Lachhman Singh Bhagwan Singh vs Inspector General of Police Govt.

Chopra, J.

1) The Petitioner was employed as Head-constable in the erstwhile Patiala State in 1947. On the formation of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union in 1948, he was intergraded as Head-constable in the Pepsu police. On 13-3-1949, he was promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector against a permanent vacancy, but was reverted to the original post by order of the Inspector General of Police dated 27-7-1953.

The order was conveyed to him on 31-7-1953. Temporary promotion of the Petitioner by the Superintendent of Police in October 1953 was se, aside by the Inspector General of Police and he was again demoted as Head-constable in December, 1953. It was during this period that the '' Petitioner was served with a notice under Clause ''(b) of Rule 4 of the Pepsu Civil Services (Safeguarding . of National Security) Rules, 2006 Bk., intimating that since the Petitioner was reasonably suspect-, ed to be engaged in subversive activities and his retention in service was prejudicial to national security he was liable to be compulsorily retired from service under Rule 3 of the said Rules.

The notice is dated 28-10-1953 and It required the Petitioner to submit his explanation within a fortnight of its receipt. The Petitioner submitted his explanation and denied the charges de tailed in the notice. While the proceedings in| pursuance of this notice was still pending, a new set of rules came into force. These are called the Pepsu Civil Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter to be referred to as ''Security Rules''). On coming into force of these Rules the Petitioner was served with a" fresh notice. It is dated 4-6-1954, and says:

Whereas for the reasons stated in the Annexure it is considered that (a) you are reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive activities and (b) you are associated with others in subversive activities, and that your retention in the public service is on that account prejudicial to national security, and that consequently it is proposed to retire you from service compulsorily under Rule 3 of the Pepsu Civil Services, (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954 (Copy enclosed), you are hereby directed to submit to the Rajpramukh, through the undersign ed, within 14 days of the receipt of this notice, any representation you wish to make against "he action proposed to be taken in regard to you.

Such representation, if any, will be consider ed by the Rajpramukh before appropriate order are passed. If you submit no representation'' within the time specified, it will be assumed that you have no representation to make against the proposed action and the Rajpramukh will proceed to pass appropriate orders on your case without any further reference to you.

It is proposed to place you under suspension, pending the conclusion of these proceedings. However, if you so wish, you will be permitted to proceed on such leave as may be admissible to you, with effect from 15-6-1954. You are hereby required to send intimation of your wishes in this behalf immediately.

You are further asked to state whether you wish to be heard in person before orders are passed on your case.

The annexure enumerated the six charges brought against the Petitioner. The Petitioner again submitted a detailed and lengthy explanation covering eighteen typed pages. Each one of the charges was denied and they were stated to be maliciously based upon the vindictive attitude of the Inspector General of Police towards the Petitioner. The Petitioner, in his explanation requested to be heard in person by the Rajpramukh and also to be allowed to examine certain police officers in his defence.

The Petitioner was called upon to appear before the Inspector General of Police on 2-8-1954 for being personally heard. He, however, declined to avail himself of the opportunity saying that he wanted to appear only before the Rajpramukh. The Inspector General of Police informed the Petitioner in reply that according to the Rules he could be personally heard by the Head of Department, which in his case, was the Inspector General Of Police.

The Petitioner again declined, and pressed that in case he could not be allowed a hearing by the Rajpramukh the matter may be decided at an early date on a consideration of the representation submitted by him. The Inspector General of Police, after considering the material placed before him and the Petitioner''s representation, reported that there were sufficient grounds for taking action under Rule 3 of the Security Rules and for ordering compulsory retirement of the Petitioner.

The matter was then placed before and considered by an Advisory Committee, consisting of the Chief Secretary, the Legal Remembrance and the Assistant Inspector General of Polios. The Committee arrived at the conclusion that the Petitioner

has been associated with Communist and Kisan Sabha workers engaged in subversive activities and that his retention in public service, namely the police, is on that account prejudicial to national security

and recommended that he may be compulsorily retired from service under the said Rules.

The case was thereafter placed before the Chief Minister with the Chief Secretary''s note that the Petitioner was found to be

engaged in subversive activities in so far as he has been associated with Communist and Kisan Sabha workers engaged in subversive activities.

and therefore deserved to be dealt with under Rule 3 and compulsorily retired from State service. This note bears the signature of the then Chief Minister dated 20-11-1954, indicating his approval. Orders compulsorily retiring the Petitioner were consequently issued by the Chief Secretary on 23-11-1954 and conveyed to the Petitioner.

