Kulwant Chauhan vs State of H.P. and Others

Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.—This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ''Code'') has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing F.I.R. No. 158/2012, dated 19.10.2012, under Sections 279 and 337 , registered at Police Station, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur and consequent proceedings in Case No. 14-2 of 2013 titled as ''State versus Kulwant Chauhan'', pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No. 3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur.

Brief facts are that one Sarswati Devi, daughter of Ranjit Singh, lodged the aforesaid F.I.R. with the Police Station, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, alleging therein that when she alongwith one Poonam Kumari was coming from College and was on her way to her residence at Naswal and when they reached near Petrol Pump, one Alto Car bearing registration No. HP-03C-2401, being driven by the petitioner hit Poonam Kumari, who sustained injuries on her head and other parts of the body. It is further averred that parties have now amicably settled the dispute vide compromise deed Annexure P-2.

Today, the petitioner, respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 3, who is minor, alongwith her mother Smt. Rama, are present before this Court and identified as such by their respective counsel(s). It is stated by learned counsel for the parties that they have compromised the matter amicably without any pressure, coercion and undue influence and compromise deed Annexure P-2 to this effect has been placed on the case file. It is averred by respondents No. 2 and Smt. Rama Kumari, who is mother of respondent No. 3 (Poonam Kumari injured in this case), in the compromise that immediately after the accident, petitioner took Poonam Kumari to the hospital and got treated her there and used to ask her well-being at home after the treatment and in this way cordial relations developed in between both the families. They have further stated that they have no objection in case the aforesaid F.I.R. is quashed.

Though the State has expressed its slight reservation regarding compounding of the offence but I find that this is not such wherein the offences for which the petitioner has been charged can be stricto sensu held to be the offences against the State. Even otherwise, once respondents No. 2 and 3 have compromised the matter, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and the continuation of the criminal case against the petitioner would put the petitioner to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case.

In Narinder Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another, the Hon''ble Supreme Court after summing up the legal position has laid down the following guidelines for the High Court in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings, which reads thus:-

"(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the F.I.R. or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

Keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines, it is not disputed that the parties have reached a settlement and on that basis have preferred the present proceedings seeking quashment of the F.I.R. Once the respondents No. 2 and 3 do not want to hold the petitioner responsible, the quashing of such F.I.R. would definitely be to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the Court.

The facts of this case otherwise do not in any manner fall within the exceptions laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court where compromise cannot be entered into or the proceedings cannot be quashed.

Thus, taking holistic view of the matter and looking into all attending facts and circumstances, I find this case to be a fit case to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code and accordingly F.I.R. No. 158/2012, dated 19.10.2012, under Sections 279 and 337 , registered at Police Station, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, is ordered to be quashed. Since F.I.R. No. 158/2012, dated 19.10.2012, under Sections 279 and 337 , registered at Police Station, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur has been quashed, the consequent proceedings in Case No. 14-2 of 2013 titled as ''State versus Kulwant Chauhan, pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, are thereby rendered infructuous. However, the same are expressly quashed so as to obviate any confusion.

The petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.