Kumar Gyanendra Chandra Pande vs Secretary of State

Mullick, J.—This case arises out of the following land acquisition proceedings.

(1) By a declaration dated the 12th July 1909 and 2nd December 1909, under the Land Acquisition (Mines) Act the Local Government acquired 205''75 acres of land in mouzas Pipuljuri, Rajbandh and Khaprojola. The declaration recited that mines of coal, iron stone, slate or other minerals lying under the land or any particular portion of the land except only such parts of the mines and minerals as it may be necessary to dig or carry away or use in the construction of the work for the purpose of which the land is being acquired are not needed. It further recited that.

land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense, for the public purpose viz., for quarries in the Santhal Parganas in connexion with the construction of the Lower Ganges bridge at Sara in the villages of Khaprojola, Pipuljuri and Rajbandh.

(2) By declaration dated the 24th July 1909 the Local Government acquired 44''30 acres in mouzas Nabinagar, Khota-para, PipuJjuri and Eajbandh for constructing quarry sidings.

(3) By declaration dated the 11th August 1909, the Local Government acquired 345 acres in mouza in Pipuljuri for staff quarters.

(4) By a declaration dated the 24th August 1909, the Local Government acquired 62 acres in mouza Nabinagar for a railway siding.

(5) By declaration dated the 17th September 1909, the Local Government acquired 1''36 acres in mouza Pipuljuri for drainage sidings for the Pakur stone quarry.

(6) By declaration dated the 22nd February 1910, the Local Government acquired "41 acres in mouza Pipuljuri for police staff quarters.

The total amount of land acquired therefore amounts to 91''08 acres in Pipuljuri, 121.97 acres in Rajbandh, 4''48 acres in Khaprojola, 6''27 acres in Basmata, 18''47 acres in Nabinagar and 8''63 in acres in Khotapara.

The petitioner who is the plaintiff in a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Pakur and claims the 16 anna patni right in mouzas Khaprojola, Pipuljuri, Rajbandh and Basmata and an 8-anra proprietary right in mouza Nabinagar, asks in that suit for a decree for possession of the subsoil including stone and other minerals lying in or upon or under the lands covered by the declarations relating to these five mouzas.

It is contended on behalf of the Secretary of State, the opposite party, that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is excluded by reason of Section 5 of Regulation III of 1872 which enacts that when a notification is published that a settlement shall be made of any particular area in the Santhai Parganas then no suit shall lie in any Civil Court for any land or any interest in or arising out of land in the area covered by the notification between the date of the notification and the date on which such settlement is declared to have been completed. During this period the sole tribunal competent to try the suit shall be an officer appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor u/s 2 of the Santhal Parganas Act, 1855 or u/s 10 of Regulation III of 1872.

It is admitted that there is such a special officer competent to try the suit if Section 5 of Regulation III of 1872 applies.

The only question is whether the plaintiff''s suit is one for any land or interest in land within the meaning of Regulation III of 1872.

Now the expression "land" has not been defined in this Regulation, the object of which is to provide for the peace and good government of the territory known as the Santhal Parganas. The short title of the Regulation is "The Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation," and it is obvious from an examination of its various provisions that one of its objects is to authorize a preparation of a record of rights of the surface land which includes either all the land except the mines or the soil overlying the minerals. I think the term soil is coextensive in meaning with the term land as used in the regulation. The term land in the regulation includes the soil and the subsoil, but does not include mines or minerals.

I am supported in this interpretation by the fact that it does not appear their in any previous settlement under the regulation a record of rights has ever been made of mines or minerals. The settlement officer has hitherto been considered competent to make a record of rights of the surface lands including pits and excavations but not of any mines or minerals. I am of opinion that this view of the regulation is correct.

With regard to the subsoil as distinguished from the surface land I think the same interpretation applies.

Now it appears that the lands covered by the declarations consists of a layer of clay and then of a layer of boulders of stone and then of a layer of hard rock. It appears also that in some places the rock comes up to the surface.

A quarry is an excavation for getting minerals and it is admitted that Government have made such excavations on the area in suit and have extracted stone therefrom. Ordinarily a mineral is any substance which is part of the natural formation of the earth except the common soil or the rock of the country. From the Land Acquisition proceedings it would seem that it is admitted that the stone taken by Government from the quarries is mineral within the meaning of the declarations.

In his suit the plaintiff claims the subsoil including the minerals. In the view I take the subsoil is land within the meaning of the regulation and the Subordinate Judge has no jurisdiction. But it is clear that the subject matter is not the soil or the subsoil but a mineral not included therein. In fact the plaintiff''s claim is that the Secretary of States right to extract stone from the quarries is spent and that he alone has now the right to extract some from the quarries or the underlying rock.

The Secretary of State has already admitted that no mineral rights have been acquired by him in the subject-matter of the declarations 2, 4, 5 and 6 and the contest seams to turn upon declaration 1. The Secretary of State claims that although he is not entitled to coal, iron stone, slate or other minerals the declaration entitles him to continue to take stones for the Lower Ganges Bridge.

Therefore the dispute, between the parties is confined to a mineral lying upon or under the surface. It does not relate to land within the meaning of Regulation III of 1872 and the plaintiff''s suit therefore does not come within the purview of Section 5 of the Regulation.

The case is one of first impression, but giving the best consideration, I can, to it I am satisfied that the contention of the Secretary of State must fail and that the Subordinate Judge has jurisdiction to try the suit.

The application, therefore, succeeds and it is allowed with costs hearing-fee three gold mohurs.