Kunhan vs Sankara and Others

It is first urged that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain this suit, the encumbrances found to have been improperly created by the

appellant being to the extent of more than Rs. 2,500. The plaint refers to the encumbrances as instances of mismanagement on the part of the

appellant and it does not pray for a decree that they be set aside. The only relief prayed for is the removal of the appellant from his position of

karnavan and it was held in Narangoli Chirakal Kunhi Raman v. Puttalathu Kimhunni Nambiar ILR 4 Mad. 314 that such relief is incapable of

valuation. The decision in Ganapati v. Chathu ILR 12 Mad. 223 is not in point, for the plaintiff''s in that case sued to obtain a declaration that the

Uraima right to a certain devasom was vested solely in their tarwads and the ground of decision was that the value of a suit for declaration of title

to specific property should be taken, for the purpose of jurisdiction, to be the same as that of a suit to recover possession of that property.

Another contention is that all the members of the tarwad have not been made parties to the suit. The Subordinate Judge observes that all the

adult members have been made parties and this is not denied before us. Though minors in the tarwad may not have been made parties to the suit,

yet we agree with the Subordinate Judge in thinking that the adult members sufficiently represent the interest of the tarwad for the purposes of this

suit.

It is next said that Original Suit No. 442 of 1885 on the file of the District Munsif of Shernad bars the present suit. In that suit there was no

adjudication, and when it was withdrawn, permission to institute a fresh suit was asked for, and granted. There is, therefore, no foundation for the

contention that the present claim is either res judicata or barred by Section 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the ground of objection chiefly

relied on in support of this appeal is that the misfeasances imputed to the appellant were committed by him whilst he was de facto karnavan during

the lifetime of Kunhi Krishnan Nayar and that they ought not to be accepted as a ground for depriving him of his present position as de jure

karnavan. The question to be kept in view is, however, whether by reason of misconduct the appellant has rendered himself unfit for the office of

karnavan, and on this point it can make no difference to the tarwad, whether the misfeasances were committed by him either solely or in

conjunction with another; in either case, the interest of the tarwad requires that the management of its affairs should not be entrusted to him. It has

also been found that he usurped the management during the life-time of Kunhi Krishnan Nayar, and acted not as his delegate and under his

direction, but without any restriction or regard to Kunhi Krishnan''s authority as de jure karnavan. The decision in Nambiatan Nambudiri v.

Nambiatan Nambudiri 2 M.H.C.R., 110 shows only that the authority of a de jure karnavan is absolute, and that he may, at his pleasure, put an

end to the management of tarwad affairs by an anandravan, and that for that purpose, such management is to be taken to have continued by his

sufferance or to have been that of his delegate. It is certainly no authority for exonerating the de facto manager from responsibility or blame for the

maladministration of tarwad property. Neither are we prepared to attach weight to the appellant''s contention that some of the lands unnecessarily

encumbered belong to a branch tarwad, and that his acts of mismanagement, so far as they relate to them, should be excluded from consideration

whilst coming to a finding as to his fitness for the karnavanship of the whole tarwad. This second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.