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Judgment
C.T. Selvam, J.—Petitioner, a minor, represented by his mother, informs of having become entitled to extent of lands under will of his
grandfather dated 7.3.1948 and two codicils thereto dated 3.3.1950 and 14.10.1950. An extent of 316.89 acres was acquired by the
respondents 1 and 3 even in the year 1972 under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 for the purpose of construction of the Palar Porundalar dam.
Pursuant to taking of possession, the land was handed over to the Public Works Department and the dam was constructed in 1972. The lands are
within the dam water spread area. Respondents had issued notifications on 29.3.1972, 5.4.1972, 12.4.1972, 3.5.1972 and Section 5(A) enquiries
were also held on 16.5.1972, 6.7.1972, 18.7.1972 and 19.7.1972. In the meanwhile, possession had been taken and the dam had been
constructed. A notification u/s 18(1) of the Tamil Nadu land reforms (fixation of ceiling on land) Act 1961 had been issued on 22.7.1981 and the
respondents had failed to pursue the process set upon by them under the land acquisition act. Informing that such a course had been adopted by
the respondents in respect of lands belonging to Ms. Narendra Dairy Farms Private Limited and the same had been held to be bad under orders of
this Court in W.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of 1974 dated 9.4.1979, that appeal against such findings had been dismissed in W.A. No. 576 of 1979
under orders dated 6.11.1985 and further appeal to the Supreme Court also stood dismissed, petitioner seeks relief as prayed for. In the counter
affidavit of the respondents, it is contended that the holdings of the petitioner''s father attracted the provisions of the Tamil Nadu land reforms
(fixation of ceiling of land) act 1961. His holdings as on 6.4.1960 were determined and a draft statement u/s 10(1) of the land reforms act was
prepared and published in the Tamil under Government Gazette dated 1.9.1965. The final statement u/s 12 of such act was published in the
government Gazette dated 29.3.1972. In G.O. Ms. No. 1389 revenue dated 11.6.1981 notification u/s 18(1) of the act declaring excess an extent
of 3450.231/4 ordinary acres equivalent to 1099.90 standard acres was approved and published in Tamilnadu government Gazette dated
22.7.1981. Action was taken under the provisions of the land acquisition act in respect of the same land towards construction of the Palar
Porundalar dam without informing the fact thereof to the Land Reforms Department. It is informed that the landowner i.e. the petitioner''s father
had moved W.P. No. 2842 of 1992 before this Court seeking a direction for deposit of the compensation amount for lands covered in the
notification issued u/s 4 of the land acquisition act. This Court under orders dated 24.11.1999 had observed that the notification u/s 4(1) of Land
Acquisition Act was withdrawn as a notification u/s 18(1) of the land reforms act already was published and the lands covered by the land
acquisition proceedings were declared as surplus already under such act. This Court had directed the Assistant Commissioner (land reforms)
Dindigul to issue notice to the landowner and after conducting proper enquiry, fix the compensation and to pass orders according to law. Enquiry
under Rule 45(1) of the Tamil Nadu land reforms (fixation of ceiling on land) rules 1962 was conducted and under orders dated 5.7.2006 the
compensation was determined at Rs. 6,46,794. The orders have been served on the landowners on 8.7.2006. The draft assessment roll had been
prepared and published in the Tamil Nadu government Gazette dated 9.8.2006 and served on the landowner on 1.9.2006. In answer to
objections raised by the mother of the petitioner, an order u/s 50(4) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (fixation of ceiling on land) Act 1961 was
passed on 23.10.2006 and served on the landowner as also the petitioner''s mother on 20.11.2006. Thereafter, the final assessment roll had been
published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 29.11.2006 and served on the landowner as also the petitioner''s mother on 26.12.2006. It is
informed that owing to an order of stay granted in the present proceedings the compensation payable under the land reforms act for the lands in
question could not be determined. It is contended that as the will in favour of the petitioner was of the year 1950, the notification u/s 18(1) of the
Land Reforms Act having been issued on 22.7.1981 and the lands in question having been taken over by government thereunder, the petitioner
who only could inherit lands held by his father, could not claim an inheritance of lands that have fallen into the hands of government long before his
birth in 2001. It is contended that as observed by this Court in its order W.P. 2842 of 1992 dated 24.11.1999, the notification u/s 4 of the land
acquisition act stood withdrawn as a notification u/s 18(1) of the land reforms act had already been published. The lands in question had been
found to be surplus holdings as on 6.4.1960. Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act 1961 contained a non obstante clause, the lands
were required for public purpose as construction of darn is also an agrarian act, the decisions of this Court in W.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of 1976 and
connected proceedings could not serve the petitioner''s purposes and hence the writ petition is to be dismissed.