In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioner questions the validity of this order and also of the order of his reversion dated 27-7-1953 and prays for their being quashed.

So far as the order of reversion is concerned, suffice it to say that the petition, presented on 1-2-1955, was very much delayed. The delay having not been properly explained, I re fused to hear the Petitioner on merits and the prayer is consequently rejected.

Rule 3 of the Security Rules says:

Where the Rajpramukh is of opinion that a Government servant is engaged in or is reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive activities or is associated with others in subversive activities and that his retention in the public service is on that account prejudicial . to national security, the Rajpramukh may make an order compulsorily retiring such Government servant from service,

Rule 4 provides the procedure for taking action under the Rules and lays down:

Before an order under Rule 3 is made:

(a) the competent authority shall by notice in writing inform the Government servant of the . action proposed to be taken in regard to him and give him an opportunity to make to the Rajpramukh, within such period as may be specified in the notice, representation in writing against the action; and

(b) the Rajpramukh shall take into consideration the representation, if any, so made by him.

According to its definition given in Clause (c) of Rule 2 "the competent, authority" in this case was the Inspector General of Polices.

Rule 5 requires the competent authority to place the Government servant against whom action is proposed to be taken under the Rules. under suspension and also to permit him to proceed on such leave as may then be admissible. Rule 6 expressly excludes the application of anything contained in the Pepsu Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1953, to the proceedings taken under these Rules.

Petitioner''s ground of attack is two fold: (1) that Rules 3 and 4 of the above Rules are ultra virus and void inasmuch as they are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, and (2) that the action taken against the Petitioner under the Rules is mala fide and deserves to be set aside. On the first point, Shri D.S. Nehra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the Rules are discriminatory inasmuch as they confer an arbitrary and unrestricted discretion on the Government to single out a State servant to be proceeded against under the Rules and thus to deprive him of the safeguards and advantages of the elaborate procedure laid down by the Pepsu Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules for taking disciplinary action against members of the Civil service.

Rule 7 of these general Rules, which lays down the procedure, provides that before any action Specified in the Rules is taken against any state servant the grounds on which it is proposed to take suchJaction shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges and communicated in writing to the person charged:

He shall- be required, within a reasonable time; to state in writing whether he admits the truth of all, or any, of the charges, and the explanation or defence, if any, he has to offer and whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires an oral inquiry shall be held at which all; evidence shall be heard as to such of the charges; as are not admitted.

The person charged shall, subject to certain restrictions, be entitled to cross-examine the wit-nesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. Where the charges are complicated, or special cause is shown, the officer conducting the inquiry may allow the person proceeded against to be represented by a counsel; After the inquiry is completed the accused officer is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report and to show cause against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted upon him. Right of appeal and revision is also given to the person proceeded against under these Rules.

The argument is that a person selected to be summarily dealt with under the Security Rules is deprived of the privileges of all these salutary provisions and has to satisfy himself by merely submitting a written explanation, which may or may not be accepted.

Article 14, it is contended, not only applies to substantive laws but to procedural laws as well, and since the Security Rules lay down a procedure which is very much less advantageous to the person accused than the ordinary procedure and since the State Government is left free to make any arbitrary selection of the person, to be proceeded against under the Rules, the Rules are hit by Article 14 and therefore void.

Article 14 of the Constitution reads:

The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

According to Shri Verma, learned A.A.G., the word "law" in this article means State made law or law enacted by a State, and does not include ''rules'' made by the State. Reliance in this connation is placed on A.K. Gopalan Vs. The State of Madras, and The State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, The question in both these cases related to the interpretation of the word "law" as used in Article 21 of the Constitution and the contention was that it included "the immutable and universal principles of natural justice" as well. The contention was repelled and it was held that the word "law" '' in Article 21 only means "positive or state made law".

8.Part III of the Constitution relates to Fundamental Rights and Clause (2) of Article 13, which falls in this chapter, enjoins

The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights, conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

As provided by its Clause (3) (a), the word "law" in this article, unless the context otherwise requires, includes "any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law" Any rule made by a State would thus be unconstitutional and void under this article so far as it takes away or abridges any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.

Certain rules made by the Madras Government regulating admissions to Medical and Engineering Colleges of the State on communal basis were in question before the Supreme Court in - The State of Madras Vs. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, On behalf of the State, it was urged that the provisions of Article 29 which occurs in Part III, have to be read along with other articles in the Constitution, including Article 46 which charges the State with promoting with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and with protecting them from social injustice and all form of exploitation.

