appellant in this appeal and he filed the suit in O.S.No.558/95 on the file of the District Munsiff

Court, Virudhachalam for permanent injunction against the respondent/first defendant and three others. The learned District Munsif having

considered the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence adduced on either side, decreed the suit as prayed for and directed the parties to

bear their respective costs.

2.

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the defendants preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 4 of 1995 on the file of the

Subordinate Court, Virudhachalam. By the judgment and decree dated 28.08.1996, the learned subordinate Judge, having perused the evidence

on record and upon hearing the arguments advanced on either side, allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial

Court and dismissed the suit without costs. Hence the above second appeal.

3.

The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal may be stated briefly as under ::-

The appellant/plaintiff is the tenant of the suit property under the respondent/first defendant Temple. Originally, the suit property belonged to the

plaintiff''s predecessors in title and they settled the property to the Temple by way of a registered Settlement Deed dated 03.12.1939 agreeing

thereunder, to perform the charities and festivals in the first defendant temple, from and out of the income derived by cultivating the suit property.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement of tenancy in the year 1948 with the first defendant temple agreeing to cultivate the land as a tenant and also

to pay the rates and taxes in respect of the same and utilise the income for performing festivals in the Temple as per the conditions stipulated in the

said settlement deed dated 03.12.1939. While so, the first defendant attempted to grant lease of the property in favour of defendants 2 to 4 in

contravention of the said tenancy agreement in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the first defendant is not entitled to interfere with the possession and

enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff and the Plaintiff, as a tenant, is entitled to the benefits under the tenancy laws.

4.

The first defendant resisted the suit on various grounds inter-alia contending that the allegations made by the plaintiff in the Plaint are not true.

Further, the plaintiff being an influential person and also an Ex. Village Administrative Officer created records in his favour in collusion with the

trustees of the first defendant temple. Further, the plaintiff has also acquired possession of the property with the connivance of the Trustees and

therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any right as a cultivating tenant under the tenancy laws. Since the suit property belongs to the first defendant,

lease was auctioned in favour of the defendant 2 to 4 on 15.06.1985. Since the plaintiff failed to obtain patta for the Suit Property in his name, he

has come forward with this Suit, on false allegations.

5.

In the above circumstances, this court formulated the following substantial question of law, on 07.10.1997, for consideration ::-

Whether the lower Appellate Court erred in law in dismissing the suit for injunction based on its finding as to the status of the tenancy instead of

going into the question of possession which is admittedly with the plaintiff/appellant and found to be so by the lower Appellate Court?

6.

Heard Mr. K. Vijaya Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. K.V. Sundararajan, learned counsel for the respondent.

7.

Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the findings rendered by both the Courts below, regarding possession of the suit property by

the plaintiff on the date of the Suit. The trial Court has held that the plaintiff is cultivating the suit land as a tenant under the first defendant and that

therefore, he is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. But, however, the first Appellate Court relying on the decision made in

Saravanan R. v. Sri Vedaranyeswaraswami Devasthanam 1989 (2) MLJ 375, reversed the finding rendered by the trial Court on the ground that

since the suit land belonged to the first defendant temple, the provisions under Tamil Nadu Agriculatural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act,

1969, are not applicable, in view of the Tamil Nadu Public Trust Act, 1961, and therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge has set aside the

judgment and decree of the trial Court and allowed the appeal.

8.

In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out with reference to the findings rendered by the first Appellate Court that in

view of the documentary evidence adduced, the plaintiff has established that he was in possession of the suit property and was also performing the

festivals in the first defendant temple, as per the recitals in the settlement deed Ex.A.1, dated 03.12.1939. Even though the learned subordinate

Judge agrees with the findings rendered by the learned District Munsif that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and was cultivating the

same as a tenant under the first defendant on the date of the Suit, he has held that the plaintiff is precluded from claiming the benefits under Tamil

Nadu Act, 25 of 1955, in view of the provisions under Tamil Nadu Public Trust Act, 1961, for the simple reason that the first defendant Temple is

a Public Trust exempted from the purview of the provisions under Tamil Nadu Act, 25 of 1955. Hence, there is no controversy that both the

Courts below accepted the plaintiff''s evidence that he was in a possession and enjoyment of the suit property on the date of suit.

9.

Therefore, the next question that arises for consideration is, whether the proceedings of the Record Officer (Executive Magistrate and Thasildar)

Virudhachalam in TR.No. 3/92 dated 17.08.1992 (vide) Ex.A.88 for the inclusion of the plaintiff as a tenant of the suit land in the record of

Tenancy Rights under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969, (Tamil Nadu Act, 10 of 1969) is

valid and binding on the first defendant.

10.

In my opinion, placing reliance on the judgment cited above, the learned subordinate Judge has concluded that the proceedings under Ex.A.88

obtained by the plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the suit is not binding on the first defendant and that in view of Tamil Nadu Public Trust Act,

1961 also, the plaintiff cannot claim the benefits under the Tamil Nadu Act, 25 of 1955. But, on the contrary learned counsel for the appellant has

brought to the notice of this Court, the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this court in Muniyandi Vs. Rajangam Iyer, , which had been later

followed by S. Natarajan, J.(as His Lordship then was) in the judgment in V.S. Alwar Iyengar Vs. Tahsildar and Record Officer, Srivilliputtur and

Others, , in support of his contention that in view of specific provision u/s 16(A) of Tamil Nadu Act X of 1969, the Civil Court cannot decide the

question whether, the enquiry report of the Record Officer, the proceedings (vide) Ex.A.88 is in accordance with law, and if so, whether the same

is binding on the Civil Court so as to render a finding with reference to the possession of land by the tenant.

11.

For the purpose of appreciating the facts narrated above, it is necessary to extract the provision u/s 16-A, which reads as under:-

Bar of jurisdiction of civil Courts:- No civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Record Officer, the District Collector or

other officer or authority empowered by or under this Act has to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any action

taken or to be taken by such officer or authority in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.

12.

Hence, in view of the mandate of law reiterated by this court in the decisions referred to above, the civil Court has jurisdiction to determine the

nature of tenant''s possession incidentally, and that such decision should not override the said provision u/s 16-A referred to above. It follows that

the concurrent findings rendered by the Courts below regarding the possession of the suit property by the plaintiff on the date of Suit, clothe with

the right to maintain the suit for bare injunction against the landlord namely, the first defendant in the suit. In this context it is necessary to distinguish

the decision Muniyandi Vs. Rajangam Iyer, as that case is different from the case on hand, as it was with reference to the question, whether the

mere right to pluck coconuts from the coconutgrove would amount to lease or license rent and that if so, whether the provisions of Tamil Nadu

Act, 25 of 1955, are applicable. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the ratio of the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case.

13.

Having regard to the above factual aspects of the case, and considering the ratio laid down in the said decisions, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the Civil Courts are not conferred with jurisdiction to decide dispute in relation to the tenancy and that incidentally such facts may be

considered with reference to the possession of the land. Hence, the learned Subordinate Judge committed an error in concluding that the appellant/

plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction even though he is in possession of the suit land and therefore, the judgment and decree

rendered by him have to be set aside.

14.

For the reasons aforesaid, the second appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and

restoring the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. However, there is no order as to costs. The first respondent will be at liberty to workout the

rights if any, to recover the rent with reference to the demised land, from the appellant, in accordance with law. Consequently, connected C.M.P''s

are closed.