We have heard Mr. N.R. Chandran learned senior counsel for the petitioner on 18.7.2012 and 23.7.2012. Despite opportunities provided
there have been no arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents. Informed as we were that the matter had been argued twice over before
other judges, this Court had reserved orders on 2.8.2012 granting liberty to the respondents to submit their written arguments. Till date, the
respondents have not done so.
Learned senior counsel for petitioner submitted that in identical factual circumstance, the respondents had given a go by to proceedings under
the land acquisition act and proceeded under the land reforms act. A learned single judge of this Court under orders in W.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of
1974 dated 9.4.1979 had directed that the respondents go by the land acquisition act. This decision stood confirmed up to the apex Court. He
submitted that the lands in question lay submerged owing to the construction of the Palar Porundalar dam. The purpose of the land reforms act was
to make available land held in excess of the ceiling limit to the landless towards their carrying out agricultural operations thereupon. Since such
purpose could not be served in the instant case, the land reforms act could not be resorted to. He next contended that even if it be taken that both
the land acquisition act as also the land reforms act would apply, that which was more advantageous to the land owner ought to be applied.
Learned senior counsel relied on judgment of this Court in The Revenue Divisional Officer and The Commissioner and Secretary, Education
Department Vs. Saroja Victor and A. Vanaja, , to inform that if, as in the instant case, proceedings for acquisition had been initiated after
possession was taken, it would be open to the landowner, at the time of seeking a reference u/s 18 of the land acquisition act, to request the
collector to include in the terms of reference the question relating to damages for use in occupation for the period from the date of taking
possession till date of notification u/s 4 of the land acquisition act. Explaining the reason for the petitioner moving the present writ petition in the
year 2006 as against possession of lands taken in 1972, learned senior counsel submits that just as the petitioners, the respondents also were also
under the impression that the decision in Narendra Dairy''s case applied also to the present case. Having caused the notification u/s 18(1) of the
Tamil Nadu land reforms (fixation of ceiling on land) act 1961 on 22.7.1981, the respondent had resorted to publishing a draft assessment roll as
late as on 9.8.2006 which was the cause for concern leading to the filing of the present writ petition.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the decisions in W.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of 1974 and connected W.A. Nos. 677 and 678 of
1979 and SLP Civil Appeal Nos. 1285 and 1286 of 1992, have direct bearing on the matter arising in the present proceedings while the
contention of the respondents is that they do not. The answer would lie on whether such decisions merely are those arrived on factual
considerations or whether they lay down propositions of law. Towards arriving at a decision, it would be useful to extract relevant portions of the
judgment of the Learned single judge in W.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of 1974:
... having regard to the purpose and object of the Land Ceiling Act, it docs not require much to see that the first respondent cannot rely upon the
provisions of the Land Ceiling Act to acquire land needed for an irrigation project. This position seems to have been fully realised by Government
in the earlier stage of matters, and that is why in spite of the land ceiling Act and the amending Act having come in to force, the first respondent had
deemed it necessary to initiate proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act to acquire a certain extent of land belonging to the petitioners, albeit
that extent constituting surplus land in the hands of the first petitioner. Not only were acquisition proceedings initiated, but the proceedings almost
reached a stage of finality in that even declarations u/s 6 had been published. Further now possession of the dam site as well as a large extent of
land for water spread area had also been taken over by the respondents. I have already referred to he admissions made by the respondents in their
counter in the matter of taking possession of the land. In that state of affairs, is it open to the respondent to resile from their earlier stand and
contend that all those proceedings can be given a go-by and the Government can get at the lands of the position are required for the irrigation
project by having resort to the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act? I think not. This ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Vijay Cotton and Oil
Mills Ltd. Vs. The State of Gujarat, can be appositely quoted here and usefully applied to the cases on hand. That was a case where Government
took possession of certain lands belonging to a party under arrangements to give the party substituted lands, but subsequently, it decided to acquire
the lands and issued notification u/s 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Compensation was also determined, but on a dispute regarding the quantum,
a reference was made to the Civil Court. At that state of matters, the Government went back on its stand and contended that there had been no
notification u/s 4(1) of the Act and consequently, the acquisition proceedings were null and void. This action of the Government was challenged