The argument, therefore, was that having regard to the provisions of Article 46, the State was entitled to maintain the "Communal Government order" fixing proportionate seats for different communities, and if because of that order, the Petitioners were unable to get admission into the educational institutions there was no infringement of their fundamental rights. The contention was completely rejected with the observation that the chapter of Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any Legislative or Executive act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate article in Part III and that the directive principles of State policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the character of Fundamental Rights.

The contention of Mr. Verma that the State Government while framing any rules could altogether, ignore the Fundamental Rights recognized by Chapter III of the Constitution must, therefore, be rejected.

I do not also see any force in the contention that all legislation by virtue of Article 309 of the Constitution is to be "subject to the provisions of the Constitution" the interim rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of the State employees, framed by the Governor or Rajpramukh under the proviso to Article 309, need not be subject to the provisions of the Constitution.

Acts of the appropriate Legislature under Article 309, and, till such legislation, the rules framed by the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State under the Proviso shall be only so far they are in conformity with the other provisions of the Constitution, including those relating to Fundamental Rights. Rules for the interim period can only be framed by the Governor or Rajpramukh in the matters and subject to he restrictions on which the State can legislate. The powers of the Rajpramukh or Governor under the proviso cannot run beyond those of the State Legislature under the article.

On behalf of the State, it is next contended that as laid down by Article 310 of the Constitution, civil servants hold office not during their good behaviour but only during the pleasure of the Governor or Rajpramukh, as the case may be, and if it pleases the Government to frame a rule that the services of a public servant, who is found or suspected to be engaged in subversive activities prejudicial to national security, may be dispensed with or that he may be ordered to retire, there would be nothing illegal in such a rule and it would not offend the provisions of Article 14.

The argument is that persons accused of being engaged in subversive activities may form a class by themselves and for the purpose of safeguarding national security they may be dealt with separately. The Security Rules apply equally to persons falling in this class and there is nothing wrong in providing a special and short-circuited procedure for the satisfaction of Rajpramukh for taking action under the Rules. Undoubtedly, the contention has much force.

The principle of equality before the law or the equal protection of law does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who arc not, by nature of circumstances, in the same position. Equality before the law does not mean an absolute equality for every one, under all circumstances,, and in every matter, for that may be an impossibility.

Classification would be permissible if it is based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained. The responsibility for maintaining law and order in the State and for the matter of that to curb subversive activities prejudicial to national security, rests primarily on the Government of a State.

For this, the State may select one or a few of the depravities for suppression or to be specially dealt with. The article does not prohibit the Legislature from enacting a special law to combat special evils. To meet different situations and solve different problems that arise in the affairs of a State, the State may enact, appropriate laws or make necessary rules, where and if so empowered.

These laws or rules, though applicable to a specified class or persons, will not be repugnant to the requirements of the article, provided they bear a reasonable relation to the object in view. Discrimination of State employees engaged in subversive activities involving danger to national security as a special class, and dealing with them separately, cannot be regarded as an unreasonable classification.

Rules of procedure laid down by law do come within Article 14 of the Constitution quite as much, as a. substantive law and it is, therefore, necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with out discrimination. But at the same time, the principle of reasonable classification is equally applicable to procedural as well as to substantive law, and it is competent to the State to make different provisions as to procedure to suit different types of cases.

The establishment of special courts or allowing special procedure to deal with special types of cases will not per se be an infringement of this article. Hence, to prescribe a special procedure for dealing with acts and conduct unlawful in themselves, and of a kind specially dangerous to national security, would be defensible on the principle of reasonable classification.

There is yet another aspect of the matter. No one can have a fundamental right to be appointed to or retained in any particular service. Article 310 of the Constitution lays down that every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State, holds office during the pleasure of the Governor or, as the case may be, the Rajpramukh of the State.

The pleasure, however, is made subject to the provisions of the Constitution or may be fettered by an appropriate legislation. Article 309 empowers the Legislature of a State, or its Governor or Rajpramukh, to enact laws or make rules with a view to regulate the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed to public service and posts in the State.

If it pleases that Governor or Rajpramukh to frame a rule that he will not retain in service or shall retire a public servant who is found or is reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive activities, there would be nothing illegal or unconstitutional in such a rule. The rule would be within the powers of the Governor or Rajpramukh and in consonance with the principle embodied in Article 310.

