High CourtsDivision Bench

Lachhman vs Ram Chand

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 23 January 1980 · Citation: (1981) 3 ILR (P&H) 257

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.C. Jain, C.J · Harbans Lal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 — Section 17A
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Letters Patent Appeal No. 178 of 1976 in Regular Second Appeal No. 379 of 1970
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Judgment

6 paragraphs · 630 words

Harbans Lal, J.—The regular second appeal filed by Ram Chand, Respondent, was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated March 24, 1976 and the suit for pre-emption was decreed. The present letters patent appeal is directed against the same.

2.

Briefly, the facts are that a suit for pre-emption was filed by Ram Chand, Respondent, son of Narain Dass, vendor, in respect of the sale of agricultural land through a registered sale deed dated November 8, 1966. The Plaintiff Respondent claimed superior right of preemption being the son of the vendor. The vendee, Lachhman Appellant; contested the suit on the ground that he was a tenant on the suit land at the time of the sale, in dispute and as such, the sale was not pre-emptible in view of Section 17-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, (hereinafter calico the Land Act). The plea of the vendee was negatived and the suit was decreed by the trial Court. The vendee, however, succeeded in appeal before the Additional District Judge who, though affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the Plaintiff Respondent being the son of the vendor had a superior right of pre emption, yet held that the status of the vendee at the time of the sale was that of a tenant and therefore, the sale was not pre-emptible. In the regular second appeal, the learned Single Judge reversed the finding of the first appellate Court in this regard and decreed the suit.

3.

It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, that the suit land had been given to the vendee on lease for 20 years by the Collector in 954, after taking the same from its owner, Lachhman, the Appellant, who is no other than the vendor of the same, under the provisions of the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act (hereinafter to be called the Utilization Act) and that the vendee had not been inducted on this land as a lessee by the vendor at any stage. It is quite evident from a perusal of the provisions of this Act, that the Collector is empowered to take possession of lands from their owners for the purpose of bringing them under cultivation and to transfer the same to some other persons as lessees for a period between 7 to 20 years. After the expiry of this period, the owners of the lands are entitled to be restored their possession During the period of lease by the Collector, however, the ownership of the land continues to be with the landowner. In these circumstances, there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the vendee Appellant assumed the status of a tenant under the landowner though he was brought on the suit land as a lessee by the Collector under the provisions of the Utilization Act.

4.

The other contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, that during the period of lease for 20 years the ownership of the landowner remained in abeyance and as such, he was not competent to sell the same and the sale, in dispute, was null and void, is also without merit. There is no provision in the Utilization Act according to which it could be held that the landowner ceased to have the right of ownership or that he was debarred from transferring this land by way of sale or otherwise. In these circumstances, the sale by the landowner cannot be held to be void or invalid in any manner. Both these contentions were rightly repelled by the learned Single Judge.

5.

No other point has been urged.

6.

Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.