Kuldip Kumar vs Karam Singh and Another

Paramjeet Singh, J.

CRM No. 12768 of 2013

For the reasons indicated in the Crl. Misc. application, the same is allowed. Delay of 8 days in filing the appeal is condoned.

CRM A-111-MA of 2013

The instant application has been filed u/s 378(4) Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to appeal against the impugned judgment dated 21.11.2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Karnal, whereby complaint has been dismissed and respondents have been discharged.

Brief facts of the case as mentioned in the impugned judgment are as under:-

... complainant Naseeb Lata was a member i.e. Panch of Gram Panchayat village Biana and accused no. 1 was the President of the Gram Panchayat and accused no. 2 was working as Secretary and accused persons have forged the signatures of the complainant Naseeb Lata on the proceedings book of the Gram Panchayat and this fact came to the notice of the complainant when the accused persons have called the complainant on 24.8.2007 for signing the proceedings books of the panchayat and when the complainant put her signatures over the proceedings book, then she came to know that the accused persons have put signatures of the complainant in the proceedings book of Gram Panchayat on the proceedings conducted on 11.8.2007, 13.8.2007 and 20.8.2007 by impersonating some other persons in place of the complainant. She has further alleged that she has never put her signatures over the proceedings done on these dates i.e. 11.8.2007, 13.8.2007 and 20.8.2007 as she never joined the said meetings. Thus, the accused persons in collusion with each other have withdrawn the payment of Rs. 10,000/- vide Cheque No. 709107 on 13.8.2007, Rs. 10,000/- vide cheque No. 709108, Rs. 48,000/- vide cheque no. 709109 and Rs. 46,000/- vide cheque no. 709110 and similarly vide proceedings dated 20.8.2008, the accused persons have withdrawn the payment of Rs. 10,000/- vide cheque no. 709112 and Rs. 28,000/- vide cheque no. 70911. Thereafter, the complainant move the applications before SP, Karnal, DC, Karnal for taking action against the accused persons but to no avail. Hence, the present complaint for taking action against the accused persons.

In order to substantiate her case in pre-charge evidence, the complainant has examined Roshan Lal as CW1, Kuldeep Kumar as CW3, Ram Dhan Babber as CW4 and Shiv Kumar Bhardwaj as CW5.

The learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 21.11.2012, after appreciating the evidence, dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused-respondents. Hence, this application for grant of leave to appeal.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the impugned judgment.

The learned trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, observed as under:-

Now perusal of the material on the record reveals that CW1 Roshan Lal has stated that JCB had worked for 59 hours. However, it has been recorded for 124 hours in the proceedings book but no such document has been placed on record to show that JCB for cleaning the johar of the village was used and for this purpose Rs. 550/- per hour was affixed. However, the accused persons have recorded this to the extent of 600/- per hour and for a period of 124 hours and thus they have misappropriated the funds of the panchayat. However, nowhere it is shown that the fact of hiring the JCB by Gram Panchayat at such a rate per hour was recorded in the proceedings books of the panchayats.

Moreover, the complainant has averred in her complaint itself that she came to know qua her forged signatures when she was called by the accused persons on 24.8.2007 for signing the proceedings book of the panchayat. It seems quite unconvincing that on 24.8.2007 the complainant was called by the accused persons to sign the same but on 11.8.2007, 13.8.2007 and 20.8.2007 she was not called and her signatures was forged by impersonating her. 11. Perusal of the material on record further reveals that in the proceedings books of the panchayat dated 11.8.2007, the signatures of complainant Naseeb Lata are present along with the signatures of 10 other persons including the Sarpanch Karam Singh. In the proceedings book on 13.8.2007 and 20.8.2007, there are the signatures of all those persons. The only complainant Naseeb Lata has averred that her signatures have been impersonated. The perusal of the material on record reveals that though complainant Naseeb Lata has appeared as CW3 in preliminary evidence. However, she has not appeared as a witness in pre-charge evidence and only her husband has appeared. Further material on the record reveals that the signatures of the complainant in all the three proceedings book are same and the complainant has alleged that all the three signatures have been affixed by impersonating her. Moreover, the report of hand-writing and Finger Print Expert can not be taken into consideration as he has compared the signatures by taking disputed signatures from the photocopies and not from the original and therefore, he has also admitted that the signatures from the photocopies can not be compared with the standard signatures. Besides this the science of Handwriting expert is not a developed science and Hon''ble Supreme Court has time and again held the evidence led by the hand-writing and Finger Print Expert is only corroborative piece of evidence and it can be taken into consideration if it is supported by other material on the record. Moreover, when the hand-writing and Finger Print expert is examined as a private person by the party then they always have tendency to depose in favour of the party. Reliance is placed upon Gulzar Ali Vs. State of H.P., and Lal Singh vs. Ashok Kumar and another, Vol. CXXIV(2000-1) 44.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in ''Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) RCR (Cri) 748'', held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. This view has been reiterated in State of Goa Vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, and '' Chandrappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka,

A Division Bench of this Court in ''State of Punjab v. Hansa Singh, 2001(1) RCR (Cri) 775'', while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has opined as under:-

We are of the opinion that the matter would have to be examined in the light of the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan, which are that interference in an appeal against acquittal would be called for only if the judgment under appeal were perverse or based on a misreading of the evidence and merely because the appellate Court was inclined to take a different view, could not be a reason calling for interference.

In ''Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, 2011 (9) SCC 479'', decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon''ble Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:

An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed.

Similarly, in the case of '' State of Rajasthan Vs. Shera Ram @ Vishnu Dutta, '', the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal.

The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for.

Thereafter, in the above case a large number of judgments were discussed and then it was opined as under:-

There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under challenge. As such, this application for leave to appeal is dismissed.