and the question which had to be decided by the Court was whether the Government can take up inconsistent positions in Court at successive
stages in the same litigation to the detriment of its opponent. The Supreme Court held that the Government, having chosen to acquire the land and
issued the notification u/s 6(1) was not entitled to resile from its stand and take up the plea that the acquisition proceedings had not been properly
initiated and therefore, the land owner was not entitled to claim compensation. In the instant case also, the Government having launched the
acquisition proceedings and taken possession of the land, cannot now go back on the stand and say that since the land sought to be acquired will
come to be vested in it as surplus land under the Land Ceiling Act, it can conveniently drop the acquisition proceedings and in that they will utilise a
portion of the surplus land for implementing the The State of Madras Vs. A.Y.S. Parisutha Nadar can also be referred to herewith advantage. In
that case, the Government initiated acquisition proceedings to acquire a certain land, had vested in it u/s 3 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act and
therefore, it will not pay compensation to the owner of the land. A Division Bench of this Court replied the contention of the Government and held
that once the Government availed itself of the provisions of the Machinery under the land acquisition Act or compulsory acquisition, treating the
land as belonging to others, the Government comes under the obligation to pay compensation as provided under the Act. Applying this principle, it
has to be held that once the Government had sought to acquire the land on the footing the land can be obtained only by means of acquisition for
forming the dam, then it cannot give up its position and say that it will lay its hands on the land by taking it over as surplus land under the Land
Ceiling Act. There is the further impediment to the contention of the respondents. Viz., that any extent of land taken over as surplus under the
provisions of the Land Ceiling Act cannot be made use of for any other purposes except for distribution of landless persons, since that is the solo
purpose for which the land ceiling Act has been enacted. The learned Advocate General argued that the Land Ceiling Act contemplate distribution
of surplus land to subserve the common good and therefore a land taken over as surplus can also be utilised for constructing a dam or irrigation
project. I am afraid this contention cannot be accepted because the objects mentioned, the Land ceiling Act clearly indicate that land in excess of
the ceiling are taken over by Government, has to be necessarily distributed to landless and other persons among the rural population and such
distribution is aimed at increasing agricultural production and promoting justice, social and economic. To hold otherwise, will amount to the Court
condoning the Government making a colourable exercise of its powers under the Land Ceiling Act. It was pointed out in Municipal Council of
Sydney v. Camobeli (3) 1925 AC 338 343.
A body such as the municipal council of Sydney authorised to take land compulsorily for specified purpose will not be permitted to exercise its
powers for different purposes, and if it attempts to do so, the Court will interfere.
In spite of the Land Ceiling Act and mending Act 17 of 1970 having come into force on 15.2.1970, the surplus lands did not automatically vest in
the Government because as per the terms of the land ceiling Act, the surplus land will be deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and
vested in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of the commencement of the Act only after the publication of the notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 18. In this case, the notification u/s 18(1) had been made only at or about the time the writ petitions were filed.
The respondent cannot, therefore, contend that even at the time, the acquisition proceedings were initiated, the surplus lands had vested with the
Government.
The second argument of the petitioner''s counsel was that the proviso to Section 6(1) had been introduced to safeguard the interest of the citizen
whose land was sought to be acquired and not to facilitate the Government making facile withdrawal from acquisition proceedings resorted to by
its earlier, on a question of technicality. In otherwords, the submission of Mr. Venugopal was that the proviso had been introduced only to prevent
the Government from abusing its powers under the Land Acquisition Act and making sweeping notifications u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in
order to freeze the price of land which Government had no immediate intention of acquiring for public purposes. As a further step in this line of
argument Mr. Venugopal argued that... the interdiction contained in the proviso had been introduced only to safeguard the interests of the citizens,
it was always open to the citizen to waive the protection afforded to him and to ask the Government to continue the acquisition proceedings not
withstanding the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act having been made more than three years before the publication of the notification
u/s 6(1) of the Act. I think there is considerable force in the argument of Mr. Venugopal, the proviso to Section 6(1) on which the learned
Advocate General placed reliance has been introduced only to act as a check on the Government and not to facilitate the Government to take
cover under that provision and disown it obligation to go ahead with the acquisition proceedings, unmindful of the loss and hardship caused to the
owner of the land.
