Kusum Devi vs The State of Jharkhand and Others

Aparesh Kumar Singh, J.—Heard counsel for the parties. The petitioner in the present writ application is challenging the reasoned order at Annexure-4 contained in memo No. 782 dated 27.4.2009 where under her claim for family pension has been rejected.

The brief facts of the present case are as follows:-

The petitioner claims herself to be the second wife of late Ragho Singh, a constable in the erstwhile government of Bihar, who was discharged from his service on 31.10.1967 itself. The said person died in the year 1999 and thereafter, in the year 2004 the writ petitioner approached this Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.S. No. 104 of 2005 claiming death cum retirement benefits, family pension and other legal dues in favour of her deceased husband. She had referred to a judgment reported in 2002 (1) JLJR 703 to claim that she was still entitled for family pension. In such circumstance, the petitioner was permitted to make a representation before the respondents who were directed to consider the case sympathetically and pay the admissible dues within a period of 4 weeks. The petitioner, thereafter, pursued contempt also which was however dismissed as the reasoned order had been passed in the meantime. In the reasoned order which is at Annexure-4, the Deputy Inspector General of Police cum Principal, Police Training College, Hazaribag has considered the claim of the petitioner and found that there are no documents available in the said institution apart from the order of the dismissal to verify the correctness of the claim of the petitioner. He also found that the petitioner, after 38 years of such discharge and 6 years after the death of the said employee had approached the respondents for consideration of her case. He also took into account the Rule 47 of the Bihar Pension Rules which came in the way of considering such claim. In the wake of the aforesaid reason, representation was rejected.

The respondents have filed counter affidavit in support of their stand on 4.1.2011 itself. When the matter has been taken up today, learned counsel for the petitioner has sought for time to file rejoinder to the same, after 3 years of such filing of counter affidavit, which is being refused.

Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court does not find any infirmity in the order of rejection. For such a stale claim respondents cannot be blamed for not maintaining such records over the period of more than 40 years. In such circumstance, in relation to raising of a stale claim the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, has also observed that such cause of action which has become grossly barred by delay should not be encouraged by taking resort to filing representation one after the another so as to revive a dead cause of action. Para 14 to 18 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:-

Para 14:- In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, , this Court, after referring to C. Jacob (supra) has ruled that when a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court''s direction. Neither a court''s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.

Para 15:- From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time. In Karnataka Power Corporation Limited through its Chairman and Managing Director and Another Vs. K. Thangappan and Another, , the Court took note of the factual position and laid down that when nearly for two decades the respondent-workmen therein had remained silent mere making of representation could not justify a belated approach.

Para 16:- In State of Orissa Vs. Pyarimohan Samantaray and Others, it has been opined that making of repeated representations is not a satisfactory explanation of delay. The said principle was reiterated in State of Orissa and Others Vs. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik and Others, .

Para 17:- ln Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Ghanshyam Dass and Others, , a three-judge, Bench of this Court reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana ((1977) 6 SCC 538) and proceeded to observe that as the respondents therein preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the tribunal in 1997, they would not get the benefit of the order dated 7.7.1992.

Para 18:- In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Seshachalam, , this Court testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus:-

........filing of representation alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant actor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.

In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, therefore the writ petition is devoid of merit and otherwise suffers from gross delay. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.