Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy vs Rai Kiran Chandra Roy Bahadur and Others

Henderson, J.—This Rule raises a question regarding the interpretation of Section 168A, Ben. Ten. Act. It is opposed by opposite parties 1 to 9. The facts are these. When the rent suit was instituted the landlords were opposite parties 1 to 9, opposite parties 10 to 12 and opposite parties 16 to 25. The rent suit was actually instituted by opposite parties 1 to 12. The execution proceedings were taken by opposite parties 1 to 9. Opposite parties 10 to 12 were made parties, because they refused to join in the execution petition. The holding was pur chased by opposite parties 1 to 9. The present petitioner filed an application u/s 168A (1) (b) on the allegation that he had purchased ''the interest of opposite parties 10 to 12 at a putni sale. This purchase took place on 15th May 1940 which was prior to the institution of the execution case. The prayer made by the petitioner is that opposite parties 1 to 9 should be compelled to deposit the rent which has become due between the date of his purchase in the putni sale and the date of the confirmation of the present sale. The important point to note is that the petitioner has not purchased the decree obtained by opposite parties 10 to 12. His contention however is that the word "decree-holder" really means "landlord."

The learned Munsiff delivered a careful judgment. He pointed out that hardship would be caused to persons in the position of the petitioner. He however rightly held that that was not a matter to be taken into consideration in interpreting the section. In dismissing the petitioner''s application the learned Munsiff has given the natural meaning to the word "decree-holder." If the word "decree-holder" means "landlord," the drafting of the section will be about as bad as drafting could be". Not only that but the word decree-holder will have to be given two different meanings in the same sentence. It may very well be that the position of persons like the petitioner was forgotten at the time the section was drafted. In my judgment, the learned Munsiff would have been wrong to strain the language to give it a meaning which it could not possibly be asked to bear, unless some hardship would be caused to somebody. The Rule is discharged. I make no Order as to costs.