In decision of the division bench in W.A. Nos. 677 and 678 of 1979, it has been held as follows:
We may now advert to the effect of initiation of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, long prior to the issue of the notification u/s 18(1)
of the Land Ceilings Act. From the dates already mentioned, it is clear that the initiation of the proceedings under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act was subsequent to the commencement of the Land Ceilings Act, though prior to the notification u/s 18(1) of the Land Ceilings Act.
When the notifications u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands in question were issued, the Government resorted to these
provisions, treating the subject matter of the acquisition as not belonging to itself, but as belonging to the respondents herein. In The State of
Madras Vs. A.Y.S. Parisutha Nadar a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether it was open to a claimant to assert title to the
lands acquired against the State Government which became vested in it by force of operation of the statute, viz., Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948. The
argument was that when once an Estate was taken over by the State Government under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Estates Abolition Act,
the State became the absolute owner thereof and no claim against the Government can be put forward by any other person. That argument was
repelled on the ground that the claim of the State Government acquiring its own land and paying compensation to itself was ridiculous and that the
State Government is not competent to put forward its own title to the acquired property in a proceeding tinder the Land Acquisition Act as the
very scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is on the basis that the lands acquired belonged to others and not to itself. We have not been persuaded
to hold that this principle is inapplicable on the facts and circumstances of this case or that it is erroneous. Thus, even on the principle laid down in
the decision referred to earlier, it follows that the Government cannot resile now from the land acquisition proceedings already commenced.
The question whether tile resort had by the State to the provisions of the Land Ceilings Act with reference to the lands in question, in respect of
which proceedings had already been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, is not a colourable exercise of power, may now be considered. We
are assuming for purposes of considering this aspect that the State has the power to acquire lands for the irrigation scheme in question under both
the enactments. It is obvious that if the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are pursued to their conclusion, the State will be obliged to pay
compensation to the respondents in respect of the acquired lands at the market value, which prevailed at or about the time of the notification u/s
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is also not in dispute that the compensation payable in respect of the surplus lands taken over under the
provisions of the Land Ceilings Act does not bear any comparison at all with the compensation payable under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. In other words, the State has a choice of applying two enactments with reference to the lands in question - one that would oblige
it to pay a higher compensation and the other, under which, a very meagre amount alone may become payable. In such a situation, it is not open to
the State to use its powers under one of the two enactments, which will be more disadvantageous to the citizen. Even on the assumption that it is
open to the State to resort to the acquisition of the lands in question under the provisions of the Land Ceilings Act for the purposes of the irrigation
dam, the State cannot proceed to exercise its powers thereunder to the detriment of the citizen, in the matter of compensation, which would not
arise if proceedings invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act already commenced were continued. We may usefully refer in this
connection to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Jiwani Devi Paraki Vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta and Others,
Where one is repository of two powers that is power of requisition as well as power of acquisition qua the same property and if the purpose can
equally be served by one which causes lesser inconvenience and damage to the citizen concerned unless the repository of both the powers suffers
from any insurmountable disability, user of one which is disadvantageous to the citizen without exploring the use of the other would be bad not on
the ground that the Government has no power but on the ground that it will be a misuse of the power in law.
We are of the view that even assuming that it is open to the State to resort to the provisions of Land Ceilings Act to acquire lands for the irrigation
dam in question it would be a misuse of its power. We are unable to understand the decision of the Supreme Court in M.R. Mudaliar v. State of
Madras, as enabling the State to have some kind of a choice in the matter of the acquisition of lands. The argument in that case was that the
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act having been taken already, that would not bar the application of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu
Leaseholds (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act., 27 of 1963. It was pointed out that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the
Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1963 operated on different fields and that the grant of a ryotwari patta u/s 9 would enable the grantee to get compensation
under the Land Acquisition Act. This decision, in our view, does not in any manner justify the State in its choice of one enactment in preference to
another. It has to be remembered that even by the application of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1963, the grantee of the patta would still
have in him an interest, which is capable of being acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and it was in that context, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the two enactments operated in different fields. Such a situation does not obtain in this case. Whether it be under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or the Land Ceilings Act, the result is the total extinction of the interest of the owner of the land in the lands.
