High CourtsSingle Bench

Kuldeep Singh @ Lalla and Others vs State of U.T. and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 23 December 2010 · Citation: (2010) 12 P&H CK 0227

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jaswant Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 320, 482 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 324
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. M 16242 of 2010
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Judgment

15 paragraphs · 920 words

Jaswant Singh, J.—Prayer is u/s 482 Cr.PC for quashing of FIR No. 95 dated 7.4.2010 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 506 of Indian Penal Code registered with Police Station Mani Majra, Chandigarh and all the consequent proceedings arising there from on the basis of compromise dated 18.05.2010(P-2).

2.

As per allegations leveled in the FIR by the complainant, on dated 07.04.2010 at about 10.30 PM when he along with his friend Pardeep Kumar were going to his home at Dakoli, Zirakpur enroute and in the way complainant stopped in front of main gate of Bangali sweet and made one telephone call to one of his friend. Immediately on his disconnecting the call, 2/3 cars halted near them and the occupants of the said car including the Petitioners armed with sharp edged weapons attacked the complainant and caused injuries on the forehead of the complainant as well as to his friend.

3.

While issuing notice of motion parties were given liberty to appear before the learned Illaqa Magistrate for getting their statements recorded in terms of the compromise who after recording their statements was required to submit its reports regarding genuineness of compromise and the said liberty was further extended subject to payment of costs of Rs. 5000/- to be deposited by the Petitioners with the Chandigarh State Legal Services Authority.

4.

Aforesaid costs of Rs. 5,000/-have been deposited with Chandigarh State Legal Services Authority.

5.

Report (Mark-A) in the shape of letter dated 22.12.2010 of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh duly forwarded by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Chandigarh has been received wherein it is stated that the parties appeared before that court and suffered statements recorded separately in terms of the compromise thereby stated that the matter between the parties has been compromised in the FIR and complainant has no objection if the aforesaid FIR and all consequential proceedings are quashed against the Petitioners.

6.

From the report submitted it is evident that the dispute between the Petitioners-accused and the complainant has been amicably resolved by entering into compromise wherein the complainant has stated that he has no objection if the present FIR against the Petitioners-accused is quashed.

7.

Learned State Counsel is unable to raise any serious objection in view of the statement recorded in terms of the aforesaid compromise whereby the complainant is not willing to support the case of the prosecution.

8.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, has made it explicitly clear in para 15 of its judgment that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or effect the powers u/s 482 of the Code.

9.

A Full Bench of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052 has also held that this Court, in appropriate cases, while exercising powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C., may quash an FIR disclosing the commission of non-compoundable offences. The relevant extracts read as under:

The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C., which can affect the inherent power of this Court u/s 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar u/s 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

10.

Hon''ble Apex Court in another case in Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, while relying upon its decision in B.S. Joshi''s case(supra) has also held that in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of criminal proceedings and the continuance of the same after compromise between the parties would be a futile exercise.

11.

Similar views were expressed by Hon''ble the Apex Court in Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, , the relevant extract of which is as under:

We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.

12.

Keeping in view the above settled legal position and taking into account the fact that both the parties have desired to live separately in peace and harmony and carry on with their lives without any ill will or rancour by resolving their differences and entering into the aforesaid compromise, it is evident that it is a fit case where there is no legal impediment in the way of the Court to exercise its inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing of the FIR in the interest of justice.

13.

Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 95 dated 7.4.2010 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 506 of Indian Penal Code and the subsequent proceedings arising there from are quashed against the Petitioners.