Kshirode Lal Pal vs Labanya Prova Pal Choudhuri

Renupada Mukherjee, J.—This Rule is directed against an order passed by a Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, disallowing an application made by the judgment-debtor Petitioner u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In order to appreciate the real point involved in this Rule it is necessary to state the following facts:

The decree-holders opposite parties brought an ejectment suit against the Petitioner tenant in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, for ejecting him from a room and kitchen on the second floor of premises No. 38, Balaram Majumder Street, bearing a rental of Rs. 22 per month. The tenant put up a defence against ejectment, and during the pendency of the suit in the trial court the landlords opposite parties made an application u/s 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, for an order upon the Petitioner to deposit in court all arrears of rent and also to pay future rent month by month. On December 7, 1955, the opposite parties made an application to the court for striking out the written statement of the Petitioner on the ground that the rent for Kartick, 1362 B.S., was not deposited in court in time. This application was allowed on January 19, 1956, and the written statement of the Petitioner was struck out and the suit for ejectment was eventually decreed on March 22, 1956. The life of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, expired on March 31, 1956 and the new Act of 1956 came into operation on that date. After the expiry of the previous Act of 1950 under the provisions of which this decree had been passed, the landlords opposite parties started execution proceedings on May 31, 1956. This application for execution was objected to by the Petitioner-judgment-Debtor on the ground that with the repeal of the old Act of 1950 the court which had passed the decree had ceased to exist and it also lost its jurisdiction and there was no successor court competent to execute the decree. Some other objections were also taken on behalf of the judgment-Debtor but I do not mention them here because, in my opinion, they are not tenable on the face of them.

Mr. Guha appearing on behalf of the judgment Debtor-Petitioner raised a contention which is a very subtle and ingenious one. He contended that a Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, is not ordinarily empowered to try an ejectment suit as a Civil Court under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. He submitted that Section 16 read with Schedule B of the Rent Control Act of 1950 specifically empowered a Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes to try an ejectment suit as a Civil Court where the premises are situate on a land wholly within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and when the rent payable for one month does not exceed Rs. 500, Section 16 of the Rent Control Act of 1950 runs in the following terms:

Notwithstanding anything Contained in any other law a suit by a landlord against a tenant in which recovery of possession of any premises to which this Act applies is claimed shall lie to the courts, as set out in Schedule B, and no other court shall be competent to entertain or try such suit.

Mr. Guha contended that with the repeal of the Rent Control Act of 1950 the court which passed this decree ceased to exist and the court which is now trying ejectment suits under the Rent Control Act of 1956 could not try the suit which had culminated in the present decree inasmuch as that suit was decreed on the ground of technical default. There is no doubt some substance in Mr. Guha''s argument that the suit which was decreed on March 22, 1956 could not have probably been decreed under the provisions of the new Act which came into existence on March 31, 1956. It cannot, however, be said that simply because of the repeal of the Rent Control Act of 1950 the Court which passed the decree has ceased to exist. That Court was a Civil Court of a Subordinate Judge although he was posted as a Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes for the time being. The effect of the repeal of the Act of 1950 was that suits arising under the old Act could no longer be filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge exercising his jurisdiction as an ordinary Civil Court. It cannot, however, be said that on account of this repeal the Subordinate Judge ceased to function as a Civil Court even for the purpose of executing the decree which he had already passed in his capacity as a Civil Court Judge. In my opinion it must be held under circumstances such as these the court of the Subordinate Judge did not become defunct and as soon as an application would be filed for execution of decrees passed prior to the passing of the new Act of 1956 the Subordinate Judge would have the jurisdiction to entertain such an application for execution. I, therefore, hold that the court below was right in dismissing the objection of the judgment-Debtor Petitioner.

In this connection I would also refer to Section 5 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1956, which came into operation on July 27, 1956. By Section 5 of this amending Act, Section 40 of the new Act of 1956 has been substantially amended. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the amending Act of 1956 specifically allows proceedings to be instituted in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment under the Rent Control Act of 1950. Section 5 of the amending Act also makes it clear that the amended Section 40 should be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted in place of the previous Section 40 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956. In my opinion under the amended Section 40 of the new Act of 1956, a decree-holder who had obtained a decree before the passing of the new Act of 1956 would be entitled to execute his decree and the repeal of the Rent Control Act of 1950 would not stand in the way of such execution. On this ground also the objection taken by the judgment-Debtor-Petitioner to the execution of the decree must b dismissed.

In the result I am of opinion that the objection taken by the Petitioner against the execution of the decree has been rightly dismissed by the court below and there is no ground for interference in revision.

This Rule is therefore discharged.

I do not make any order as to costs.