There is therefore no scope for the contention that both the enactments could operate at the same time. We are therefore of the view that the
decision relied upon cannot in any manner assist the State in justifying the application of one enactment instead of the other. We therefore hold that
there is misuse of the power by the State in applying the provisions of the Land Ceilings Act to the lands in question, when proceedings had
already been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act.
Lastly, the learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the extent of 411.4 acres declared as surplus may be taken over by the
State pursuant to the proceedings under the Land Ceilings Act part of its policy to bring about agrarian reforms. In this connection, learned counsel
also relied upon the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Kerala and Another Vs. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.
etc., to contend that the construction of irrigation systems would also be within the ambit of agrarian reforms. We may briefly refer to the scope of
the Land Acquisition Act as well as the Land Ceilings Act. The object of the Land Acquisition Act is to acquire lands needed for public purposes
and for companies and for determination of the amount of compensation in respect of such acquisition. The Land Ceilings Act had been enacted to
given effect to the directive principle of the State policy in Article 39 of the Constitution. Article 39 deals with the State directing its policy towards
securing ownership and control of material resources of the community with a view to secure equitable distribution in such a manner as to subserve
common good in order that the concentration of wealth and means of production to common detriment, in the hands of a few, did not result. The
preamble of the Land Ceilings Act further indicates that the primordial purpose is to acquire lands in excess of the ceiling area in order that such
excess may be made available for distribution amongst the landless and other persons in the rural areas in accordance with the rules framed. Thus,
the policy of the Land Ceilings Act as well as the rules shows that the surplus lands have to be allotted to the landless persons and not for other,
purposes. It may be that the provisions of the irrigation facilities are also part of agrarian reforms as stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court
relied on by the learned Additional Government Pleader. But agrarian reforms is not one of the avowed objects of the Land Ceilings Act, which is
intended only to reduce the disparity in the ownership of agricultural lands and to secure an equitable distribution of the surplus lands in a manner,
which would subserve the common good, result in agricultural production and promote justice, social and economic. Taking into account the
purpose and object of the Land Ceilings Act, the appellants cannot rely upon its provisions to acquire lands needed for an irrigation project.
Presumably, realising this, the State had thought it fit to initiate proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, so as to) acquire the surplus lands
belonging to the respondents. Not content with merely issuing a notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, the proceedings also culminated in a declaration u/s
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, at lease with reference to a major portion of the lands for the Dam site as well as the water spread area and that
had been taken possession of. Under those circumstances, it is not open to the appellants to justify the taking over of the surplus lands in question
under the guise of bringing about agrarian reforms under the Land Reforms Act. No other point was urged.
The decision of the division bench also informs that it is the factum of possession by Government and not the mode by which it is obtained that is
relevant for the purposes of Section 48 of the land acquisition act. Once having taken possession, it will not be open to the government to
withdraw therefrom u/s 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The connected appeals before the Supreme Court in C.A. Nos. 1285 and 1286 of
1992 have been dismissed as infructuous recording the fact that compensation arrived at by the Land Acquisition Collector had been received
under protest and a reference been made u/s 18 of the land acquisition act. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to express any opinion on
the question of law involved in the appeals.
Useful reference may be had to the order of this Court in W.A. No. 576 of 1979 dated 6.11.1985, wherein the learned single Judge who had
disposed of WP numbers 119 and 120 of 1974, penning the judgment of the division bench had further explained the position as follows:
7....The Act has been passed for fulfilling the objectives contained in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. The objective is
for the State to take steps to see that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve
the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the
common detriment. As an integral part of the scheme, the State has been enjoined to remove the disparity in the ownership of agricultural land
leading to the concentration of such land in the hands of certain persons and to enquire surplus land concentrated in the lands of some persons and
distributed it to the landless and other deserving persons among the rural population. In confirmity with the object of the Act, the word ""land"" has
been defined in Section 3(22) as meaning agricultural land, i.e., land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes of purposes
sub servant thereto. The definition has been made to include forest land, pasture land, plantation and tope, but house-site or land used exclusively
for non-agricultural purposes has been specifically excluded. Section 5 prescribes the Ceiling area for different kinds of owners. Section 7 is the
operative Section which lays down that on and from the date of the commencement of the Act, no parsec will be entitled to hold land in excess of
the ceiling area. Section 8 relates to the furnishing of returns by persons holding land in excess of the ceiling area and Section 9 deals with the
collection of information. Then comes Section 10 which deals with the preparation and publication of draft statement as regards land is excess of
the ceiling area. Section 11 empowers the Authorised Officer to decide the question of title in certain cases. Then comes Section 12 under which a
publication of a final statement is to be made. The next relevant Section to be mentioned in Section 18 which provides for the Government taking
over the surplus land in terms of the publication of final statement u/s 12 or 14. Section 10-A provides for the inclusion of any land which had
inadvertently escaped the notice of the authorities from being included in the extent of holdings owned by the landowner. Section 18-B conform
power on government to modify the notification u/s 10(1) consequent on corrections being made u/s 15. Section 18-C confers power on the
Government to cancel or modify notifications u/s 18(1) in certain cases. Sections 18-D and 18-E are consequential provisions which relate to
divesting and veating of land excluded or newly included, as the case may be.
