Tribunals and Commissions

Ku. Jai D/O Deepak Patil vs CHIEF ENGINEER , Regional Officer

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 15 October 2012 · Citation: 2012 0 NCDRC 612

HON’BLE JUDGES
J.M.Malik , Vinay Kumar J.
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 945 words
1.

THERE is a delay of 324 days in filing this revision petition. The petitioner has explained the delay in para 4 of the application moved for condonation of delay, which runs as follows: "That the impugned order passed by the State Commission on 11.7.2011 and the same was communicated to the petitioner only in the month of October 2011 and as the petitioner was seriously ill and admitted in the hospital for long time and could not contact the counsel at New Delhi for filing the present revision petition and after complete recovery the petitioner approached the counsel along with her father at New Delhi in the second week of August 2012 and thereafter the counsel at New Delhi drafted the revision petition and sent the same for the approval of the petitioner and in this process some delay has been occasioned which is not intentional and apart from this the petitioner has got very good prima facie case and she is likely to succeed before this Hon ''ble Commission and in the circumstances the Hon ''ble Commission may be pleased to condone the delay in filing the present revision petition in the interest of justice.

2.

WE are not satisfied with the fragile excuse set up by the petitioner. There is no evidence that the petitioner was seriously ill. No medical certificate saw the light of the day. His allegations are based only on oral submissions. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was admitted in the hospital but no documentary proof was filed. It is also not explained that even if the petitioner was sick, in that event, who were his family members, could his family members not file this revision petition immediately. There is not even an iota of evidence that from October 2011 to August 2012, the petitioner was sick and unable to file this revision petition. The expression "sufficient cause " cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which could defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be terms as sufficient cause for the purpose of delay condonation. For all these reasons, the delay cannot be condoned. This view neatly dovetails with the law laid down in the following authorities.

In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras ".

3.

IN Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ''sufficient cause '' is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ''sufficient cause '' is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. " In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held: "The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005] "

4.

THE Hon ''ble Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that: "Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay. "

Recently , this Commission presided over by Hon ''ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan has dismissed the revision petition on the ground of delay and the delay of 104 days was not condoned, vide reference in case "Mahindra Holidays and Resorts India Ltd. Versus Vasantkumar H. Khandelwal and Anr. " [Revision petition No. 1848 of 2012 decided on 21.05.2012]. See the law laid down in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108.

5.

IN view of the above discussion, the revision petition is dismissed as barred by time.