K.R.V. Venkatarama Iyer vs Pushpavathi Ammal

Venkatadri, J.—This revision petition is preferred by the tenant against an order passed by the District Judge, Chingleput, reversing the

order of the Subordinate Judge and restoring the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, on a petition filed by the Respondent herein that

she required the suit premises for her own use and occupation.

The suit premises originally belonged to the Respondent''s father, Gangadhara Mudaliar. He purchased the house on 10th July 1958, for the

benefit of his daughter. Soon after he purchased the property, he executed a Will on 30th July 1958, bequeathing this property to his daughter.

After some years, he conveyed this property by a settlement deed, dated 27th January 1962 to his daughter. Now the daughter has filed the

present petition before the Rent Controller for eviction on the ground that she required the house for her own use and occupation. The tenant

contended that the application was not a bona fide one, the reason being that her father originally called upon the tenant to pay enhanced rent of

Rs. 60 and Rs. 75 and that when the tenant refused to pay the enhanced rent, the father of the landlady executed a settlement deed in favour of his

daughter, with a view to enable her to file an application, as he himself could not file an application, since he was in possession of a building of his

own. The Rent Controller gave a finding that the landlady''s application was a bona fide one. But on appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge of

Chingleput reversed that finding and held that the claim for owner''s occupation was not a bona fide one. On revision to the District Judge, he

agreed with the finding of the Rent Controller and, therefore, restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. Now the tenant has filed

this revision petition.

Learned Counsel for the tenant contends that the District Judge ought not to have interfered with the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge

that the Respondent''s application was not a bona fide one. The learned Subordinate Judge, according to him, after considering all the surrounding

circumstances attending at the time of the petition, came to the conclusion that the claim of the Respondent for her own occupation was not a bona

fide one.

Now, the question that arises for consideration is how far a District Judge can interfere in revisional jurisdiction. The relevant provision under the

Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is Section 25. Under that section, a District Judge, may, at any time, call for and examine

the records relating to any order passed for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. I have also to

consider whether the scope of revision under this Act is wider than that in Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. The Supreme Court had to

consider from time to-time the scope of revisional jurisdiction arising under the House Rent Control Acts from the various States. In Moti Ram Vs.

Suraj Bhan and Others, , the landlord filed an ejection petition on the ground that the tenant was a habitual defaulter and was in arrears of rent. The

Rent Controller dismissed the petition, rejecting the pleas of the landlord. On appeal, the District Judge confirmed the finding of the Rent

Controller. But on revision to the High Court, the same was allowed and the claim for evicting the tenant was decreed. The question arose in the

Supreme Court as to whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere in revision with the findings of the Courts below. The revisional

jurisdiction conferred u/s 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is analogous to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on a District

Judge under our Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed at page 905:

The revisional power conferred upon the High Court, u/s 15(5) is wider than that conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under

Article 15(5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the

examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord u/s 13(3)

(a)(iii).

In Hari Shankar Rao v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury (1962) 1 S.C.R. 933 (Supp.) the landlord filed an eviction petition on the ground that the

tenant sublet a portion of the building. The trial Judge decreed the suit. The decision of the trial Judge was confirmed on appeal by the District

Judge. A revision was filed to the High Court u/s 35(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. That section reads:

The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed at page 939:

The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to

law. u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court''s powers are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption

of jurisdiction where none existed or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that

jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. In other Acts, the power is not so limited, and the High Court is

enabled to call for the record of a case to satisfy itself that the -decision therein is according to law....

The phrase ""according to law"" refers to the decision as a whole, and is net to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter....

The Supreme Court had to consider Section 35(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act in Pooran Chand Vs. Motilal and Others, . Subba

Rao J., while following the decision in the above case, observed as follows at page 462:

It is clear...that the power of the High Court u/s 35 of the Act is wider than that u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though it cannot be

equated to that of its jurisdiction in an appeal. It is neither possible nor advisable to define with precision the scope and ambit of Section 35 of the

Act, but it should be left to the High Court to consider in each case whether the impugned judgment is according to law or not, as explained by this

Court in the said decision.

In the above two cases, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider the phrase according to law occurring in Section 25 of the Act in

question.