Averting now to Section 7, which is the operative Section, it forbids any person governed by the Act to hold land in excess of the ceiling area
from the date of the commencement of the Act. Therefore, it follows that a person is entitled to hold the permitted extent of land which falls within
the ceiling area, and such extent of land should satisfy the definition of ""land"" u/s 3(22) of the Act, i.e., land which is actually put to agricultural use
or capable of being put to agricultural use. In the same manner, it must be held that what can be taken over by Government as surplus can only be
a land falling within the definition of Section 3(22).
From the above decisions, the following legal propositions emerge:
(i) Resort can be had to the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act only where the purposes of such act can be served. Unless the lands found in
excess can be placed in the hands of landless persons towards their carrying out agricultural operations thereupon, the provisions of the land ceiling
act cannot be resorted to.
(ii) Even where resort has been had to the provisions of the land ceiling act, the surplus land would be deemed to have been acquired for a public
purpose and would vest in Government free from all encumbrances from the date of commencement of the act only after the publication of the
notification under sub-section 1 of Section 18.
(iii) Where two enactments would apply in respect of a matter, that which is more favourable to the affected party is to be resorted to. Acting
otherwise, would be a colorable exercise of power.
(iv) Irrespective of the manner in which possession has been taken, once the same has been done, government cannot drop the acquisition
proceedings by resort to 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
(v) Having embarked upon acquisition u/s 4(1) of the land acquisition act, the government cannot take advantage of its own wrong of not making
the declaration u/s 6 within two years thereof, since proviso to Section 6(1) of the land acquisition act ''has been introduced only to act as a check
on the government and not to facilitate the government to take cover under that provision and disown its obligation to go ahead with the acquisition
proceedings unmindful of the loss and hardship caused to the owner of the land.
Keeping the above principles in mind, we find that in the instant case it would have to be held that having resorted to acquisition under the Land
Acquisition Act, compensation whereunder is far greater than that which would accrue under the Land Ceiling Act, it would not be open to the
respondents to abandon the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and take recourse to the Land Ceiling Act. That the lands in question
have been rendered incapable for agricultural use owing to the construction of the Palar Porundalar Dam would be an additional reason why the
writ petition succeeds.
On perusal of the order of this Court in W.P. No. 2842 of 1992 dated 24.11.1999, we find that it has been contended by the respondent State
that as notification stood issued by the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) Dindigul, the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act stood
withdrawn. Thereupon, Learned single Judge had expressed the view that in the circumstance the relief prayed for viz., a direction for deposit of
compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- in proper securities and payment of accrued periodical interest to the third respondent (i.e.) Official Assignee High
Court, Madras to the credit of the petitioner in L.P. No. 72 of 1986 on the file of this Court (Insolvency jurisdiction), was no more available at that
stage. We have no doubt that if the earlier decisions of this Court, two of which are those of Division Benches and are binding upon a single Judge,
had been brought to the notice, the view expressed in the order in W.P. No. 2842 of 1992, dated 24.11.1999, would not have come about.
Accordingly writ petition shall stand allowed as prayed for. As informed in decision of this Court in Revenue Divisional Officer v. Saroja Victor
(supra), it would be open to the petitioner, at the time of seeking reference under Sectional 8 of the Land Acquisition Act, to request the Collector
to include in the terms of reference the question relating to damages for the period from the date of taking possession till date of notification u/s 4 of
such Act.