A special procedure for satisfaction of the Governor or Rajpramukh, or the authority appointed by him, that a public servant is so engaged may also, for the same reason, be provided. The complaint that the rule abridges or simplifies the procedure provided for imposing certain other penalties would be unfounded and unacceptable.

The satisfaction is to be of the Governor or Rajpramukh and he has the authority to decide how and in what manner he is to be satisfied that a public servant is not fit to be retained to service. Where he proposes to reduce a public servant in rank or to remove or dismiss him from service, requirements of Article 310 (2) have to be observed. He is free to take any other action he likes and in the manner he may provide.

The Pepsu Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules have a different scope and deal with different matters. Rule 4 of these Rules enumerates the various penalties which may be imposed upon members of the services in the State, retirement being not one of them. Rule 7 lays down the procedure to be followed for affording reasonable opportunity of showing'' cause against the proposed action. Where the penalty proposed to be imposed is one of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.

This includes the framing and communicate of charge or charges, hearing of evidence in presence, - examination of defence, etc. etc. se Rules have no application to the case of public servant who is proposed to be retired on ground that, in the opinion of the Rajpra-kh, he is engaged in or is reasonably suspect-to be engaged in subversive activities and his ention in public service is, on that account, judieial to national security.

Even if his case be covered by and can be lit with under the Pepsu Civil Service (Pu-hment and Appeal) Rules, there is nothing one in making a special provision to deal with chases because of their seriousness and runny of the, matter involved. The gravity of the are varies according to its nature and the sition which the offender holds at the time to not the charge relates.

The entire criminal law in our country proeds on the basis of classification or offences of trivial offences a summary procedure is escribed, for those a little graver in character commons-case procedure is laid down; for of necks still'' more, serious there is the warrant-se procedure and filially there comes a reburials in a Court of Sessions.

In my opinion, therefore, the Security ales are not hit by the inhibition laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution. They cannot also be lessoned as violating, this Article merely be-use they_ may be regarded as conferring cer in amount of discretion on the Executive.

Now coming to the merits of the case, Rule 3 of the Security Rules applies where, in re opinion of the Rajpramukh, the officer concerned:

(i) is engaged in subversive activities, or

(ii) is reasonably suspected to be engaged subversive activities, or

(iii) is associated with others in subversive activities, and his retention in the public service on that account prejudicial to national security. There can be, and there is, no dispute regarding the first two contingencies. The third condition, taken singly, requires that before a person can be punished by virtue of that rule he must be "associated with others in subversive activities.

The plain and simple meaning of this part if the rule is that the person should be associated with others ''in their subversive activities''; his association with persons who are engaged in subversive activities alone would not be sufficient; t is his association, in the subversive activities of theirs that is made punishable.

A person cannot be punished under this rule merely because he meets, dines or is on visiting terms with persons who are engaged in subversive, activities. I cannot, therefore, accept the'' interpretation intended to be placed on it by learned Counsel for the State. According to him, the clause simply means that the person should be associated with others who are engaged in subversive activities.

That would be adding something to what is actually stated, which is by no means permissible under the well recognized canons of interpretation of laws. The rule would have been differently worded if it was meant to convey that his mere association with certain persons was sufficient to bring the conduct of a public servant within it''s purview.

Shri Verma has drawn my attention to an Office Memorandum issued by the Chief Secretary only a day after the promulgation of the Security Rules, viz. on 5-5-1954. Besides issuing certain other instructions, the Chief Secretary in Clause 3 of this Memorandum says that membership of or association with any of the organizations enumerated therein will be considered a good ground for taking action against a Government servant under the Security Rules.

The Communist Party of India is mentioned as one of them. The subject of the Memorandum is described as "Pepsu Civil Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954; Instructions for dealing with Government servants engaged in or associated with subversive acivilitities".

This by itself means that the Government servant to be dealt with under the Rules should be "engaged in or associated with subversive activities", and not only associated with persons who are engaged in subversive activities. The fact that the Chief Secretary places a different interpretation on the rule and issues instructions which are not strictly covered by the rule does not tantamount to bringing about a change in the rule itself, and is of no material consequence.

The rule has to be interpreted according to its plain meaning, and it means nothing short of what has been stated above.

On behalf of the Petitioner, it is strenuously urged that the charges communicated to the Petitioner have no connation with the conditions laid down in Rule 3 of the Security Rules, and no action could therefore be taken against him under that rules. It is pointed out that previously too the Inspector General of Police, on three different occasions, instituted depart mental inquiries against the-Petitioner, in each of which the latter was exonerated, and that twice the Petitioner was reverted as Head-cons table under orders of the same officer.