In Karam Singh Sobti and Another Vs. Shri Pratap Chand and Another, , the landlord filed a suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground that

he sublet the premises without the consent of the landlord. The defence to the petition was that the landlord had acquiesced in the subletting and,

therefore, he was not liable to be evicted. The trial Judge gave a finding that the landlord had not acquiesced in the subletting. But on appeal, the

senior Judge found that the landlord continued to receive the rent with the full knowledge of subletting. He, therefore, held that the landlord was not

entitled to a decree for possession and set aside the order of eviction. The landlord moved the High Court of Punjab in revision. When the revision

was pending in the High Court, the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 came into force. It repealed the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The

High Court held that there was no evidence to justify the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the landlord had acquiesced in the subletting.

Accordingly the High Court allowed the petition. Then the tenant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the High

Court was competent in revision to set aside the finding of the lower appellate Court on the question of acquiescence.

Bearing these principles in mind and especially what the Supreme Court observed in Moti Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and Others, , where the Court

had to consider Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, a provision analogous to Section 25 of Madras Act XVIII of 1960,

I have to consider the scope of jurisdiction conferred u/s 25 on the District Judges, who have been conferred with similar powers as the High

Courts in the various similar Acts referred to herein.

From what has been stated above, it is clear that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge under the provisions of the Rent

Control Act is wider than, that conferred u/s 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. Now, u/s 25 of the Act, a District Judge can call for and examine

the records for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order.

The only question now for consideration is whether the order passed by the District Judge can be sustained on the facts and circumstances of

the present case. The Rent Controller found that the application was a bona fide one and ordered eviction. On appeal, the learned Subordinate

Judge held that the application was not a bona fide, one, on the surrounding circumstances attending at the time of the petition, namely that the

father of the landlady was demanding enhanced rent from time to time and when he was not able to get enhanced rent from the tenant, he executed

a settlement deed conveying the suit property in favour of the daughter, so as to enable her to file an application that she required the building for

her own occupation. The Subordinate Judge considered various circumstances in regard to the conduct of the father and the daughter in not

occupying the building soon after the purchase of the property. But the District Judge reversed the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, after

examining the legality and propriety of that finding. According to the District Judge, when the father purchased the property, it was his intention to

give it to his daughter. Accordingly he executed a Will bequeathing the property to his daughter. After some years he executed the settlement deed

in favour of his daughter so as to enable her to set up separate residence of her own. Soon after the execution of the settlement deed, the landlady

sent notice to the tenant and also requested him to vacate the house. The father also requested the tenant to pay the rent to his daughter. On these

facts and circumstances, the District Judge found the application of the landlady a bona fide one and, therefore, restored the order of eviction

passed by the Rent Controller.

Sitting in revision, I cannot say that the finding of the District Judge is erroneous. In this connection, it is useful to refer to what Rajamannar

C.J., had laid down to be the circumstances in which a revisional authority would be entitled to interfere with the findings of fact of a subordinate

authority. The learned Chief Justice has extracted in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu (1957) 1 M.L.J. 158 what Rajagopala Ayyangar J., has laid down

in Civil Revision Petition No. 1420 of 1954:

...white an appellate authority is entitled to examine every question of fact and law...a revisional authority...cannot normally interfere with findings of

fact unless (a) there were no other materials on which such a finding could be based; or (b) the finding has been reached by a consideration of

irrelevant or inadmissible matter ; or (c) it is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion or (d) the finding had been

reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter....

In the instant case, the District Judge had enough material before him, and in exercise of his revisional authority, he set aside the finding of the

Subordinate Judge. I do not think that the matter calls for any interference in revision, u/s 115 of the Code of Civil procedure, especially when the

District Judge has not exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction in setting aside the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge.

The civil revision petition is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

It is represented to me by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that it is not possible for him to vacate the house immediately as he has got

school going children and in the ordinary course of events the schools will be closed by the end of April. In these circumstances I think it is

justifiable to give him some time to enable him to get alternative accommodation and also see that his children are not put to inconvenience.

Therefore, I give him time till 30th April 1965 for vacating the premises and hand over possession.