High CourtsSingle Bench(2010) 09 MAD CK 0076

L. Maran vs The Superintendent of Police, The Deputy Superintendent of Police and The Sub Inspector of Police

Madras High Court · Decided on 21 September 2010

HON’BLE JUDGES
K. Chandru, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition (MD) No. 11916 of 2010 and M.P. (MD) No''s. 1 and 2 of 2010

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

81 paragraphs · 1,774 words

K. Chandru, J.—Heard both sides. The Petitioner aggrieved by an action of the Respondents in refusing to permit him to hold a public

meeting on behalf of his party has come forward with the present writ petition. The Petitioner''s request to hold a public meeting on 20.09.2010 at

Managiri Village, Thiruppathur Taluk coming within the Natchiyarpuram Police Station limits was rejected on grounds of law and order and breach

of public peace. Since permission of the meeting was refused and due to the urgency involved, the matter was taken up. Notice was issued to the

learned Special Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Vijayakumar and he had taken instructions from the Respondents.

2.

The Petitioner claiming to be the District Organiser of ""Naam Thamizhar"", a political party, decided to organise a meeting to stop killings of

Fishermen belonging to Tamil Nadu and also to retrieve the Katchadeevu Island back to India. The meeting is to be addressed by their State

Coordinator and it was to be held on 20.09.2010 at 5.00 p.m. in Managiri Village. This was part of series of meetings held by that party all over

the Tamil Nadu. It is claimed that such meeting were held in a democratic fashion and in a peaceful manner.

3.

However, the Respondents by the impugned order refused to grant permission on two grounds. Firstly, in the Thiruppathur Sub Division, in

order to deal with law and order problem, Section 30(2) of the District Police Act is in force. Secondly, memorial day of Martyr

Immanuelsekaran, memorial day of Marudhupandiar brothers as well as Devar Guru Poojai are to take place during this period in this area.

Therefore, in all likelihood breach of law and order may take place. Hence if any permission is granted, then there will be a breach of public peace

and law and order.

4.

On notice, the learned Special Government Pleader stated that the authority had applied his mind and had refused permission to hold the

meeting. The court''s power to set aside the order is very limited. If at all the Petitioner wants to have a meeting, it could be done after Devar Guru

Poojai (incidentally, it falls on 30.10.2010). If one would go by the stand of the Respondent, the ban period starts from the memorial day of

Martyr Immanuelsekaran and ends with Devar Guru Poojai. Thus there will be no activity during those 45 days by other groups, which in no way

connected with creating problems in the sub division of Thiruppathur. It must be noted that there cannot be 45 days suspension of the fundamental

rights of the citizens including the Petitioner in that sub division.

5.

The power of the Respondents u/s 30 is one of regulating the meetings and processions. In the guise of regulatory powers, one cannot totally

suspend the rights of the citizens or keep it in an animated suspension. The Respondents will have to examine the request of each citizen on its own

merits and decide the issue. They cannot cloud it with either irrelevant factors or factors which are not germane to the issue on hand. Killings of

fishermen from Tamil Nadu by the Srilankan Navy or demand for retrieving Katchadeevu Island is not a new demand. Whenever there is killing of

fishermen of Tamil Nadu, such demands are revived in the State and there has been meetings and processions including direct actions on such issue

all over the State. It it not clear as to how the Respondents can link up such conduct of meetings for the issue which has not even remote

connection with the memorial days of Martyr Immanuelsekaran or Marudupandiar brothers or Devar Gurupoojai and how one can refuse

permission for such an innocuous request.

6.

The claim made by the Respondents that for the 45 days in the Sub Division, there can be no other activity only because of the three events

mentioned therein is not only preposterous proposition, but virtually subordinating every other issue to these three events which will be taking place

in a span of 45 days. It will be a sad day when such orders are sustained and Respondent police will be allowed to curtail the fundamental rights of

citizens of this part.

7.

In this context, it is necessary to refer to two decisions of this Court, which will have a bearing on the issue. The first judgment was in C.J.

Rajan, Madurai-2 v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mayiladuthurai and Anr. reported in 2008 (3) MLJ 926 . A division bench headed by P.K.

Misra, J. (as he then was) came down heavily upon the Respondent police in refusing permission to conduct meeting on irrelevant grounds.

8.

Subsequently, in Patchaimal K.T. v. The Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari and Ors. reported in 2009 W L.R. 65, after referring to the

legal and constitutional issue and precedent on the subject and relevant statutory provisions, this Court set aside the order of the police and

permitted demonstration to be conducted by the opposition party.

9.

In this context, it is necessary to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himat Lal K. Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and

Another, rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein, the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay

Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any

guidance under the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteed

under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the work ""regulating"" in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act would include

the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street.

Mathew, J., dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission

sought for holding a meeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various

rights in crowded public streets, and that the State can make regulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen and can impose

reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order.

10.

Further, the Supreme Court also in S. Rangarajan Vs. P. Jagjevan Ram and Others, held that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution of India means the right to express one''s own opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or is any one manner of ideas made through

any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger

interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance

between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interests specified under Article 19(2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of

expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court''s commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot

be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger

should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should

be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a ""spark in a

powder keg.

11.

Therefore, it is too late for the Respondents to refuse permission to hold a meeting on a matter of public importance. With respect to the

Respondents'' reliance upon Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, it can only be said that it enables the Respondents to direct the control and

conduct of all assemblies and processions on public road or in the public streets or thoroughfares and to prescribe the Rules by which and the

times by which the processions may pass and Section 30(2) and (3) on which reliance was placed, is extracted below:

Section 30(2): He may also, on being satisfied that it is intended by any persons or class of persons to convene or collect an assembly in any such

road, street or thoroughfare, or to form a procession which would, in the judgment of the Magistrate of the district, or of the sub-division of a

district, if uncontrolled, be likely to cause a breach of the peace, require by general or special notice, that the persons convening or collecting such

assembly or directing or promoting such procession shall apply for a licence.

(3)On such application being made, he may issue a licence, specifying the names of the licensees and defining the conditions on which alone such

assembly or such procession is to be permitted to take place, and otherwise giving effect to this section.

12.

Therefore, the said provision is only a regulatory power and not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police.

13.

A further contention that the Petitioner was not heard before passing of the order also assumes importance. In the light of the above facts of the

case and precedents set out above, this Court has no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the police. Accordingly, the impugned order will

stand set aside. In view of the fact that the meeting date has come to an end, the counsel for the Petitioner filed a memo, dated 20.9.2010, stating

that his client is willing to conduct a public meeting in the same village on 24.09.2010 between 5.00 p.m. and 09.30 p.m. Though the learned

Special Government Pleader stated that the Petitioner will have to make a fresh application, this Court do not think such requirement is necessary.

Once the impugned order is set aside, necessary and appropriate relief can be moulded by the court.

14.

In view of the stand taken by the Petitioner to postpone the meeting to other day, the Respondents are hereby directed to grant appropriate

permission to the Petitioner to hold a public meeting with sound facilities on 24.09.2010 between 05.00 p.m. and 09.30 p.m. at Managiri village,

Thiruppathur Taluk coming with the Natchiyarpuram Police Station limits. It is needless to state that the police should give appropriate police

protection for the conduct of such meeting.

15.

This writ petition will stand allowed with the above terms. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous

petitions stand closed.