Placing his reliance on these successive ad verse orders, Shri D.S. Nehra wishes to conclude that the Inspector General of Police must have borne some personal grudge against the Petitioner and that the present action was one of the series of the Petitioner''s victimization of; that account.

The Petitioner has not been able to point out any cause whatsoever for the alleged ill will, nor is there any indication of it in any of the orders. But it has still to be seen whether the action in question does or. does not fall within the four-corners of Rule 3; and that necessitates an examination of the charges on which the action was based and the various orders made during those proceedings.

It is common ground between the par ties that the charges have nothing to do with the first two alternatives of Rule 3, and Shri Verma frankly concedes that they would have no connation with the third condition as well, if the interpretation that he places on the rule be not accepted.

The charges only relate to the Petitioner''s association with persons who or organizations which are supposed to be. engaged in subversive activities. They do not accuse the Petitioner of having at any time taken any part in their subversive activities. In view of the admission, it may not be necessary to critically examine each one of the charges; I would, however, like to advert briefly to them.

The first charge says that the Petitioner, before joining service, worked as an office secretary of the District Kishan Sabha, Sunam, (a Communist sponsored body) and that he had close associations with certain ring leaders of the Communist Party.

The second charge also relates to the period before the Petitioner joined service and tells him that he and his wife were members of the Communist party and that "your marriage was the result of love affairs during your association as members of the same party". It may be remembered that the Petitioner joined the pre-, sent service in 1947. Action for his or his wife having been a member of a particular party be fore 1947 is being taken in 1954.

Past conduct of a person may sometimes be useful to explain his present activities, but it has then to be shown that at no time thereafter he had improved or changed his views. The fact that at one time the Petitioner worked as the office Secretary of the Kishan Sabha or that he was once a member of the Communist party was within the knowledge of the authorities when he was appointed.

The Station House Officer had reported to that effect on Petitioner''s application, and in spite of it he was accepted for service. Two years later that is in 1949 one of the accusations in an inquiry against the Petitioner was that before joining service he worked as secretary to the Kishan Sabha and was a member of the Communist party. The inquiry resulted in favour of the Petitioner and he was exonerated of the charge. In a Commendation Certificate granted to the Petitioner on 17-2-1950, Superintendent of Police (C.I.D.) Patiala, stated:

I feel pleased to record my keen and high appreciation of A.S.I. Lachhman Singh who by the dint of his grasp of eventful political currents and cross-currents, his power of understanding and forthright uprightness of character impressed me more than an average man of normal intelligence could. I have every hope that this young promising, officer will earn good name through his industry and integrity in future.

The charge that more than seven years earlier he was a member of the Communist party would |have no importance for purposes of the present proceedings.

Charge No. 3 accuses the Petitioner (1) of having been on visiting terms with one Giani Bachan Singh when the latter was on parole and (2) Of his having leaked out certain official in- formation to the Communist workers of village Kishangarh. The first part of the charge has no relation to the requirements of the rule.

The second one is too vague to convey much sense. It does not disclose the information said'' to have been leaked out It might have been with respect to the transfer or an ordinary visit of a police officer, or some such other minor or unimportant matter. Howsoever deplorable the-leaking out of official information by a public servant may be, that by itself would not bring the case within the ambit of Rule 3.

The person accused of it may be depart-mentally dealt with under some other law or set of rules, but his case would fall under the Security Rules only if it were further shown that the information was such as could or should have been helpful to those to whom it was conveyed in their subversive activities. It will be-only then that he would be regarded as associating with them in their subversive activities.

The fourth charge reads:

During the days of elections you met the women workers of the C.P.I, in the house they were putting up at village Kishangarh.

It would simply be a repetition to say that mere meeting the workers of a particular party would not amount to taking part in their subversive activities. The meetings might have been to dissuade "the women workers" from voting in favour of a candidate of their party. Even if it were otherwise, there is nothing unlawful or illegal in supporting a member of any political party in elections.

In 1952, an enquiry had been instituted against the Petitioner regarding his failure to send timely report of the cutting of certain trees-belonging to the Biswedars of village Kishangarh to his Station House Officer. When this inquiry was going on the Petitioner is alleged to have written a letter to his brother Sardar Jagjit Singh Sohal, an agent of the Communist paper "Nya Zamana", Jullundur, seeking his help in the matter under inquiry. This forms the basis of the fifth charge.

The fifth and the last charge does not relate to any conduct of the Petitioner himself. It merely says that his brother S. Jagjit Singh wrote a letter to one of his friends, a Communist, to try to get the Petitioner, who had been suspended, reinstated.

It is thus manifest that none of the charges has any relation to the requirements of Rule 3 of the Security Rules.

The notice given to the Petitioner merely reiterated the last two conditions of Rule 3 and. stated that (a) the Petitioner was reasonably suspected to be engaged in subversive activities, and (b) he was associated with others in subversive activities. The Inspector General of Police, in his report dated 7-8-1954 recommending-further action, did not clarify as to which of these two conditions was fulfilled. He concluded his recommendation in the following terms-

After thoroughly considering the material brought against the suspect and the representation made by him, I think there are sufficient grounds for taking further action against hint and therefore recommend that orders for his compulsory retirement may please be issued.

The matter was considered by the Advisory Committee. The opinion that the Committee formed is expressed in its report dated 28-10-1954 thus:

The Committee after full consideration of his representation and the whole case are of the considered opinion that HC Lachhman Singh No. 2380 of the Police Department, Pepsu, has been associated with Communist and Kisan Sabha workers engaged in subversive activities and that his retention in the public service, namely the Police, is on that account prejudicial to national security, and recommend that he may be compulsorily retired from service Under Rule 3 of the Pepsu Civil Services (Safeguarding of National Security)Rules, 1954.

The note dated 17-11-1954 prepared by the Chief Secretary for orders of the Chief Minister says

It was reported that H.C. Lachhman Singh was engaged in subversive activities in so far as'' he has been associated with Communist and Kisan Sabha workers engaged in subversive activities. The case was fully examined by the Advisory Committee consisting of the Chief Secretary, Legal Remembrancer and the Assistant Inspector General of Police Incharge C.I.D. set up for the purpose and they have recommended that his retention in the public service, namely police, on account of his above-mentioned conduct is prejudicial to national security and that he may be compulsorily retired from service tinder Rule 3 of the Pepsu Civil Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954." This note was simply signed by the Chief Minister by way of his approval and it forms the final order passed against the Petitioner.

The report of the Advisory Committee and the final order clearly show that the guilt found to be proved against the Petitioner was that he had been associating with Communist and Kisan Sabha workers who were engaged in subversive activities, and it was on that account that his retention in service was regarded as prejudicial to national security and action was taken against him Under Rule 3 of the Security Rules. The order is thus based upon a wrong interpretation of the rule, and it does not fulfill its essential conditions.

It is correct that the satisfaction of Rule 3 of the Security Rules is that of the Rajpra-mukh and it is not open to court to substitute its own judgment for that of the State Government. Sufficiency or adequacy of facts on which the satisfaction is based is not a question that can be agitated in court.

But the court is, entitled to see whether the grounds have any relevancy to the requirements of the rule or fall within its ambit. The court can also examine the material in order to ascertain whether the conclusion reached by the State Government is one which could possibly and treasonably be reached.

In a case u/s 3 of the Preventive Detention Act from this State, - Sodhi Shamsher Singh and Others Vs. The State of Pepsu and Others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observe:

It has been held by this Court, on more occasions than one, that the propriety or reasonableness of the satisfaction of the Central or the State Government upon which an order for detention u/s 3, Preventive1 Detention Act is based, cannot be raised in this Court and we can- not be invited to undertake an investigation into sufficiency of the matters upon which such satisfaction purports to be grounded.

We can, however, examine the grounds disclosed by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, namely, the prevention of objects prejudicial to the defence of India or to the security of State and maintenance of law and order therein.

Even though no dishonest motive can be imputed, the order may yet be mala fide if it is bad for want of necessary care and caution, or is passed for some purpose other than the one for which it could have been made.

I have no hesitation to agree with Mr. Verma that the tenure of the Petitioner''s service was at the pleasure of the Rajpramukh and that his services could be terminated, even without showing any cause, under some other set of rules framed by the State in this connation. But that does not make any difference, for the action has been taken under the rules which have no application and the Petitioner''s services have been terminated on a serious charge. As the rights of the Petitioner have been clearly infringed, it is a fit case in which the writ must issue.

In the result, the petition is allowed to the extent that a writ will issue quashing the order dated 23-11-1954 by which the Petitioner was retired from State service. The Petitioner shall get his costs. Counsel fee shall be Rs. 100/-.